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Pragmatism over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence

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ARTICLE

Pragmatism Over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence

Lee Reeves* **

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INTRODUCTION

These are rough times for employment discrimination plaintiffs in federal court. Overtly discriminatory employment practices are largely a relic of the past, and direct evidence of discrimination is rarely available. The disappearance of the most obvious forms of discrimination has ushered in new challenges for employment discrimination plaintiffs. Plaintiffs today typically face the daunting prospect of ferreting out discrimination where, at least at first glance, none seemingly exists. In order to prevail, then, plaintiffs in most cases must expose as pretextual an employer's seemingly innocuous explanation for taking a contested adverse employment action. For their part, judges have been increasingly reluctant to wade into this he-said, she-said quagmire. Over the last twenty-five years, federal district and appellate judges have interposed a variety of substantive and procedural obstacles making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in employment discrimination cases. Why they have done so is a matter of considerable debate.

Many scholars have argued that the judiciary's decreasing receptivity to employment discrimination claims is attributable either entirely or predominantly to the fact that the judiciary has become more ideologically conservative. Proponents of this position note that the Republican Party has won seven

of the ten presidential elections since Title VII's inception, and therefore conclude that the judiciary's recent skepticism of employment discrimination claims stems from the fact that the federal bench has become increasingly composed of persons who are, on the whole, inclined to take a dim view of employment discrimination claims. I seek to dispute that hypothesis as incomplete at best and to offer a competing theory. Specifically, I argue (i) that employment discrimination jurisprudence is properly viewed not as a holistic entity, but rather as a series of circuit-specific creations; and (ii) that each circuit's employment discrimination jurisprudence is influenced by two factors, total workload per judge and employment discrimination filings per judge. At the very least, ends-oriented, ideological considerations are insufficient to explain the broader body of lower court employment discrimination jurisprudence over the past twenty-five years.

This Article has five parts. After considering empirical evidence, Part I concludes that judges' political ideology plays only a limited role in their decisionmaking. Part II identifies the increase in case filings over the last two decades as a likely non-ideological cause of the increased judicial skepticism towards claims of employment discrimination. This Part begins by examining aggregate trends in the district and appellate caseload and then translates caseload into the more meaningful metric of workload. Part II next evaluates various steps courts have taken to handle these workload increases. Finally,

had created a federal bench "that is unsympathetic and often openly hostile" to civil rights and sexual orientation discrimination claims); Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1269-70 (1993) (arguing that a conservative Supreme Court's "restrictive[] reading" of civil rights law culminated in the "disastrous" decisions of the 1988 Term); John Valery White, The Activist Insecurity and the Demise of Civil Rights Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 785, 788 (2003) ("One easy explanation of the demise of civil rights law focuses on changes in the political temperament of judges in the federal judiciary since the election of President Reagan in 1980. This argument holds that conservative judges, hostile to civil rights, have simply undercut civil rights law. This is surely an accurate and compelling explanation . . ." (internal footnotes omitted)); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Dismantling Civil Rights: Multiracial Resistance and Reconstruction, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 523, 525-26 (2001-02) (asserting the existence of a "twenty-year conservative assault on civil rights" and an "on-going conservative legal-political effort to dismantle civil rights . . . that is] being achieved piecemeal through the federal courts"); Julie Mertus, Brief, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 135, 135 (1991-92) ("[In] civil rights cases today, a conservative and even hostile federal judiciary often has not played by the rules: judges have been unwilling or unable to listen to the facts. Many judges treat facts as mere distractions, acknowledging them only selectively to serve their own agendas."); Michael J. Songer, Note, Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact: The Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 272 (2005) ("The erosion of disparate impact doctrine is significantly attributable to conservative judges exploiting the ambiguous legal standards to decide cases in accordance with their ideological proclivities.").
Part II concludes with a discussion of why employment discrimination claims are particularly taxing on the lower federal courts.

Part III identifies two factors that appear to influence how receptive a given circuit is towards claims of employment discrimination: overall workload and the number of employment filings. This Part then examines the relative workloads of the courts of appeals and the district courts within a given circuit, as well as the number of employment discrimination filings across the circuits. Part III concludes that there are vast differences between the circuits in terms of both of these factors.

Parts IV and V compare the various approaches that the circuits have taken to some of the issues that commonly arise in employment discrimination cases. Together, these parts conclude that a circuit's interpretation of relevant statutory and procedural provisions correlates with its workload and the number of employment filings it handles. More precisely, these sections demonstrate that on balance, circuits with heavier workloads and greater numbers of employment discrimination filings have interpreted substantive law and procedural rules in a manner that is less receptive to employment discrimination claimants than have their counterparts in circuits with lesser workloads and fewer employment discrimination filings. The Article concludes with a few brief observations about the significance of the recent volume of employment discrimination claims as well as the prospect of reform.

I. THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL AFFILIATION AS AN EXPLANATORY VARIABLE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES

During its 1988 Term, the Supreme Court issued five decisions that sharply curtailed the ability of plaintiffs to prevail in employment discrimination cases.2 These decisions collectively capped a decade-long repudiation of pro-

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2. See Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 909 (1989) (holding that the statute of limitations in cases challenging discriminatory seniority systems began to run when the seniority system was adopted or changed, not when the claimant was subjected to the seniority system or when the claimant suffered injury as a result of the system); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763-64 (1989) (holding that parties who were not a party to an underlying action had no obligation to intervene to object to a consent decree and permitting such third parties to attack the agreement collaterally); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1989) (holding that claims of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibited discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, but not in the performance of contracts); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989) (holding that a defendant could escape liability for discrimination in “mixed motive” cases if it could show that a discriminatory motive was not the “but for” cause of the adverse action suffered by the employee); Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989) (requiring that an employment practice that has a disparate impact on a protected group under Title VII be supported by a “legitimate business justification,” rather than the more demanding “business necessity” test).
plaintiff doctrine that lower courts developed during the early days of Title VII. First adopted in the 1960s and 1970s by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, this so-called "southern jurisprudence" referred to courts' practice of construing procedural rules—most notably summary judgment—liberally in employment discrimination cases to give plaintiffs a better chance to prevail. The message running through this quintet of Supreme Court opinions was, in essence, that enough was enough. Courts should not tilt the playing field in the employee's favor, as it was no longer valid to presume that an adverse employment action resulted from unlawful discrimination.

Because several of the Court's opinions were sharply divided along perceived conservative-liberal fault lines, many commentators concluded that these decisions were part of the federal judiciary's larger ideologically-motivated campaign to roll back anti-discrimination laws (at least in the employment context). Congress's reaction to the Supreme Court's 1989 decisions was swift and decisive, and did nothing to dispel the notion that the battle over employment discrimination was political in nature. In the two years that followed, Congress twice passed bills to nullify the Supreme Court's employment discrimination decisions. President George H.W. Bush signed the latter of these two bills—the Civil Rights Act of 1991—into law. The political undertones of this interbranch tussle were not lost on observers. In each case, a slim majority of the Supreme Court, composed largely of justices appointed by Republican presidents, had issued in quick succession a spate of decisions uniformly unfavorable to employment discrimination plaintiffs over the dissent of the other four justices, most of whom were appointed by Democratic presidents. Thereafter, a Democratically-controlled Congress legislatively overruled these decisions, restoring various protections that the Supreme Court's decisions had stripped away.

Given this back and forth between Congress and the Court, it was a short analytical leap for many commentators to conclude that the federal judiciary's

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4. The Fifth Circuit refers to what are now the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which were divided by Congress on October 1, 1981.

5. While originally developed in the Fourth and old Fifth Circuits, many circuits outside the South quickly followed suit. See Blumrosen, *supra* note 3, at 342 (noting that "judges in the other circuits seemed to defer informally to their counterparts in the south who had intimately experienced the relationship between racial prejudice and employment practices").


7. President George H.W. Bush vetoed Congress's first attempt, calling the Civil Rights Act of 1990 a "quota bill." However, Bush subsequently signed into law a substantially similar proposal a year later, the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Congress's stated purpose of the 1991 Act was to overturn the recent decisions of the Supreme Court, which Congress viewed as improperly diluting important protections guaranteed by Title VII.
increasing skepticism of employment discrimination claims was ideologically motivated. Their argument has two parts. As a general matter, Democrats are liberals, and liberals are in favor of a broad construction of employment discrimination laws. Conversely, Republicans are conservatives, and conservatives generally favor a more narrow or literal interpretation of employment discrimination laws. Accepting these generalizations, as the ratio of Republican to Democratic judicial appointees has risen in recent years, the judiciary as a whole has become increasingly skeptical of employment discrimination claims.

This "partisan entrenchment" argument is premised on several assumptions, at least three of which are shaky. The first problematic assumption is that all Democratic and Republican appointees are ideologically fungible. The use of the political affiliation of the nominating president as a proxy for each judge's ideology is undoubtedly crude, as many nominees of both parties have views that do not toe the party line, so to speak. Moreover, the party line itself may change. That is, even to the extent that a judge's views do conform to the political ideology of the nominating president, the ideology of a given president may differ from other presidents from the same party. For these reasons, it is not at all clear that the political affiliation of a judge is a reliable predictor of how that judge will vote in every case.

The second dubious assumption is that a judge's ideology does not change over time. While many judges insist that their views had not changed during their tenure on the bench, empirical evidence supports a different conclusion.

8. Proponents of this theory maintain that [w]hen a party wins the White House, it can stock the federal judiciary with members of its own party, assuming a relatively acquiescent Senate. They will serve for long periods of time because judges enjoy life tenure.... They are temporally extended representatives of particular parties, and hence, of popular understandings about public policy and the Constitution. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1067 (2001).


10. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 123 (2006) (“As we have seen, some Republican presidents will appoint more conservative judges than others; and Clinton appointees are widely thought to be more conservative than Carter and Johnson appointees.”).

11. See, e.g., Jan Crawford Greenburg, Exclusive: Supreme Court Justice Stevens Remembers President Ford, ABC NEWS: NIGHTLINE, Jan. 2, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=2765753&page=1. In response to Greenburg’s question whether his views had remained consistent over his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens insisted that he was still the same conservative that Presi-
In a recent study of the twenty-six justices who have served on the Supreme Court for ten or more terms since 1937, all but four exhibited some degree of ideological drift during their tenure. No consistent pattern of change emerged: Twelve justices became more liberal, seven became more conservative, and three moved “in more exotic ways.” At the appellate level, one commentator has similarly found empirical evidence of ideological drift, but has concluded that, on balance, judicial appointees of every president from John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush have become increasingly conservative over time. Accordingly, even if one could accurately peg a judge’s ideological starting point, there is reason to believe that that judge’s views would change over time in ways that would defy prediction.

Third, the partisan entrenchment theory assumes that judges, whatever their ideology might be, vote in a manner consistent with that ideology. Otherwise, the balance of Republican to Democratic appointees in the federal judiciary would be of little or no consequence. It is one thing to say that ideology informs judicial decisionmaking; it is quite another to say that ideology is dispositive in most (or even a substantial fraction) of cases, particularly in the lower federal courts. To argue the latter requires the belief that judges subordinate their fidelity to the rule of law to their personal beliefs when deciding cases. Even those who subscribe to the partisan entrenchment theory stop short of claiming that judges’ ideological beliefs dictate how judges vote in the vast majority of cases. For all of these reasons, any argument based on the partisan entrenchment of the judiciary must be taken with a grain of salt, if not a barrel.

These caveats aside, it cannot seriously be disputed that at some level, Democratic presidents do nominate more ideologically liberal judges than Republican presidents. And for all of the limits of political affiliation as a predictor of judicial ideology, it is not clear that any better litmus test exists. At the very least, then, political affiliation is an objective, observable metric that provides a useful starting point for this discussion of why employment discrimination claimants have fared so poorly in recent times.

