This Article explores that conundrum. Part I introduces the preliminaries of removal, remand, and Congress’s no-review directive, supplying an orientation to the background of these concepts, their purpose, and their operation. Part II discusses the only appellate resolution to have ever squarely confronted this question, the Fourth Circuit’s opinions in Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Co. Part III conducts the statutory analysis to evaluate whether Congress has indeed enacted a statute that actually forestalls the federal judiciary’s ability to protect itself against fraud in the remand process. After exploring the nuances of the statute’s language, the guide of “ordinary meaning,” and the lessons of congressional intent, this Article concludes that, notwithstanding the seemingly absolutist, prohibitory language of Congress’s no-review statute, deceptively-induced remands can be vacated by the courts. Part IV considers the potential impacts of such a conclusion and finds that a robust, longstanding body of existing law serves to ensure stability and predictability in this use of the vacatur power.
William M. Janssen,
Remands by Deception,
81 Mo. L. Rev.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/18