Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics, and Negotiations Approach

Authors

Rafael Gely, University of Missouri School of LawFollow
Leonard Bierman, University of TexasA & M Mays BusinessFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Spring 1995

Abstract

In this article, we directly attack Professors Wachter and Cohen's assertion regarding the economic efficiency of the Mackay doctrine. Applying internal and external labor market analysis, we argue that the Mackay doctrine is economically inefficient because it allows employers to behave “opportunistically” with respect to employees that have made “firm-specific” investments in their employing firms. To remedy this problem we propose a new “negotiations approach,” the components of which are: (1) the statutory overruling of Mackay, and (2) the concomitant amendment of the NLRA to make the striker replacement issue a “mandatory” subject of collective bargaining.

Recommended Citation

Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics, and Negotiations Approach, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 363 (1995)