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13. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 121.
14. See infra note 45.
15. The partisan entrenchment argument also presumes that as a prerequisite for nomination, a judge must share, or at least be perceived to share, the ideology of the appointing president. While this is typically true, notable exceptions exist. See Epstein et al., supra note 12, at 1498-99 (noting that Eisenhower nominated the Catholic Brennan in an effort to curry favor with Catholic voters, and that Herbert Hoover nominated Benjamin Cardozo to the Supreme Court “not because of his ideology, but because of his stellar credentials”).
The lower federal courts have indeed become more conservative as measured by the ratio of Republican to Democratic appointees on the bench. In 1965, the year Title VII became effective, Democratic appointees accounted for slightly over 60% of federal district and appellate judges. That percentage increased over the next three years under President Johnson, who by the end of his administration had appointed a total of 41 appellate and 125 district judges. The next twelve years were more or less a wash in terms of net appointments for either party, as the Republican gains under the Nixon and Ford administrations were negated (and then some) by the explosive growth of the federal judiciary under President Carter, who appointed 56 appellate judges and 206 district court judges during his four years in office. By the end of the twelve years of the Reagan and Bush I administrations, however, the Republicans controlled a solid majority of the judiciary: Between them, Presidents Reagan and Bush I appointed 442 district judges and 115 appellate judges.

The pendulum swung back during the 1990s. President Clinton appointed 61 judges to the appellate bench and 306 judges to the district court bench. After Clinton's eight years in office, the numerical Republican advantage had been eliminated altogether at the district court level and mostly at the appellate level. By 2001, Democratic presidential appointees accounted for a majority of lower court judges over 50% of the judges in the federal district courts and

16. See Federal Judicial Center, Judgeship Appointments by Presidents (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tablel.pdf [hereinafter Judgeship Appointments by Presidents]. The percentages stated in this section are only approximations, as the Federal Judicial Center does not maintain historical data of the number of sitting federal judges by party affiliation. Thus, the percentages stated here reflect only total judicial appointments by president, and do not account for judges who have either assumed senior status or left the bench altogether.

17. See id.


19. Congress did not authorize any new judgeships during the Ford administration. President Ford appointed 12 appellate judges and 52 district court judges. See Judgeship Appointments by President, supra note 16.


21. See Judgeship Appointments by Presidents, supra note 16. The growth of the Republican cohort was enhanced by the Judgeships Act of 1990, which created 11 new appellate and 74 new district judgeships. In his only term, President George H.W. Bush was able to appoint a total of 37 appellate judges and 150 district judges. Id.

44% in the courts of appeals. Although the current administration has appointed over 200 judges to the lower federal courts, most of these judges have not been on the bench long enough to influence the relevant body of case law very much. Accordingly, for present purposes, President George W. Bush's appointees largely came too late to be part of any conservative attack on civil rights during any significant period of time this Article examines.

The end result of these past forty years is that from a numerical standpoint, Republican appointees have indeed gained ground relative to Democratic appointees in the judiciary. Yet, the two parties have remained close to parity with each other at each level of the lower courts for most of this time. Empirically, then, it is hard to see how an assault on employment discrimination laws motivated solely or largely by ideological considerations could have succeeded given that there has been a roughly equal number of judges of an opposing ideology at every point in time.

This is not to say that political ideology has no role in judicial decision-making. Both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that it does. The much more difficult issue is to determine how much political ideology influences judicial outcomes. In this regard, two recent empirical studies are particularly noteworthy.

The most comprehensive study of the degree to which political ideology affects judicial decisionmaking is a meta-analysis by Daniel Pinello. Pinello analyzed 60,861 instances in which judges either supported or rejected "civil rights and liberties" claims between 1959 and 1998. Pinello concluded that political ideology was responsible for 35% of the variance in judicial opinions in those cases. While this number is concededly significant, it should be noted at the outset that the explanatory power of political affiliation is only marginally greater in employment discrimination cases than in cases generally. According to Pinello, political affiliation accounts for 27% of the variance in all federal cases, many of which present issues that have no political valence whatsoever. In other words, the fact that ideological variance in employment

(“When George W. Bush entered the White House, 51 percent of the federal judges had been appointed by Democratic presidents.”).

25. Id. at 234. This does not mean that Pinello studied 60,861 discrete cases. Some of these cases Pinello included in his studies are from courts of appeals, and a typical case before a three-judge panel might yield three different “votes,” so to speak. Id. at 222-24.

Pinello’s meta-analysis includes both state and federal cases. Although Pinello does separate out federal and state cases, he does not separate out federal and state cases by category of cases. Rather, he aggregates state and federal cases and then segments by case type. Id.
26. See id. at 234.
27. Id. at 235.
discrimination cases is not much higher than the “baseline” ideological variance Pinello observed suggests that the 35% number is not as substantial as it would otherwise seem.

Furthermore, assuming that judicial voting patterns in “civil rights and liberties cases” can be extended to the subset of employment discrimination cases, political affiliation does not appear to explain the variance in judicial voting patterns in almost two-thirds of the cases. As an empirical matter, the partisan entrenchment argument therefore seems incomplete at best, at least with respect to employment discrimination jurisprudence.

A recent empirical study by Cass Sunstein concludes that while political affiliation can somewhat predict how a judge will vote in employment discrimination cases, it is far from dispositive. Sunstein’s study is especially helpful, as it examines empirical data at a level of detail that Pinello’s does not. In particular, Sunstein’s study parses employment discrimination claims into various subcategories, making it possible to differentiate among different types of employment discrimination cases. The results of Sunstein’s study are shown in the figure below.

**FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF “LIBERAL” VOTES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES BY PARTY AFFILIATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic Appointees</th>
<th>Republican Appointees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race Discrimination</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Discrimination</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability Discrimination</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Discrimination Cases</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


29. Sunstein’s study also provides limited evidence to show that neither Republican appointees nor Democratic appointees are fungible (i.e., that there are intra-party differences in voting patterns between nominees of different presidents). Sunstein’s study shows that, across the board, Democratic appointees are more likely to vote in a pro-plaintiff manner than their Republican counterparts. The study also suggests that significant disparities exist between the appointees of a given president relative to appointees of many other presidents, including presidents of the same political party. At the same time, however, many of Sunstein’s results are not statistically significant, given the limited sample size of judicial votes Sunstein observed. See id. at 114-15.

30. Id. at 20-21. In every category, Sunstein defines a “liberal” vote as one in which a judge voted to afford the plaintiff “any relief.” See id. at 157-59 nn.4, 9, 10 & 12.
Figure 1 suggests that across the board, Democratic appointees are more likely to vote in favor of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases than their Republican counterparts. Taking the weighted average of these figures, Figure 1 shows that Democratic appointees are likely to vote in favor of an employment discrimination plaintiff in just under half of all cases, while Republican judges do so in slightly less than one-third of cases. The difference between these two figures suggests that a typical Democratic appointee is 15% more likely to vote to grant an employment discrimination plaintiff relief than his or her Republican counterpart.

Yet there is reason to believe this bottom-line average is misleading. Although disability claims account for barely 10% of discrimination lawsuits, they represent more than a third of the cases in Sunstein's employment discrimination survey. In other words, disability cases are overrepresented by more than a factor of three. By contrast, race discrimination claims are substantially underrepresented. Race discrimination claims account for just 17% of cases in Sunstein's study, whereas they constitute roughly 35% to 40% of discrimination claims overall. Given that the pro-plaintiff disparity in disability cases is almost twice that which Sunstein observes in race discrimination cases (16% versus 9%), there is reason to believe that the overall disparity figure overstates the degree to which Democratic and Republican appointees differ in discrimination cases.

It is somewhat unfair to quibble with Sunstein's overall figures, as he has divided the data into various component subcategories. In any event, there are other significant vulnerabilities in the data (many of which Sunstein is careful to acknowledge) which collectively caution against drawing overly sweeping conclusions based on his study. Perhaps the most significant methodological problem is Sunstein's exclusion of unpublished cases from his study. In this respect, Sunstein states that "[i]n some courts of appeals, unpublished opinions are widely believed to be simple and straightforward and not to involve diff-


32. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS: FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2007 (2008), http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (tracking types of discrimination alleged in EEOC charges filed between 1997 and 2005, and identifying race discrimination as the most frequently asserted type of discrimination); see also Gina J. Chirichigno, Crying Wolf? What We Can Learn From “Misconceptions” About Discrimination: A Transformational Approach to Anti-Discrimination Law, 49 HOWARD L.J. 553, 583, n.158 (concluding, based on EEOC charge statistics between 1992 and 2004, that “racial discrimination is, or is perceived to be, the most common type of discrimination faced by modern employees,” and observing that in 1992, 41% of all EEOC charges included allegations of race discrimination).
cult or complex issued of law.” He therefore concludes that, “[i]n such courts, it is harmless to ignore unpublished opinions simply because they are easy.” But this hardly follows. Indeed, for both my purposes and his, this exclusion is anything but harmless.

As Sunstein correctly suggests, courts of appeals are most likely to issue an unpublished opinion in cases where the applicable law is settled and straightforward. Employment discrimination is certainly one such area, as the substantive law and the relevant procedural standards involved have, with some notable exceptions, remained largely stable over the years. The great majority of discrimination cases turn not on any complex question of law, but instead on questions of fact – most frequently, why the employer took a particular course of action. It would therefore seem that, at least relative to other, more fluid areas of law, employment discrimination cases would be particularly amenable to resolution by unpublished opinion. Empirical evidence confirms this: One commentator has observed that “80 to 90 percent of employment discrimination cases filed in federal court do not produce a published opinion.”

Recent Westlaw searches confirm the underinclusiveness of Sunstein’s sample. More than a third of employment discrimination cases are resolved by unpublished opinions. As one commentator has aptly put it, Sunstein’s methodology (at least with respect to employment discrimination cases) is akin to “studying the iceberg from its tip.”

33. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 18.
34. See id.; see also Cass Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 313 n.36 (2004) (expressing similar rationale for excluding unpublished cases).
35. Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue, Studying the Iceberg From Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y R. 1133, 1133 (1990). To be fair, many of the cases Siegelman and Donohue include in their survey generated no opinion at all, because they were settled prior to verdict. The search described in note 36, infra, attempts to account for this. Nonetheless, the fundamental point about selection bias remains. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra, at 1165 (concluding that “[i]n the context of employment discrimination litigation, the occupational distribution of plaintiffs, the kinds of discrimination being complained about, the laws allegedly being violated, and the outcome of litigation all differ significantly between published and unpublished cases” (emphasis added)).
36. A Westlaw search in the database of reported appellate cases for the terms “Title VII” and “African-American” or “black” /s discriminat! revealed 2,514 cases. The same search in the database of unreported appellate cases yielded 1,141 cases. A Westlaw search for “Title VII” and “sex discrimination” or “sexual harassment” yielded 3,681 reported appellate cases, and 1,866 unreported ones. Finally, a search for “Americans with Disabilities Act” /s discriminat! revealed 1,135 reported appellate decisions, and 1,036 unreported ones. Thus, these searches collectively revealed 7,330 reported appellate decisions, and 4,043 unreported ones. These figures likely overstate the total number of cases, as these categories are not mutually exclusive. Taking these figures as they are, though, Sunstein excluded 36% of appellate decisions dealing with discrimination.
37. Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 35, at 1133.
Given that Sunstein seeks to determine the extent to which political affiliation predicts judicial voting in employment discrimination cases, and to report how often ideology appears to drive voting disparities, it is difficult to overstate the significance of his excluding the "easy" cases from the calculus – i.e., those cases in which the applicable law is clear and the application of law to facts is straightforward. Sunstein explicitly admits as much, stating that, "[b]ecause unpublished opinions generally involve easy cases, we would not expect to see significant party or panel effects in them, and a full sample of court of appeals opinions, including unpublished ones, would of course show reduced effects of both party and ideology." He nonetheless concludes that because his goal "is to see those effects in the hard cases, not the easy ones, . . . the absence [of ideologically-driven variance] from easy cases is essentially uninteresting."

