The last decade has proven to be a landmark era in the area of corporate mergers and acquisitions.' Perhaps the most rapid development in this area has been in the growth of antitakeover devices to defend against unwanted, hostile takeover attempts. The most noteworthy of the devices developed has been the share purchase rights plan. Since its inception in 1983, the use of the share purchase rights plan, or "poison pill" as it is more commonly known, as a defensive mechanism against hostile tender offers has generated much controversy and debate in the legal and business communities. The purpose of this Article is to analyze the poison pill and use it as a vehicle to examine other important topics in the area of corporate mergers and acquisitions, all as reviewed by the Delaware Court of Chancery and, where pertinent, by the Delaware Supreme Court.

Included in

Law Commons



To view the content in your browser, please download Adobe Reader or, alternately,
you may Download the file to your hard drive.

NOTE: The latest versions of Adobe Reader do not support viewing PDF files within Firefox on Mac OS and if you are using a modern (Intel) Mac, there is no official plugin for viewing PDF files within the browser window.