Abstract
Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent argues that U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission was wrongly decided. Congressional “negatives,” including the Compact Clause invert the default rule for constitutionally suspect classes of state laws. Whereas ordinary state laws are permitted to go into (and remain in) effect unless and until Congress or the courts exercise their authority under the Supremacy Clause to state agreements that encroach on federal supremacy—which are unlawful in any event—the Supreme court has re-inverted the constitutional presumption and emptied the Compact Clause of all content. This Article explains the forgotten constitutional logic and wisdom of the Compact Clause and argues for a Compact Clause jurisprudence that will safeguard constitutional purposes.
Recommended Citation
Michael S. Greve,
Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent,
68 Mo. L. Rev.
(2003)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/1