Inasmuch as Sunstein's study purports to look at judicial voting patterns broadly, it makes little sense to focus exclusively on the subset of difficult employment discrimination cases in which disagreement is the most likely. To do so is like studying the amount of disagreement on the Supreme Court while excluding all of the unanimous or near-unanimous opinions from the sample size. Accordingly, there is substantial reason to believe that Sunstein's results significantly exaggerate the extent to which judges' ideological differences explain their voting differences, at least in the employment discrimination context.

Second, Sunstein focuses only on decisions issued by federal appellate courts. Consequently, his study affords no insight into the extent to which party affiliation is a predictor of judicial voting in any employment discrimination case resolved without a decision from a court of appeals. This exclusive focus on extremely late-stage litigation almost surely biased Sunstein's sample pool further. Employers have a particularly strong incentive to settle discrimination claims, given the operative fee-shifting provisions. Assuming that employers are risk-averse, rational actors, they would want to settle meritorious claims (and perhaps some not-so-meritorious ones) as quickly as possible. While the cost-benefit analysis necessarily varies from employer to employer and claim to claim, the point here is simply that the exclusion of all discrimination claims that were resolved before trial, at trial, or post-trial while an ap-

38. See id. at 1154 (concluding based on empirical study of employment discrimination cases that "the degree of complexity and novelty tends to be greater in published cases than in unpublished ones").
39. Sunstein et al., supra note 34, at 313 n.36.
40. Id.
41. This is not to suggest that Sunstein erred in looking only at the subset of cases (which includes employment discrimination cases) in which ideology would most likely play a role. Rather, the point is only that by focusing on a small subset of cases within the subset of cases in which ideology could be expected to be relevant, Sunstein chose an unrepresentative sample.
peal was pending, likely omits a great number of cases about which there would be broad agreement across ideological lines. 42

Third, as Sunstein notes, insofar as one judge simply joins an opinion written by another, it is not necessarily correct to assume that the joining judge(s) agreed with every aspect of the opinion. There are any number of reasons why a judge might not write separately even in cases in which the panel opinion did not truly reflect his or her views. 43 As Judge Richard Posner has observed, “in a three-judge panel, provided that at least one judge has a strong opinion on the proper outcome of the case . . . the other judges, if not terribly interested in the case, can simply cast their vote with the ‘opinionated’ judge.” 44 These so-called “collegial concurrences” reflect that, to write separately, a judge’s disagreement with another panel member’s opinion must exceed some unquantifiable, individualized threshold unique to each judge.

Moreover, the authoring judge may modify his or her opinion to accommodate suggestions from other panel members, such that ultimate opinion reflects a compromise between its members, whether in reasoning, outcome, or both. The cost of speaking with one voice is that the final opinion may not fully reflect the views of any one judge, even the authoring judge. In such cases, the most that can be said about the panel opinion is that it is a sufficiently palatable approximation of each panel member’s views such that no panel member finds it necessary to write separately. For all of these reasons, one should be exceedingly cautious in drawing conclusions about the usefulness of political affiliation as predictor of judicial decisionmaking based on Sunstein’s study. 45

These considerations aside, it cannot seriously be contended that a judge’s ideological orientation (for which political affiliation is a proxy) plays no role in his or her decisionmaking. At the same time, ideology appears to be only a weak predictor of the outcome in any given employment discrimination case. Methodological concerns about Sunstein’s study notwithstanding, the average

42. Of course, one of the factors relevant to this balancing calculus is the expected litigation outcome. To the extent that an employer believes that they will prevail on appeal because of a favorable bench, this will affect the settlement dynamic. Dynamics aside, approximately 69% of employment discrimination cases do settle. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 31, at 440.

43. A discussion of the myriad and complex motivations that impact appellate decisionmaking is beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of the subject, see VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 111 (2006).

44. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 123 (1995).

45. In fairness to Sunstein, he does acknowledge the limited role that ideology plays in judicial decisionmaking. See Sunstein et al., supra note 34, at 336 (“It would be possible to see our data as suggesting that most of the time, law is what matters, not ideology. Note here that even when party effects are significant, they are not overwhelmingly large. . . . More often than not, Republican and Democratic appointees agree with each other, even in the most controversial cases.”).
Democratic and Republican appointee in Sunstein’s survey disagreed, at most, in less than one out of five employment discrimination cases, and in one of the most common types of discrimination cases (i.e., race discrimination), they disagreed less than 10% of the time. This evidence of inter-party hegemony belies the argument that ideology can explain – either by itself or in substantial part – the reversal of fortune that employment discrimination plaintiffs have suffered in recent years in federal court.

This is not to say that those who allege that the federal judiciary has become more unreceptive to claims of employment discrimination are wrong. On the whole, federal judges have indeed made it increasingly difficult for employment discrimination plaintiffs to prevail. Relative to plaintiffs in other civil cases, employment discrimination claimants fare worse at every phase of litigation. They win fewer cases both during pretrial and at trial. And on appeal, they are relatively less successful in preserving favorable outcomes and reversing unfavorable ones. But these commentators are right for the wrong reason. As Parts II and III will show, this judicial skepticism is largely non-ideological in nature – it has relatively less to do with any rightward drift in the political median of the judiciary than with judges’ need to get through all of the cases on their dockets, and, concomitantly, the extent to which employment discrimination cases stand in the way of this goal. In other words, how receptive a given court is to employment discrimination claims appears influenced by two factors: (i) how busy a court is, as measured by its workload; and (ii) the number of employment discrimination cases a court hears.

46. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 31, at 444 (noting that between 1979 and 2001, employment discrimination plaintiffs obtained a favorable “pretrial adjudication” just 4% of the time, while other civil plaintiffs did so 22% of the time).
47. Id. at 442, 457 (observing that employment discrimination plaintiffs won 38% of jury trials and 19% of bench trials, while plaintiffs in other civil cases prevailed in 45% of jury trials and 46% of bench trials).
48. Id. at 447-50 (observing that defendants in employment discrimination cases appealed outcomes favoring plaintiffs 10% of the time, and obtained reversals in 43% of appeals, while defendants in non-jobs cases appealed outcomes favoring plaintiffs approximately 10% of the time, and obtain reversals approximately 30% of the time).
49. Id. (observing that plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases appealed outcomes favoring defendants 20% of the time, and obtained reversals in 10% of appeals, while plaintiffs in non-jobs cases appealed outcomes favoring defendants approximately 15% of the time, and obtained reversals approximately 15% of the time).
II. TOWARD A PRAGMATIC THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE: AGGREGATE TRENDS IN
WORKLOAD AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION FILINGS

A. Aggregate Trends in District Court

By any objective metric, the overall workload for the lower federal courts
has increased substantially over the last twenty-five years. As Figure 2 indicates, the number of district court filings increased 64% between 1980 and 2005.

**FIGURE 2: DISTRICT COURT FILINGS, IN THOUSANDS, 1980-2005**

Source: Annual Director’s Reports, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (http://www.uscourts.gov/library/statisticalreports.html; bound volumes for pre-1997 data)
Of course, caseload does not tell the whole story. Not only has the size of the federal judiciary grown over time, but certain types of cases are more time-consuming than others. Even taking these variables into account, however, the number of weighted filings per district judge has risen 25% since 1980.

**Figure 3: Weighted Filings per District Judge, 1980-2005**

Source: Federal Court Management Statistics

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50. By estimating the complexity of various causes of actions, the Administrative Office assigns a “weight” to each claim corresponding to the expected amount of judicial effort required to resolve the claim. By doing so, the Administrative Office has calculated a weighted number of filings per judgeship. I have translated this data into per judge figures in Figure 3 above by factoring in judicial vacancies, i.e., the number of months during a given year that a judgeship was not occupied. So for instance, if a given district had 10 judgeships in a given year, and there was a total of 18 months of vacancies total, the net number of active judges in this district for this year would be 8.5.

These statistics exclude criminal misdemeanor filings, and do not account for cases handled by senior judges, magistrate judges, or special masters. While senior judges do handle significant portions of the docket, the caseload varies widely from senior judge to senior judge. Some senior judges continue to carry a full caseload; others carry just 20% of their former caseload. What is more, senior judges have the opportunity to opt out of certain types of cases entirely, including employment discrimination cases. Because the available data does not account for these variables, I have excluded senior judges from the calculations to ensure an apples-to-apples comparison.
As Figures 4 and 5 show, employment discrimination filings have substantially outpaced the increase in filings generally. Employment discrimination claims have grown in excess of 260% between 1980 and 2005, while filings overall have grown just 64%. In other words, employment discrimination filings have increased more than four times faster than filings generally in the last quarter century. As a result, the average federal district judge in 2005 heard more than twice as many employment discrimination cases than did his or her counterpart in 1980.

**Figure 4: Total District Court Employment Discrimination Filings and Employment Discrimination Filings per District Judge, 1980-2005**

These increases become all the more striking when one realizes that, in large measure, they have come since 1990. In the early 1980s, total filings in federal district court increased sharply, owing primarily to three factors: (i) the rising number of diversity cases; (ii) Congress’s 1984 amendment to the Social Security Act making it easier for claimants to obtain relief for back pain, arthritis, and mental illness; and (iii) the Reagan administration’s aggressive pursuit of claims relating to overpayment of veterans’ benefits and student loan defaults. By 1990, these gains had substantially dissipated. Diversity filings dropped after Congress raised the amount in controversy threshold from 51. Unlike the data it maintains for the courts of appeals, the Administrative Office does not track the number of employment filings in district court either in the aggregate or by circuit. Rather, it maintains data only for “Civil Rights” filings for each district, which is broader than employment discrimination filings. In order to derive the latter from the former, I have multiplied the civil rights filings for a given district court by the overall nationwide ratio of employment discrimination filings to civil rights filings.

Source: Annual Director’s Reports, Administrative Office of the United States Courts

51. Unlike the data it maintains for the courts of appeals, the Administrative Office does not track the number of employment filings in district court either in the aggregate or by circuit. Rather, it maintains data only for “Civil Rights” filings for each district, which is broader than employment discrimination filings. In order to derive the latter from the former, I have multiplied the civil rights filings for a given district court by the overall nationwide ratio of employment discrimination filings to civil rights filings.
$10,000 to $50,000 in 1988, and President George H.W. Bush scaled back the Reagan administration's aggressive use of the federal courts to recover overpayment of veterans' benefits and defaulted student loans. The net effect was that overall filing levels climbed 35% between 1980 and 1990. By contrast, the growth in employment discrimination filings was markedly greater during this decade, increasing 61%. Figure 5 traces the growth in filings over time.

**FIGURE 5: TOTAL DISTRICT COURT FILINGS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION FILINGS, 1980-2005**

As shown above, the real action in employment discrimination filings has come since 1990. Between 1990 and 2005, overall filings in district courts increased by 22%. But over this same time, employment discrimination filings skyrocketed by 125%. In other words, the growth in employment discrimination filings has outpaced the increase in filings generally almost six times over. This is no accident, of course, as Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 the following year, and the Family Medical Leave Act two years after that.\(^52\)

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\(^{52}\) The impact of the ADA and the FMLA should not be overstated, however. See generally infra note 69.
As Figure 6 indicates, the growth in employment discrimination filings per capita judge between 1980 and 1990 mirrored that of the caseload overall – rising quickly during the early 1980s, but receding somewhat in the latter part of the decade. In the fifteen years that followed, however, employment discrimination filings per capita judge rose sharply, more than doubling in just six years, where they remained before tapering off slightly in the last few years.

