Abstract
This Comment addresses the supervisory power generally, and it specifically focuses on how the existence of the Court’s supervisory power jurisprudence created a conundrum for the Rehnquist Court’s attempt to preserve the Miranda warnings. Part II traces the history and development of the supervisory power as an independent basis for decision and the alleged sources of this power. Part III analyzes the Court’s decision in Dickerson v. United States, including Justice Scalia’s dissent, within the context of Miranda and Section 3501. Finally, Part IV discusses why the Court chose to constitutionalize the Miranda warnings, instead of invoking it supervisory power, to maintain Miranda as the proper standard governing the admissibility of custodial confessions.
Recommended Citation
Nathan E. Ross,
Nearly Forgotten Supervisory Power: The Wrench to Retaining the Miranda Warnings, The,
66 Mo. L. Rev.
(2001)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss4/4