Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Fall 2000

Abstract

The article starts by reviewing, in Part II, the history of the regulation of political activities by public employees, and in Part III, the regulation of patronage. Part IV develops the argument that both sets of regulations, although justified on different grounds, are better understood as political control mechanisms. Part V provides some empirical evidence for this argument by examining voting patterns on federal legislation restricting public employees' political activities. Part VI discusses the relationship of these laws to public sector unionization. Part VII concludes the article.

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