**Figure 6: Employment Discrimination Filings per District Judge, 1980-2005**

Source: Annual Director’s Reports, Administrative Office of the United States Courts

The upshot of this recent surge in employment discrimination filings is that, on average, a district judge in 2005 heard almost twice as many such cases than did a district judge in 1990.

**B. Aggregate Trends in the Courts of Appeals**

The story is somewhat similar in the courts of appeals. The total number of appeals taken has risen sharply over the last twenty-five years, as has the number of cases decided on the merits. As in the district courts, the increase in employment discrimination filings was disproportionately responsible for these increases since 1990.
Figure 7 demonstrates that the number of appellate filings grew by 195%, between 1980 and 2005, while merits terminations increased by 149%. Between 1980 and 1990, the growth in employment discrimination appeals mirrored the overall appeals growth rate. In the wake of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, employment discrimination appeals tripled in just seven years before declining somewhat in recent years.

**Figure 7: Appellate Filings, Merits Terminations, and Employment Discrimination Appeals, 1980-2005**

Source: Annual Director's Reports, Administrative Office of the United States Courts

53. "Appellate filings" and "merits terminations" are broader than "appeals" and "appeals terminated on the merits," respectively, as they include various motions such as requests for rehearing, requests to proceed in forma pauperis, etc.

54. The Administrative Office distinguishes between merits and procedural terminations. The latter involve dispositions on jurisdictional grounds, settlement, or consolidation, among other things.
The trend is the same on a per capita judge basis. Figure 8 shows that between 1980 and 1990, both filings and merits terminations per capita appellate judge doubled over the last quarter century.

**Figure 8: Appeals Filed and Merits Terminations Per Appellate Judge, 1980-2005**

Source: Annual Director's Reports, Administrative Office of the United States Courts
A similar pattern of increase exists with respect to employment discrimination appeals. Figure 9 illustrates that in 1980, an average appellate judge (not panel) was responsible for less than nine employment discrimination appeals. By 1990, that number had risen somewhat to twelve. In the next decade, the number of employment discrimination appeals per capita judge more than doubled, before declining to the present level of eighteen appeals annually.

**Figure 9: Employment Discrimination Appeals Filed Per Appellate Judge, 1980-2005**

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**C. Coping With the Workload: The Changing Nature of Docket Management**

The data makes clear that the lower federal courts have become increasingly busy over the past twenty-five years, particularly since 1990. It is also clear that judges hear many more employment discrimination cases than they did just fifteen years ago, let alone twenty-five. Both the data and the academic literature support the theory that judges, straining to meet increasing demands on their time, have used whatever tools they have at their disposal to resolve matters as expeditiously as possible. On the civil side, district judges have trended away from focusing on cases that were either approaching trial or

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were already in trial, and now "spend considerable effort on cases that terminate at early procedural stages." Figure 10 illustrates this reallocation of judicial resources.

**Figure 10: Method of Termination of Civil Cases in District Court, 1980-2005**

![Graph showing termination methods of civil cases from 1980 to 2005.]

Source: Annual Director's Report, Administrative Office of the United States Courts

Several commentators have attributed this shift towards pretrial adjudication to the *Celotex*-Liberty Lobby-Matsushita* trilogy, in which the Supreme Court in 1986 "significantly expanded the applicability of summary judgment." Indeed, grants of summary judgment — which were until that time substantially less common than trials — now outnumber trials "several times" over. This decline in civil trials does not reflect a reallocation of judicial resources towards criminal trials. The number of criminal defendants going to trial dropped by almost half between 1985 and 2002, as the proportion of


58. Galanter, supra note 56, at 1266.

59. Id. at 1264 n.28.
criminal proceedings terminated by plea bargains rose. Consequently, as Figure 11 shows, the number of trials in federal court has dropped by more than 60% overall since 1985. The reason for these trends is simple – district judges simply do not have enough hours in the day to let a substantial percentage of their cases go deep into the litigation process.

**Figure 11: Total Number of Trials in U.S. District Courts, 1979-2000**


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61. See also Marc Galanter, *The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts*, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004); Federal Court Management Statistics (reporting that the number of trials per capita judgeship has dropped from 38 in 1980 to 19 in 2005). The figures reported by the Administrative Office do not only include trials in the conventional sense; rather, they also count any “contested hearing[] at which evidence is presented.” ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 23 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/front/judicialbusiness.pdf.
The same is true at the appellate level. As Figures 7 and 8 demonstrated, appellate judges' workloads have steadily risen in recent years. Figure 12 below shows a related trend – the rise of “unsigned” or “per curiam” opinions.

**FIGURE 12: OPINIONS PER APPELLATE JUDGE, BY TYPE, 1980-2005**

Source: Federal Court Management Statistics. Prior to 1986, the Administrative Office did not distinguish between “unsigned” opinions and opinions issued “without comment.”

Closely related to the rise in per curiam opinions is the rise in unpublished or non-precedential opinions. The sheer volume of the appellate caseload has forced judges to issue unpublished decisions with greater and greater frequency. In 1981, just 11% of appellate merits decisions were unpublished; today, 82% of decisions are. This is certainly because judges are under sub-


stantially more pressure to churn out opinions — the number of opinions per capita judge has more than doubled between 1980 and 2005.\textsuperscript{64} At both the district and the appellate levels therefore, it seems likely that this trend towards efficient disposition reflects judges' collective efforts to manage increasingly unwieldy dockets.

By any metric, the workload of the appellate courts, like the district courts, has increased dramatically over the last twenty-five years. It is similarly clear that employment discrimination filings account for a disproportionate amount of the increase, and particularly since the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. What is less clear is how much the latter influences the former.

\textbf{D. The Particular Relevance of Employment Discrimination Claims to Judicial Workload}

At first glance, it is not apparent why employment discrimination cases should merit special attention, given that filings have risen across the board over the last twenty-five years. For all their growth, employment discrimination claims have always occupied a relatively modest share of the overall docket at the district level, reaching a high water mark of around 10% in the late 1990s before declining slightly as of late.\textsuperscript{65} Their share of the appellate caseload is even more modest, consistently hovering around 5%. Moreover, employment discrimination cases rarely present novel or difficult issues of law: In the vast majority of cases, courts apply well-settled precedent. So why should we care about employment discrimination cases as they pertain to judicial workload?

The short answer to this is that, in the aggregate, employment discrimination cases have become increasingly time-consuming to resolve. As noted previously, all but a very few employment discrimination claims today involve

\textsuperscript{64} In 1980, each judgeship issued 32 signed and 38 unsigned opinions, for a total of 70 opinions. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNITED STATES COURTS (1980). When these figures are adjusted to a per active judge basis, the total number of opinions per capita judge rises slightly, to 76. In 2005, the average active appellate judge issued 52 signed opinions, 97 unsigned opinions, and 5 opinions "without comment," for a total of 154 opinions. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS (2005).

\textsuperscript{65} In 1980, employment discrimination cases accounted for 2.5% of all district court filings; by 2005, they accounted for 7% of total filings. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.C-2 (2005); WILLIAM E. FOLEY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.C-2 (1980).
individual plaintiffs alleging disparate treatment. The practices and patterns of discrimination that were both widespread and obvious in the 1960s and 1970s are now neither widespread nor obvious. As a result, class actions have largely disappeared, and employment discrimination cases have become increasingly individualized, fact-specific inquiries. Thus, to render a decision (either at trial or on an earlier dispositive motion), a judge must wade through a voluminous morass of tedious, conflicting evidence, frequently without the assistance of plaintiff's counsel. The process of ferreting out the true motivation behind any given employment action has therefore become more complex and time-consuming even for the most astute judge. And because class claims are extraordinarily rare, the impact of one case on the next is likely to be nil. Having rolled the stone up the hill in one case, the Sisyphean task begins anew for the next.

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 greatly exacerbated the workload problem. By authorizing prevailing plaintiffs to recover damages, Congress gave plain-

66. Never particularly common, disparate impact claims have become even rarer in recent years. See Ian Ayers & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word As Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1487, 1494-95 (1996) (commenting on rarity of disparate impact litigation, and observing that just 294 disparate impact employment discrimination cases were filed in federal court between 1971 and 1995); Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality, and Antidiscrimination Law, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1194, 1205 (2000) ("Plaintiffs still bring the vast majority of Title VII cases under a disparate treatment theory, while disparate impact cases have become exceedingly rare."); see also Ayres & Siegelman, supra, at 1526 n.27 (discussing empirical methodology).

67. See John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983, 984, 1019 (1991) (noting that "class actions have virtually vanished from the landscape of employment discrimination" and that requests for class certifications in employment discrimination cases declined 96% between 1975 and 1989); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 741, 750-51 (2005) ("The great majority of employment discrimination suits in federal courts...are brought by individual plaintiffs asserting disparate treatment claims.").


69. While Congress has also passed other employment discrimination statutes in recent years, including the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, those statutes are, from a statistical standpoint, relatively insignificant in comparison to Title VII. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 31, at 433-34 (noting that "barely one in nine employment discrimination cases arise under the ADA or the FMLA"). By contrast, Title VII accounts for almost 70% of all em-
tiffs (and the attorneys that represent them on a contingent-fee basis) unprecedented incentive to file employment discrimination claims.\textsuperscript{70} The result has been a perfect storm for district judges: Filings not only skyrocketed virtually overnight, but claimants began to request jury trials in the overwhelming majority of filings, which had never before been available under Title VII. Given that virtually every employment discrimination case turns on the resolution of disputed facts (typically who did what to whom and why), it is perhaps unsurprising that employment cases go disproportionately deep into the litigation process. As Figures 13 and 14 demonstrate, employment discrimination cases go to trial between two and three times more frequently than civil cases generally, and have accordingly assumed ever-increasing prominence on the trial docket due to the increase in discrimination filings.

\textbf{FIGURE 13: PERCENTAGE OF ALL CIVIL AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES RESULTING IN TRIALS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION TRIALS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRIALS, 1982-2005}

Source: Annual Director’s Reports, Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Data prior to 1982 is not available.

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\textsuperscript{70} Following the 1991 amendments, prevailing plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases won almost triple the amount they had previously. See \textit{id.} at 457-58 (observing that the median award to prevailing plaintiff “pre-1992” was $25,000, but that the median award to prevailing plaintiffs “post-1991” was $70,000); see also Minna J. Kotkin, \textit{Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment Discrimination Settlements}, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 111 (2007) (observing, based on empirical study of confidential settlements filed between 1999 and 2005, that the mean recovery amount per employment discrimination plaintiff was $54,651).
Between 1979 and 2000, non-employment discrimination civil trials declined more than 50%, while the number of employment discrimination trials held firm. In 1979, employment discrimination claims accounted for less than ten percent of all trials; by 2000, they accounted for almost twenty percent. Most of the action has taken place over the last 15 years. In the decade following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the number of employment discrimination trials jumped 26%, while other civil trials declined by a roughly equivalent percentage. Indeed, no other statute or set of statutes has given rise to as many civil federal trials in recent years as have employment discrimination laws.

