Document Type
Article
Publication Date
Spring 2020
Abstract
A divided panel of jurists on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit invalidated Tennessee's caps on punitive damages in Lindenberg v. Jackson National Life Insurance Company on December 21, 2018. The Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane, denied an application to rehear the case. A year later, the United States Supreme Court denied the petitions for writs of certiorari of both Jackson National Life Insurance Company and the State of Tennessee. Meanwhile, the Tennessee Supreme Court heard a challenge, via certified question from the Middle District of Tennessee, to the Volunteer State's statutory limits on non-economic damages. In early 2020, a divided court held the caps did not violate the Tennessee Constitution's protections for litigants' right to a trial by jury, separation of powers, or equal protection. Accordingly, the law of damage caps in Tennessee remains unsettled. The court of last resort on issues of state law, the state supreme court, has issued a ruling that seemingly conflicts with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the state's constitution; however, the Tennessee Supreme Court majority, while acknowledging the Sixth Circuit's opinion in a footnote, explicitly chose not to address any issues of punitive damages.6 Therefore, the constitutionality of Tennessee's punitive damage limits is currently unsettled, and this situation presents a rare state-circuit split of authority.
This essay attempts to reconcile the two opinions to determine the law on Tennessee punitive damage caps and the right to a jury, as well as to caution against the ambiguities caused by state-circuit splits. Of course, the Sixth Circuit's opinion is not binding on Tennessee courts. However, it is persuasive authority that runs contrary to a recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision. It is, consequently, necessary to detangle this jurisprudence to distill some clarity. This analysis proceeds in five parts: first, this introduction; second, an examination of the Sixth Circuit's Lindenberg opinion; third, a brief summary of the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in McClay; fourth, a consideration of the state of the law; and, fifth, a contemplation on the future of Tennessee punitive damage caps, state-circuit splits in the Sixth Circuit, and other conclusions.
Recommended Citation
Bailey D. Barnes,
State-Circuit Split: Reconciling Tennessee Damage Caps after Lindenberg and McClay, 2 Courts & Justice Law Journal 201
(2020).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs/1282