Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and Bundled Discounting

Authors

Thom Lambert, University of Missouri School of LawFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2011

Abstract

This article asserts a comprehensive response to Elhauge’s provocative arguments. With respect to tying, the article shows that governing Supreme Court precedent does not deem the non-foreclosure “power” effects of the practice to be anticompetitive and that those effects are unlikely to reduce social welfare in the long run, especially after accounting for dynamic efficiencies. With respect to bundled discounting, the article shows that Elhauge’s proposed liability rule is both inapposite to consumer harm and inadministrable and that both “linked” market foreclosure and a form of below-cost pricing are necessary for anticompetitive harm and should therefore be prerequisites to antitrust liability.

Recommended Citation

Thomas A. Lambert, Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and Bundled Discounting, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 909 (2011)