To say that employment cases go to trial does not tell the whole story; it is more accurate to say that they go to trial before a jury, because in the over-

71. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 31, at 435 (noting that the ratio of other civil trials to employment discrimination trials fell from 10:1 in 1979 to 4.66:1 in 2000).
whelming majority of cases, at least one party (typically the plaintiff) requests a jury trial. Figure 15 demonstrates that while other jury trials have declined since 1990, the number of employment discrimination jury trials tripled in the decade following the 1991 amendments.

**Figure 15: Number of Jury Trials in Employment Discrimination and Other Cases in U.S. District Courts, 1979-2000**


Jury trials are particularly taxing on district courts, largely because the finder of fact in a jury trial is composed of non-lawyers who are presumed not to know the applicable law or rules of evidence. To remedy these deficiencies, a judge must take any number of measures (e.g., jury instructions, sidebars, voir dire) that would be unnecessary in a bench trial. Consequently, while an average bench trial takes a little over two days, jury trials typically last more

73. For instance, of the 692 employment discrimination cases that were litigated to verdict in 2005, 84% were tried before a jury. See 2005 Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics tbl.C-4, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/tables/C04mar05.pdf.
than a week. This is particularly significant given that employment discrimination cases go to trial more often than almost any other type of civil claim.

Employment discrimination cases are also disproportionately taxing on appellate courts. To begin with, employment discrimination verdicts are appealed at a higher rate than other civil cases, regardless of whether the plaintiff or defendant won in district court. The overwhelming majority of these appeals are filed by plaintiffs following an adverse pretrial ruling—most commonly a grant of summary judgment. Given the plenary scope of appellate review, an appellate judge typically finds herself in the same position as did the district judge—scouring the record to determine if the plaintiff presented enough evidence to get to trial.

For all of these reasons, the modest share of lower court dockets occupied by employment discrimination cases would seem to understate substantially their impact on judicial workload.

III. WORKLOAD AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION FILINGS ACROSS THE CIRCUITS

Thus far, I have endeavored to show that overall judicial workload has increased substantially over the last twenty-five years and that employment discrimination claims have played a critical role in this increase. What this aggregate data obscures, however, is that workloads are not (and never have been) uniform across courts. The same is true of employment discrimination filings. To the contrary, there are substantial disparities with respect to both overall workloads and the number of employment discrimination filings, which, for the reasons previously stated, contribute disproportionately to a court’s overall workload.

Because Congress has federalized an ever-increasing number of causes of action for employment discrimination, more and more people fall within at least one protected class. Compounding the workload problem is the perception among many plaintiffs that they can litigate their claims to judgment faster in federal court than in state court due to the delays in many state courts.

74. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 193 (1985) (noting that the average federal jury trial lasts 5.19 days, while an average non-jury trial lasts only 2.34 days). This data is generalized for all trials; no data is available that is specific to employment discrimination cases.

75. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 31, at 447 (comparing historical appeal rates in employment discrimination cases to appeal rates in other civil cases).

76. See id. at 450 (noting that 79% of employment discrimination appeals between 1987 and 2000 were filed by plaintiffs following an unfavorable final adjudication at the pretrial stage). Overall, 94% of employment discrimination appeals during this time were filed by plaintiffs. See id.

77. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Can Congress Use Its War Powers to Protect Military Employees From State Sovereign Immunity?, 34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 999,
Although judges can rarely keep out plaintiffs who are determined to pursue their claims at any cost, federal judges can engage in "prophylactic jurisprudence" to dampen the incentive of plaintiffs (or, perhaps more importantly, the lawyers who might represent them) who are more ambivalent about pursuing their claims, primarily by elevating the substantive and procedural thresholds that frequently arise in employment cases. As we will see in Parts IV and V, a circuit's receptiveness to employment claims appears strongly influenced by its workload and the number of employment cases it sees. Because the rise in employment claims is part and parcel of the overall workload, it seems plausible to expect less judicial receptiveness to employment discrimination claims in circuits where such claims are more common.

If my theory of prophylactic jurisprudence is correct, one would expect to see those judges in busier circuits adopting statutory and procedural interpretations that place greater burdens on plaintiffs relative to judges in less burdened circuits. Moreover, this theory, if proven, would tend to undermine a purely ideological theory of judging because there are circuits that are ideologically liberal as well as conservative (or at least perceived to be) at the top and the bottom of the workload rankings.

1042 (2004) (noting the perception that litigation in state court is more susceptible to delay than litigation in federal court).

78. It is worth noting at the outset that there is no consensus among commentators regarding which circuits are the most conservative. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 110 (characterizing the Seventh, Eighth, and First Circuits to be the most conservative circuits (in that order), and the D.C. Circuit to be the third most liberal circuit); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests: Equal Protection Jurisprudence at the Crossroads, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 260, 271 n.61 (2002) (opining that "the Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits . . . are among the most conservative appellate courts in the country"); David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1767 n.58 (2004) (characterizing the Fourth Circuit as "the most conservative court of appeals in the country"); Carlos J. Cuevas, The Consumer Credit Industry, The Consumer Bankruptcy System, Bankruptcy Code Section 707(B), And Justice: A Critical Analysis of The Consumer Bankruptcy System, 103 COM. L.J. 359, 400 n.155 (1998) (asserting that the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits "are probably the most conservative circuits"); Thomas Michael McDonnell, The Death Penalty – An Obstacle to the "War Against Terrorism"?, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 353, 408 (2004) (asserting that the Fourth Circuit is "the most conservative and pro-prosecution of all the federal circuit courts of appeals"); Jonathan Turley, Paradise Lost: The Clinton Administration and the Erosion of Executive Privilege, 60 MD. L. REV. 205, 208 n.16 (2001) (asserting that the D.C. and the Eighth Circuits were "home to some of the country's most conservative jurists"); Barry Tarlow, RICO Report, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 2004, at 55, 57 (2004) (characterizing the Fifth Circuit as "notoriously conservative"). Given the apparent casualness with which many commentators have bestowed the label of "most conservative circuit," this divergence of opinion is not surprising. In many cases, such assertions seem to signify nothing more than the author's disagreement with one or more decisions issued by the circuit in question. Yet even those commentators who have performed statistical research and inter-circuit comparisons of judicial voting patterns have reached disparate results.
A. Relative Workload Across Circuits

Figure 16 shows the workload borne by district judges in each circuit over time.

**FIGURE 16: WORKLOAD PER DISTRICT JUDGE, BY CIRCUIT**

![Workload charts for different circuits](chart)


Although the relative rankings are not static over time, some general trends emerge from the data. District judges in the First, Third, and District of Columbia Circuits have on average lighter workloads than their counterparts in other circuits. Moreover, the workloads of the First and District of Columbia Circuits have either stayed constant or declined in absolute terms. At the other

*Compare Sunstein et al., *supra* note 34, at 307 (identifying the Fifth and Seventh Circuits as “the most conservative” circuits), *with Sunstein et al.,* *supra* note 10, at 13, 110 (characterizing the Seventh, Eighth, and First Circuits to be the most conservative circuits (in that order), and the Fifth Circuit as the fifth most liberal circuit).*
extreme, the relative workloads of district judges in the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have been consistently high and, for the most part, increasing year over year.

As previously noted, appellate workload data is hard to come by except in aggregate form. The best source for appellate workload is data compiled by Judge Posner. As of the mid-1990s, ordering the circuits from greatest to least by workload index yields the following ordering:

**Figure 17: Workload per Appellate Judge, by Circuit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Circuit</th>
<th>Workload</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>228</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>148</td>
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</table>

The data indicates that appellate judges in the First, Third, and District of Columbia Circuits, like their district court counterparts, have lighter workloads than judges on most other circuits. And, similar to district judges in their respective circuits, appellate judges in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have substantially greater workloads than do appellate judges in other circuits.

79. POSNER, supra note 74, at 231-33. Judge Posner arrived at his workload rankings by comparing the active number of judges in each circuit with the weighted average difficulty of the cases handled judges within each circuit. It appears that Judge Posner has used a similar sort of weighted caseload methodology that the Federal Judicial Center uses to calculate district workload to create his relative workload index. Judge Posner considered the number of termination on the merits (as opposed to procedural terminations), as well as the number of total appeals filed that result in signed opinions. The result of his calculations are the relative rankings of each circuit by workload shown above. It is not clear whether Judge Posner took into account judicial vacancies when calculating his workload data.
Just as workloads are distributed unevenly across the circuits, so are employment discrimination filings.

**FIGURE 18: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION FILINGS PER CAPITA DISTRICT JUDGE, BY CIRCUIT, 1980-2005**

Although district courts in virtually every circuit experienced a sharp increase in employment discrimination filings following the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Figure 18 shows that substantial disparities in discrimination filings remained. District courts in the First, Fourth, and District of Columbia Circuits encountered relatively few discrimination filings, while their counterparts in the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits saw their already-high number of discrimination cases almost double within a few years.
With respect to employment discrimination appeals, there are two groups of circuits – the Eleventh Circuit, and everyone else. As Figure 19 shows, judges in the Eleventh Circuit have handled the greatest number of employment discrimination appeals of any circuit by a wide margin – two to five times the per capita amount of discrimination appeals handled by judges in the First, Third, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits. In the late 1990s, an average Eleventh Circuit judge resolved sixty employment discrimination appeals annually – an average of more than one per week. After the Eleventh Circuit, the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have handled more discrimination appeals per capita judge than any other circuit.

The significance of a high volume of employment discrimination filings is twofold. First, employment discrimination cases are relevant to workload inquiries because, for the reasons stated previously, they have the potential to be
particularly time consuming. Second, and perhaps of equal or greater importance, judges who see high volumes of employment discrimination claims are more likely to become jaded to such claims than judges who only occasionally hear them.

Several studies indicate that, whether due to increased enforcement of civil rights laws or wholesale attitudinal changes on the part of society or both, discrimination has in fact steadily decreased since the passage of Title VII. Notwithstanding this progress, the volume of employment discrimination claims has skyrocketed in recent years, substantially outstripping the population growth over this period. Given these apparently contradictory trends, it stands to reason that even the most fair-minded judge will come to believe over time that an ever-increasing percentage of discrimination claims lack merit. The thrust of the theory is that judges become numb to claims of bias the more they hear such claims. This phenomenon is doubtlessly quickened to the extent that a judge questions the validity of discrimination claims in general.


81. Numerous commentators have lamented that an increasing share of employment discrimination cases appear to be more about obtaining attorney’s fees than remedying discrimination. See, e.g., Peter Blanck & Chen Song, Civil War Pension Attorneys and Disability Politics, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform. 137, 139-40 (2001-02) (“[The ADA] has turned disabilities into prized legal assets, something to be cultivated and flourished in courtrooms to receive financial windfalls.” Consequently, ADA claimants “are cast as underserved, frivolous and motivated by their fee-driven attorneys.” (alteration in original)); David Sherwyn, Because it Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 17 (2003) (contending “that the current system for resolving discrimination claims provides perverse incentives for employees . . . [which results in] a system of litigation extortion that we euphemistically refer to as ‘de facto severance’”); James Forman, Jr., Recent Development, Victory by Surrender: The Voting Rights Amendments of 1982 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 133, 156 (1992) (“Employment discrimination litigation has become driven by the plaintiff’s lawyers who ‘are in turn driven by hopes of a large jury verdict, and a contingent fee coming into their pocket.’”).

