"A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with App" by Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller
 

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Fall 1990

Abstract

In this article we follow the recent developments of the modern theory of administrative agencies, by developing a rational choice theory of the Supreme Court. Our framework combines two of the main characteristics of this literature: namely, the rational choice modeling strategy with the notion that institutions matter in the design of public policy. We differ basically by modeling the Supreme Court as a self-interested, ideologically motivated institution, making its decisions subject not to the traditional legal rules of precedent, but to the constraints arising from the political interests of other institutions of government-namely, Congress and the President.

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