Abstract
This Article begins with a brief exploration of the philosophy of science that is laid out in the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho cases. It then proceeds to examine the question, “what is science”? A related section considers the disadvantages and ironic results of the Daubert-Kumho definition of science. Next, the Article considers the characteristics of a good scientific theory or model. It compares the resulting criteria to those set out in Daubert and its progeny and shows how the Supreme Court’s philosophy can produce dubious consequences. A final section sets out the conclusions, which include the possibility that the Supreme Court could have avoided some of the confusion in Daubert if it had confined itself to interpreting the rule that was at issue.
Recommended Citation
David Crump,
Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science, The,
68 Mo. L. Rev.
(2003)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss1/6