82. Immigration litigation provides another good example of this “victim fatigue” phenomenon. See, e.g., Marisa Taylor, Immigration Judges Face Increased Scrutiny, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (D.C.), June 28, 2006 (“[Immigration] judges can become jaded and desensitized by the blur of tragic tales: rape, torture, murder. Everybody is
One such judge was the late Sam Pointer, who served for over thirty years as a federal district judge for the Northern District of Alabama. With the arguable exception of Frank Johnson, no judge has done more to eliminate racial discrimination in Alabama than Judge Pointer (who, it should be noted, was appointed by a Republican president). Judge Pointer described the increasingly difficult task of differentiating legitimate employment discrimination claims from illegitimate ones this way:

The early cases involved systemic problems. It was obvious that large groups of individuals were clearly foreclosed from certain opportunities. In the 1980s and 1990s, I began to see more and more individual complaints, and it became difficult to determine the motivations of the decisionmakers. As an individual judge, I found it increasingly difficult to continue to deal with each new case fairly and impartially without taking into account the facts of the [previous cases] that I had seen, many of which I believed were illegitimate. Over time, a larger portion of [the employment discrimination claims I saw] were without merit, and my docket was overwhelmed with Title VII cases. [All of these factors were] considerations in my decision to leave the bench.

It is hard to imagine more powerful evidence for the proposition that judges (even those, such as Judge Pointer, whose civil rights bona fides cannot seriously be disputed) can become jaded when they come to believe that the saying to you, ‘My country is a horrible place.’ . . . There are judges who are sitting there day after day hearing those claims, and they get tired and burned out and they stop believing the stories.” (internal quotations omitted); Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 788 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that “many aliens, who want to remain in the United States for economic or social reasons unrelated to persecution, try to deceive immigration officials,” and that these aliens are “[o]ften coached by friends or organizations that disapprove[d] of this nation’s restrictions on immigration and do what they can to help others remain here”).

83. Judge Pointer’s ruling in United States v. U.S. Steel was the impetus for a consent decree between the steel industry and the government in which the Alabama steel industry agreed to a wholesale overhaul of its seniority systems, which had grossly disadvantaged African-Americans. See 371 F. Supp. 1045 (N.D. Ala. 1973). Judge Pointer also served as the trial judge in the case that would after consolidation become Martin v. Wilks, in which he ruled that white firefighters could not collaterally attack a consent decree entered into by the City of Birmingham to remedy past racial discrimination. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., No. CV 84-P-0903-S, 1985 WL 56690 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 20, 1985).

84. Interview with Hon. Sam C. Pointer, in Birmingham, Ala. (Mar. 22, 2004). Judge Pointer passed away on March 15, 2008, prior to the publication of this Article. Before he died, however, Judge Pointer reviewed and approved a substantially completed manuscript of this Article, including all quotes and views attributed to him contained herein.
discrimination claims they encounter are increasingly meritless. Judge James Spencer, now Chief Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, expressed similar thoughts. A frustrated Judge Spencer fired this parting shot in an opinion granting an employer’s motion for summary judgment in a Title VII lawsuit:

To the case brought before the Court this day, it is enough to say that the plaintiff’s claims fail entirely, and that the case will be dismissed. To the genre of cases to which it belongs, however, there is something more. This case is yet another entrant in a tiresome parade of meritless discrimination cases. Again and again, the Court’s resources are sapped by such matters, instigated by implacable parties and prosecuted with questionable judgment by their counsel. It is high time for this to stop. . . . Without sufficient evidence of discrimination, that is, an adverse employment decision made because of a protected characteristic (and not simply one that concerns a person exhibiting a protected characteristic), a case under Title VII must fail.

Personality conflicts are a fact of life, occurring in the workplace with the frequency of overly-demanding supervisors and crushed employee expectations. And yes, discrimination is also alive and well in America today. But one will not unearth invidious distinctions lurking beneath every act of discipline or every denial of advancement. Any attempt to argue otherwise trivializes the laws enacted to eradicate the bigotry that still blocks the path to individual achievement and inhibits our collective advancement.

It also fosters a culture of victims. This Court does not have the power to prevent the rain from falling into anyone’s life, and is not about to intercede in every workplace squabble. Where, as here, the law offers no remedy, the responsibility for recovering from the occasional affronts of office life falls at the feet of the complainant. . . .

To those souls who still labor under the heavy hand of illegal workplace discrimination, the doors of this Court will remain ever open. The pretenders, though, must learn to wrest control of their

85. See Posner, supra note 74, at 182 ("When a class of suits is dominated by suits that lack merit, judges form an expectation, often unconsciously, that the next suit in the class will lack merit. This expectation will color their reaction to new suits. This expectation is . . . one of the factors in the increased willingness of district judges to grant summary judgment and to dismiss cases on the pleadings."). See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1995) (stating that cognitive bias and stereotypes are frequently unintentional and unconscious).
own lives from deleterious circumstances without seeking recourse from the courts.  

For any number of reasons, many judges may choose not to be as forthright with their opinions about employment discrimination cases generally. To the extent this is the case, Judges Pointer and Spencer are only the vocal contingent of a larger, more reticent cohort of like-minded judges.

This is not to say, however, that judges who harbor such beliefs are necessarily conscious of their skepticism; presumably many are not. Consciousness of such views aside, to the extent that the views expressed by Judges Pointer and Spencer are commonly held, and assuming that discrimination is declining at an equal rate across jurisdictions, we would expect to see jurisdictions with more employment discrimination filings to be less receptive to claims of

87. There is reason to believe that Judges Pointer and Spencer are not alone in their skepticism of employment discrimination claims. See Tschappat v. Reich, 957 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1997). There, Judge Stanley Sporkin stated: This case shows once again the need to adjust our anti-discrimination laws. The evidence needed to make a prima facie case is much too low. It seems that almost anyone not selected for a job can maintain a court action. It is for this reason that the federal courts are flooded with employment cases. We are becoming personnel czars of virtually every one of this nation’s public and private institutions. The drafters of the original legislation could never have intended the resulting consequences from what they deemed to be necessary, progressive legislation. It is obvious that amendatory legislation is required. What is needed is a better screening mechanism as a pre-requisite for gaining access to this nation’s federal court system. If an appropriate screening mechanism cannot be devised, then at a minimum a new Article I court should be created to hear this flood of cases. The point is some change is urgently needed.

Id. at 299; see also Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that plaintiffs use Title VII “more than occasionally” to seek “principles of job protection that do not yet exist in American law”); Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1383 n.272 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (noting that pro se plaintiffs often file “meritless” claims of employment discrimination); Christine G. Cooper, Where Are We Going With Gilmer? – Some Rumination on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203, 203 (1992) (quoting then-sitting District Judge James McMillan as stating, “There’s no form of litigation I would more gladly forego than employment discrimination suits”); Roger J. Gregory, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases: Should the Guilty Employer Go Free?, 9 LAB. LAW. 43, 68 (1993) (commenting on “the changing views of federal judges concerning civil rights enforcement” and opining that “[m]any judges may feel that too many discrimination suits are brought and that too many lack a substantial evidentiary foundation” (internal footnotes omitted)); cf. supra note 47 (showing that employment discrimination plaintiffs win only half as often in bench trials as they do in jury trials).

88. See supra note 85.
employment discrimination than those with lower volumes. It is to this that I now turn.

IV. MANIPULATION OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW

A few words are in order before I begin a discussion of the varied approaches the circuits have taken in interpreting federal antidiscrimination statutes. In the discrimination arena, as in many other contexts, many circuit splits exist, and a discussion of all (or even most) of them is more suited to a treatise than an article. As noted, approximately 70% of discrimination allegations arise under Title VII. A survey of these cases reveals that Title VII claims overwhelmingly involve claims of racial and/or sex discrimination. From a statistical standpoint, then, when we talk about employment discrimination jurisprudence writ large, we are essentially talking about the law of race and sex discrimination.89 This Article therefore focuses primarily on this subset of employment discrimination cases.

Yet even within this subset of cases, not all inter-circuit divides are equally important. On some issues virtually all of the circuits have weighed in; on others only a handful or less have. Deeper circuit splits not only indicate an issue’s recurrence, they also permit more robust analysis. For these reasons, this Article is further restricted to some of the most pervasive employment discrimination issues that have divided courts over the last quarter century.

A. Defining Discrimination: What Constitutes an “Adverse Employment Action” for Purposes of Retaliation?

To prevail on a claim of disparate treatment (as distinguished for the moment from retaliation or harassment claims), a plaintiff must show, among other things, that he or she suffered an “adverse employment action.” Loathe to insert themselves as the arbiter of all workplace-related disputes, federal courts have uniformly concluded that minor slights and indignations suffered in the workplace are not actionable. And, with few exceptions, purely lateral trans-

89. See supra note 69.
90. See, e.g., Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an adverse employment action. Minor and even trivial actions that an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like would otherwise form the basis of a discrimination suit. While being ‘aggrieved’ is necessary to state a claim for retaliation, . . . it is not sufficient to demonstrate that a particular employment action was adverse.” (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original)); Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 451 (3d Cir. 2006) (Title VII “does not mandate a happy workplace”); Sallis v. Univ. of Minn., 408 F.3d 470, 476 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[m]ere inconvenience” that results only in “minor changes in working conditions” does not meet this standard); Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 23 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that without some threshold test of substantiality, “every trivial personnel action that an irritable . . . employee did not like would form the basis of a dis-
fers, changes in job duties, oral and written reprimands, threats of termination or demotion, or other actions that make an employee's job more difficult

crimation suit" (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original); Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2002) (minor or trivial changes in working conditions do not constitute an adverse employment action); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[M]ere ostracism in the workplace is not enough to show an adverse employment decision." (internal citation omitted)); Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[N]ot every unpleasant matter short of [discharge or demotion] creates a cause of action . . . ." (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original); James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 379 (4th Cir. 2004) (Title VII's "wording makes clear that Congress did not want the specter of liability to hang over every personnel decision"); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Title VII is not a general civility code for the American workplace . . . ."); Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that an adverse employment action "must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities"); Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e will not consider 'a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities' to be an adverse employment action." (internal citation omitted)); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998) ("we do not doubt that there is some threshold level of substanceality that must be met for unlawful discrimination to be cognizable").

91. See, e.g., Kessler v. Westchester County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir. 2006) (purely lateral transfers not actionable); Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 23 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting "clear trend of authority" across circuits regarding purely lateral transfers); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (lateral transfers not actionable); Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885-86 (6th Cir. 1996).

92. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1245 (11th Cir. 2001) ("In the vast majority of instances, however, we think an employee alleging a loss of prestige on account of a change in work assignments, without any tangible harm, will be outside the protection afforded by Congress in Title VII's anti-discrimination clause . . . ."); Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 256 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting claim based on transfer to more stressful job); Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1556-57 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting Title VII claim based on change in job assignment, recognizing that a contrary result would lead to "judicial micromanagement of business practices"); Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying Title VII claim based on lateral transfer).

93. See, e.g., Lucas v. Chi. Transit Auth., 367 F.3d 714, 731 (7th Cir. 2004) ("There must be some tangible job consequence accompanying the reprimand to rise to the level of a material adverse employment action; otherwise every reprimand or attempt to counsel an employee could form the basis of a federal suit."); Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 307 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 2002) (letter of warning that would remain in employee's file only temporarily did not constitute adverse employment action); Primes v. Reno, 190 F.3d 765, 767 (6th Cir. 1999) ("If every low evaluation or other action by an employer that makes an employee unhappy or resentful were considered an adverse action, Title VII would be triggered by supervisor criticism or even facial expressions indicating displeasure. Paranoia in the workplace would replace the prima facie case as the basis for a Title VII cause of action."); Koschoff v. Runyon, No. Civ.A. 98-2736, 1999 WL 907546 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 1999) (letters of reprimand and
also do not give rise to a cause of action for discrimination, as long as the challenged action did not lead to a decrease in salary or a loss of tangible job benefits.\(^9\) Moreover, even disparate treatment that results only in temporary\(^9\) or de minimis economic harm is not actionable.\(^9\) By the same token, the circuits also agree that adverse "ultimate employment decisions" such as termination, non-promotion, and those affecting leave and compensation do give rise to a cause of action.\(^9\)

This consensus with respect to disparate-treatment, adverse-employment actions fractured substantially in the retaliation context. Prior to the Supreme Court's recent opinion in *Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,*\(^9\) the circuits were badly divided over the extent to which Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination laws protected against retaliation. This divergence was significant because claims of retaliation frequently go hand-in-hand with allegations of disparate treatment and harassment. Consequently, a lower standard for retaliation claims would allow a plaintiff to get to a jury on a retaliation claim even if the disparate treatment claim or harassment claim did suspension notice not adverse employment actions after employer promised never to use them against employee).

