Fallacy of Duffield v. Robertson and Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch: The Continuing Viability of Mandatory Pre-Dispute Title VII Arbitration Agreements in the Post-Civil Rights Act of 1991 Era, The

Authors

Kristen Decker
William Krizner

Abstract

Two recent decisions, one in the Ninth Circuit and one in a Massachusetts District Court, have erroneously held that mandatory Title VII pre-dispute arbitration clauses are unenforceable under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.' A statutory construction analysis of the 1991 Civil Rights Act demonstrates that Congress did not intend to abolish the use of such clauses. Instead, Congress intended to support the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration as a valid and useful forum for the resolution of disputes arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The purpose of the following Article is twofold. First, this Article will present a persuasive critique of the arguments presented in the Duffield and Rosenberg decisions and offer an alternative interpretation of the statutory intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Second, this Article will demonstrate that enforcement of predispute agreements to arbitrate statutory employment claims is in the best interest of both the public and the parties involved in employment disputes.

Recommended Citation

Kristen Decker and William Krizner, Fallacy of Duffield v. Robertson and Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch: The Continuing Viability of Mandatory Pre-Dispute Title VII Arbitration Agreements in the Post-Civil Rights Act of 1991 Era, The, 1998 J. Disp. Resol. (1998)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1998/iss2/2