Abstract
Prior to Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., courts had interpreted Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 to apply both to purchasers of IPOs and to aftermarket purchasers who could "trace" their purchases to reliance on a defective initial registration statement. The Gustafson decision has brought into question the viability of the tracing doctrine given the noted purpose behind the 1933 Act. This Note examines evolution of the tracing doctrine and the impact that Gustafson has and will have on that doctrine.
Recommended Citation
Robert L. Ortbals Jr.,
Continuation of the Tracing Doctrine: Giving Aftermarket Purchasers Standing under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 - Lee v. Ernst & (and) Young, LLP, The,
68 Mo. L. Rev.
(2003)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss3/5