\(^94\) See, e.g., *Mowbray v. Am. Gen. Life Co.*, 162 Fed. App'x 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Neither verbal threats of termination nor merely being at risk of termination constitutes an adverse employment action."); *Mitchell v. Vanderbilt Univ.*, 389 F.3d 177, 182 (6th Cir. 2004) (threat by employer to reduce employee's pay, alter his employment status, and reassign him were never implemented and therefore not adverse employment actions); *Russell v. Principi*, 257 F.3d 815, 819-820 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("To the extent, however, that [plaintiff] relies on her temporary exposure to a higher risk of [termination], we hold that such an unrealized risk of a future adverse action, even if formalized, is too ephemeral to constitute an adverse employment action . . . ."); *Hollins v. Atl. Co.*, 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999) (threat to discharge not actionable).

\(^95\) See, e.g., *Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP*, 480 F.3d 534, 539 (7th Cir. 2007) ([H]arder work assignments do not constitute an adverse employment action."); *Broska v. Henderson*, 70 Fed. App'x 262, *4 (6th Cir. 2003) (changes that make job "significantly more difficult" not actionable); *Jacob-Mua v. Veneman*, 289 F.3d 517, 522 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[P]laintiff claims that because of her race she was given work assignments not commensurate with her skills, abilities, and job functions, given inferior equipment by her supervisors, denied attendance at a writing workshop, and denied a timely promotion. None of these allegations rise to the level of an adverse employment action.").

\(^96\) See, e.g., *Green v. Ill. Dep't of Children and Family Servs.*, 439 F. Supp. 2d 841, 850 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (suggesting that three-day paid suspension not actionable); *Hollins v. Atl. Co.*, 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999) (postponement of one day's pay not actionable).

\(^97\) See *Rhodes v. Ill. Dep't of Transp.*, 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a plaintiff in a sex discrimination suit did not suffer an adverse employment action where her employer withheld one day's pay, which was not reinstated).

\(^98\) See, e.g., *Breaux v. City of Garland*, 205 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000) (articulating actionable "adverse employment actions").

not survive summary judgment, which has substantial ramifications for settlement.

The Fifth\textsuperscript{100} and Eighth\textsuperscript{101} Circuits both took a narrow view of what constituted actionable retaliation. The Seventh Circuit adopted a similarly restrictive view, notwithstanding its contention that it applied a “more generous”\textsuperscript{102} definition of adverse employment action in the retaliation context.\textsuperscript{103} In some instances, the Seventh Circuit appeared to have applied the more restrictive disparate treatment standard for “adverse employment action” to claims for retaliation, effectively equalizing the evidentiary requirements between the two types of claims.\textsuperscript{104}

Other circuits took a somewhat more permissive approach. The Second,\textsuperscript{105} Third,\textsuperscript{106} Fourth,\textsuperscript{107} Sixth,\textsuperscript{108} and Eleventh\textsuperscript{109} Circuits all rejected the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{100} See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (entering judgment for employer on retaliation claim because “[h]ostility from fellow employees, having tools stolen, and resulting anxiety, without more, do not constitute ultimate employment decisions, and therefore are not the required adverse employment actions”); Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying “ultimate employment decision” standard to Title VII retaliation claims).
\item \textsuperscript{101} See Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1073 (8th Cir. 1998) (adopting ultimate employment decision standard for retaliation claims); Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (8th Cir. 1997) (same).
\item \textsuperscript{102} Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 902 (7th Cir. 2003).
\item \textsuperscript{103} See id. (citing sex discrimination case to excuse employer’s “troublesome” decision “to put a laundry list of complaints aired about Johnson’s work into writing” and evidence that employer denied safety equipment to plaintiff); see also Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2000) (granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim despite evidence that included “demeaning assignments, verbal abuse, surveillance, diminished responsibilities, refusal to cooperate on job assignments, and placements in situations designed to result in failure,” notwithstanding its “broad[]” definition of “adverse action”). But see Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005) (conduct would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination”); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th Cir. 2000) (opining that the Seventh Circuit had taken an “expansive view” of the type of actions that can constitute retaliation).
\item \textsuperscript{104} See, e.g., Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 902 (7th Cir. 2003).
\item \textsuperscript{105} Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997) (plaintiff must show “a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment” (internal citations and quotations omitted)); McKenney v. N.Y. City Off-Track Betting Corp., 903 F. Supp. 619, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same).
\item \textsuperscript{106} See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (“retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . [to] constitute [an] ‘adverse employment action’”).
\item \textsuperscript{107} See Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that “‘ultimate employment decision’ is not the standard in this circuit” and expressly rejecting \textit{Mattern}); Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that “conformity between the provisions of Title VII is to be preferred”).
\end{itemize}
“ultimate employment decision” standard, but still require a showing that the retaliation be “materially adverse” to the terms and conditions of employment.

A third group of circuits took a much broader view of conduct that could constitute actionable retaliation. The District of Columbia Circuit made clear that anti-retaliation laws applied to any conduct that could dissuade a reasonable employee from filing a charge of retaliation. The First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits adopted similarly expansive views of what actions could constitute unlawful retaliation.

In Burlington, the Supreme Court adopted the broadest view of actionable retaliation. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Breyer stated that “any ac-

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108. See White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a plaintiff must show a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions” of employment).

109. Bass v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, Orange County, Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1118 (11th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision only protect against “conduct that alters an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that “Title VII’s protection against retaliatory discrimination extends to adverse actions which fall short of ultimate employment decisions,” but cautioning that “some threshold level of substantiality that must be met for unlawful discrimination to be cognizable under the anti-retaliation clause”).

110. See Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that any action that would dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a discrimination claim constitutes actionable retaliation); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc’y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding illegal retaliation in employer postponement of symposium for former employee, notwithstanding court’s concession that the activity “could not be described strictly as ‘employment action’”).

111. See Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision governs, “employer actions such as demotions, disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted negative job evaluations and toleration of harassment by other employees” (internal citation omitted)).

112. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (explicitly rejecting “adverse employment action” definition applied by Second and Third Circuits in retaliation context as unduly narrow); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375-76 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that such non-ultimate employment decisions as “[t]ransfers of job duties and undeserved performance ratings” could constitute adverse employment actions cognizable under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision).

113. See Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The longstanding rule in our circuit has been to liberally define the phrase adverse employment action and not limit the term to simply monetary losses in the form of wages or benefits. A major underpinning of this rule has been the remedial nature of Title VII, reasoning that a liberal definition of Title VII is necessary to best carry out its anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation purpose.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Gun nell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that the Tenth Circuit had “liberally define[d] adverse employment action”); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984-86 (10th Cir. 1996) (construing Title VII’s prohibition on retaliation to extend to malicious prosecution action brought by former employer).
tion that could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination" could support a retaliation claim. For present purposes, however, the most interesting aspect is the circuit split prior to Burlington.

This split supports my thesis that workload, not ideology, is more important to judicial outcomes in the discrimination context. Of the seven circuits with the highest district and appellate workloads—the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh—only the Ninth Circuit, which had among the fewest employment discrimination appeals per capita, adopted the most expansive view of retaliation. Of the eight circuits that adopted either the strict or the moderate view of actionable retaliation, six circuits—the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh—handled higher than average numbers of discrimination filings at either the district or the appellate level (or both in most cases).

Conversely, of the four circuits that adopted the broadest view of retaliation—the First, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits—only the Ninth has a district or appellate workload that exceeds the corresponding average. And with scattered exceptions, each of these four circuits had few discrimination cases at both the district and appellate levels relative to their respective peers in other circuits. Accordingly, how receptive a circuit was to retaliation claims appears correlated with its overall workload and number of employment discrimination filings.

B. Proving Discrimination: The Direct/Circumstantial Evidence Divide

The manner in which a plaintiff must prove discrimination turned until recently on the nature of the evidence he or she put forth. In most cases, the plaintiff could not offer direct evidence that conclusively demonstrated that the employer had acted unlawfully. Absent such "smoking gun" evidence, the plaintiff would have to prove discrimination under the inferential proof scheme set out in McDonnell Douglas. In those cases where a plaintiff did have direct evidence of discrimination, however, the McDonnell Douglas framework was unnecessary, since the plaintiff could already show that the employer took an unlawful consideration into account in making the challenged employment decision. In these so-called "mixed motive" cases, the only way for an employer to avoid liability was to prove that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of a discriminatory motive.

Before the 1991 Civil Rights Act, courts posed the mixed-motive question in the liability phase. Consequently, a defendant could avoid liability altogether by proving that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of a discriminatory motive. Congress legislatively overruled this prac-

114. This decision flows from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 (1989) ("At some point in the proceedings, of course, the District Court must decide
tice, making evidence that the employer would have made the same decision relevant only in the remedy phase. If the defendant carries its burden under the same-decision test, a plaintiff cannot recover damages. But this does not mean that an employer would be out of the woods altogether. Declaratory and injunctive relief and—perhaps most importantly—attorney's fees remain available by virtue of the employer's consideration of an illegal motive. 115

This was very bad news for employers. After 1991, a plaintiff who could show direct evidence of discrimination was in the driver's seat in negotiations, as defendants would be liable for the plaintiff's attorney's fees (or some portion thereof) irrespective of whether the plaintiff recovered damages. 116 Given that attorney's fees frequently dwarf a plaintiff's damages, defendants would be none too eager to pursue litigation knowing they would ultimately foot the bill for not one but two sets of lawyers. Apart from attorney's fees, the employer in such cases would be stuck in the uncomfortable position of arguing to the jury that it made its decision for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons in spite of the evidence clearly suggesting it did not. For these reasons, a court's decision to classify plaintiff's claim as a mixed-motive as opposed to a single-motive case has massive consequences. This classification decision hinges on the court's determination whether the plaintiff has adduced direct evidence of discrimination. Accordingly, how direct direct evidence had to be was critically important.

The circuits took three different approaches to defining direct evidence. The most narrow version defined direct evidence as "evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of discrimination] without inference or presumption." 117 This view was adopted by the Fifth, 118 Seventh, 119 and Eleventh 120 Circuits, all

whether a particular case involves mixed motives. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy the factfinder that it is more likely than not that a forbidden characteristic played a part in the employment decision, then she may prevail only if she proves...that the employer's stated reason for its decision is pretextual.

116. See sources cited supra note 81.
119. See, e.g., Venturelli v. ARC Cnty. Servs., Inc., 350 F.3d 592, 599-600 (7th Cir. 2003); Indurante v. Local 705, Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters, 160 F.3d 364, 367 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming grant of summary judgment in national origin discrimination case for defendant despite plaintiff's affidavits detailing various ethnic slurs made by defendant during plaintiff's discharge because evidence was not direct); Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994).
120. See, e.g., Wascura v. City of S. Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1242 n.2 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate...will constitute direct evidence of discrimination.") (internal citation

http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol73/iss2/7
of which have either heavy overall workloads or many employment discrimination filings, or both.

