Abstract
In 1960, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. United States, the first full discussion of standing in a search and seizure case. That case declared that, in order to qualify as a "person aggrieved" by an unlawful search and seizure, one must have been the victim of a search and seizure, and that same person must be the one against whom the search was directed (as distinguished from one who was prejudiced only through the use of the evidence gathered as a result of a search and seizure directed at someone else). Thus, Jones changed the requirement as to the necessary proprietary interest in the property seized or the premises searched. The proprietary interest requirement was greatly liberalized by removing the common law property concepts. Following Jones, anyone legitimately on the premises where a search occurs may challenge the legality of the search; and, at least in cases where the indictment itself charges possession, the accused may move to suppress the illegally seized evidence without asserting an interest in the property seized. The question of standing to object to illegally seized evidence has occupied attention of writers for many years. Since the important decision of Jones v. United States" much of the writers' concern has been directed toward examining the merits of the standing requirement, and toward predicting the consequences of the Jones decision. It is the purpose of this comment to determine the effect of the Jones decision on the issue of standing.
Recommended Citation
Jill Bredeman Steps,
Standing to Object to Unreasonable Search and Seizure,
34 Mo. L. Rev.
(1969)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol34/iss4/6