A second, somewhat broader view known as the "animator-plus" perspective was adopted by the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits. Under this view, direct evidence is defined as evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that (i) reflects directly the animus of the employer and (ii) bears squarely on the contested employment decision.

The third and most broad view of direct evidence has been adopted by the District of Columbia and Eighth Circuits. This line of cases holds that, as long as the evidence (whether direct or circumstantial) is related to the alleged discriminatory animus, it is irrelevant whether the animus is linked closely to


124. See, e.g., Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1030 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003) (employing this more lenient definition of evidence required to trigger a mixed motive inquiry); Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (same).

125. Thomas v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (describing direct evidence as evidence that "relate[s] to the question of discrimination in the particular employment decision").

the employment decision at issue. In short, discriminatory animus alone will suffice as direct evidence of discrimination; no plus factor is needed.

Here again, my theory is confirmed. Of the three circuits that adopted the strictest view of direct evidence, the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits have (by a wide margin) the highest workloads of any appellate courts, as well as many discrimination claims. And while the Seventh Circuit’s workload hovers close to the median for both district and appellate judges, it hears more discrimination claims than almost any other circuit.

Of the two circuits that adopted the most lenient definition of direct evidence – the Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits – both had workloads at or below the district average, and two of the three lowest appellate workloads.

The remaining circuits split the difference between these two extremes. That the Fourth and Ninth Circuits found common ground on this issue does much to undermine a purely ideological theory of judging, as these two circuits are rarely viewed as kindred souls when it comes to employment discrimination jurisprudence.

Their ideological reputations notwithstanding, this moderate definition of direct evidence is consistent with the workload and employment discrimination filings of each circuit. The Ninth Circuit has one of the highest workloads, but only a modest level of employment discrimination filings, particularly at the appellate level. The Fourth Circuit has a workload that registers slightly above the average and a per capita volume of discrimination claims that also falls near the median. The Third Circuit is similar: below average workloads, but above average discrimination filings.

Overall, I observe that where circuits had high workloads and high volumes of employment discrimination claims they adopted the least plaintiff-friendly rule, but where workloads and discrimination claims were both low, plaintiffs fared the best. Where these two factors cut in opposite directions, or where these factors both hovered around the circuit averages, such as in the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, courts charted a middle course.

In its 2003 decision in *Desert Palace v. Costa*, the Supreme Court abrogated the direct/circumstantial evidence distinction in mixed-motive cases. Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that the text of the 1991 amendments unambiguously “states that a plaintiff need only ‘demonstrat[e]’ that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to ‘any employment practice.’” In the Court’s view, Congress’s failure to specify what sort of evidence the plaintiff must offer in support of her claim that the employer had an illegal motive was significant. The Court inferred from this silence that Congress intended to overrule legislatively the direct/circumstantial distinction, holding that the 1991 Civil Rights Act “does not mention, much less require,

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128. Id. at 98 (internal citation omitted).
that a plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct evidence."\(^{129}\) Although the Court explicitly declined to address the continued vitality of the direct/circumstantial evidence distinction outside of the mixed-motive context,\(^{130}\) some scholars have speculated that, with the removal of the direct evidence hurdle, single-motive cases will become a thing of the past.\(^{131}\) The rulings of a few courts confirm this speculation,\(^{132}\) but, to the extent that this interpretation is not widely followed, it remains an open question what methodology courts will use to classify employment cases.

### C. Proving Discrimination: Pretext v. Pretext-Plus

Following the *Celotex* trilogy, summary judgment became the marquee event in pretrial litigation. Recent Supreme Court opinions have further cemented summary judgment’s prominence by noting that it, not Rule 12 motions, is the primary procedural vehicle for weeding out meritless claims.\(^{133}\) Unsurprisingly, then, employment discrimination litigants (and the courts that decided their cases) clashed frequently and bitterly on what quantum of evidence a plaintiff must offer to survive summary judgment. And, for reasons that will become clear shortly, nowhere did the summary judgment battle rage more fiercely than in the area of pretext.

Except in the unusual case where a plaintiff can present “smoking gun” evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must proceed under the familiar burden-

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\(^{129}\) *Id.* at 98-99 (“Congress explicitly defined the term ‘demonstrates’ in the 1991 Act, leaving little doubt that no special evidentiary showing is required. Title VII defines the term ‘demonstrates’ as to ‘meef[t] the burdens of production and persuasion.’ If Congress intended the term ‘demonstrates’ to require that the ‘burdens of production and persuasion’ be met by direct evidence or some other heightened showing, it could have made that intent clear by including language to that effect in § 2000e(m). Its failure to do so is significant, for Congress has been unequivocal when imposing heightened proof requirements in other circumstances, including in other provisions of Title 42.” (internal citation omitted)).

\(^{130}\) *Id.* at 94 n.1.


\(^{132}\) See, e.g., *Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.* 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991-92 (D. Minn. 2003) (“The dichotomy produced by the *McDonnell Douglas* framework is a false one. In practice, few employment decisions are made solely on basis of one rationale to the exclusion of all others. Instead, most employment decisions are the result of the interaction of various factors, legitimate and at times illegitimate, objective and subjective, rational and irrational. The Court does not see the efficacy in perpetuating this legal fiction implicitly exposed by the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Desert Palace.*”).

shifting framework first articulated by the Supreme Court in *McDonnell Douglas v. Green.* The *McDonnell Douglas* analysis has three parts. In the first step, the plaintiff must come forth with evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff has suffered unlawful discrimination, although the prima facie case varies depending on the nature of the discrimination alleged. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." This burden of production is a light one, and even a dubious reason will suffice. Should the defendant carry this burden of production, the presumption of discrimination dissolves and analysis proceeds to the third and final step. In step three, the plaintiff must offer evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but instead were a pretext for discrimination. While the burden of production shifts to the defendant in step two, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Because plaintiffs rarely have direct evidence of discrimination, and because cases proceeding under the *McDonnell Douglas* inferential proof scheme are rarely resolved in the first two steps, whether a plaintiff can offer sufficient evidence of pretext is typically dispositive at the summary judgment stage. Unsurprisingly, then, there has been no small amount of disagreement among the circuits regarding the quantum and nature of evidence a plaintiff must adduce to make a sufficient showing of pretext in order to avoid summary judgment.

In *Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine*, the Supreme Court sought to clarify how a plaintiff might carry her burden to show pretext under the *McDonnell Douglas* rubric, stating:

The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the

135. Id. at 802.
136. See, e.g., *Purkett v. Elem*, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (holding that even "implausible," "silly," "fantastic," or "superstitious" reasons would satisfy the burden of production). Of course, the less believable the defendant's articulated reason, the more likely it will be determined to be pretextual.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., *Shaner v. Synthes*, 204 F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Our experience is that most cases turn on the third stage, i.e., can the plaintiff establish pretext."); *Miles v. M.N.C. Corp.*, 750 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Because of the employee's easy burden of establishing a prima facie case and the employer's normal ability to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, most disparate treatment cases turn on the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate that the nondiscriminatory reason offered by the employer was a pretext for discrimination.").
true reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.  

Given the Court's use of the disjunctive, it would appear that a plaintiff could survive summary judgment by offering evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the defendant's proffered reason for taking the contested employment action was false. Nonetheless, in the decade or so following Burdine, a deep split emerged among the circuits regarding whether such evidence, standing alone, was sufficient to survive summary judgment.

Although conflicting authority existed within some circuits, the courts more or less divided into two camps. The District of Columbia, Second,  

140. 450 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added).  
141. King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Burdine makes it absolutely clear that a plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of intentional discrimination and who discredits the defendants' rebuttal should prevail, even if he or she has offered no direct evidence of discrimination."); Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("If, however, [the plaintiff] shows [the defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory] reason to be specious, then in conjunction with his prima facie case [plaintiff] has carried his burden of proving discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence."); Townsend v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 746 F. Supp. 178, 184 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that the record "contains so many unexplained inconsistencies, irregularities, and holes that the Court simply cannot believe WMATA's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons").  
142. Lopez v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that, with respect to pretext, "[i]t is enough for the plaintiff to show that the articulated reasons were not the true reasons for the defendant's actions"); Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d Cir. 1989) ("A showing that a proffered justification is pretextual is itself sufficient to support an inference that the employer intentionally discriminated."); Dister v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Burdine made it plain that in addition to directly proving a discriminatory motive for firing, a plaintiff may prevail upon a showing that the employer's given legitimate reason is unworthy of credence, that is, that the reason supplied was not the true reason for the unfavorable employment decision."). But see Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 1984) (granting summary judgment on Title VII claim arising out of denial of tenure because the record was devoid of evidence that decision was actually motivated "by forbidden considerations such as sex or race"); Graham v. Renbrook Sch., 692 F. Supp. 102, 107 n.7 (D. Conn. 1988) ("Disbelief of testimony, however, does not alone establish that the opposite of that testimony is in fact the truth. . . . Furthermore, even if, as an abstract proposition, it were permissible to infer the opposite merely because proffered testimony were disbelieved, it would still be an illogical leap in an age discrimination case to infer a discriminatory motive simply because the employer's own explanation of its conduct is disbelieved." (internal citations omitted)).
Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits each adopted the so-called "pretext-only" rule: A plaintiff may survive summary judgment by offering evidence that if the plaintiff presents enough evidence for a jury to find that the asserted reasons for the tenure denial were not the actual reasons, then the jury may infer that the employer actually was motivated in its decision by race; plaintiff is not required to provide independent, direct evidence of racial discrimination.

143. See Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 726-27 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[I]f the plaintiff presents enough evidence for a jury to find that the asserted reasons for the tenure denial were not the actual reasons, then the jury may infer that the employer actually was motivated in its decision by race; plaintiff is not required to provide independent, direct evidence of racial discrimination."); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir. 1987) ("If the plaintiff [demonstrates] that it is more likely than not that the employer did not act for its proffered reason, then the employer's decision remains unexplained and the inferences from the evidence produced by the plaintiff may be sufficient to prove the ultimate fact of discriminatory intent . . ."); Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that "a showing that a proffered justification is pretextual is itself equivalent to a finding that the employer intentionally discriminated" (emphasis in original)).

144. See MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988) ("As a matter of both common sense and federal law, an employer's submission of a discredited explanation for firing a member of a protected class is itself evidence which may persuade the finder of fact that such unlawful discrimination actually occurred."); Washburn v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 831 F.2d 1404, 1408 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[A] plaintiff is not required to present rebuttal testimony following the defendant's showing of nondiscriminatory reasons for termination. . . The jury in its consideration of all the evidence could still find that the plaintiff's evidence established that the reasons articulated were pretextual. . . [I]ndeed, there may be some cases where the plaintiff's initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant's explanation." (internal citations and quotations omitted)); Dace v. ACF Indus., Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that the pretext inquiry "is not one of weighing the quality and quantity of the defendant's evidence against that of the plaintiff, but of determining whether the plaintiff's evidence supports a reasonable inference that Dace was not demoted for the reasons given"). But see Gray v. Univ. of Ark., 883 F.2d 1394, 1402 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming entry of judgment on sex discrimination claim notwithstanding the fact that defendant's proffered reasons for terminating plaintiff were "less than weighty, if not almost laughable," because court's inquiry is limited to whether discrimination was but for cause of termination).

145. See Perez v. Curcio, 841 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Pretext is established by showing either that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the employer or that the employer's explanation is unworthy of credence." (internal citation omitted)); Williams v. Edward Appfels Coffee Co., 792 F.2d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that a plaintiff "is not required to offer additional evidence, beyond that offered to establish his prima facie case, in order to meet his burden at [the summary judgment] stage"); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[W]hen a plaintiff has established a prima facie inference of disparate treatment through direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, he will necessarily have raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the legitimacy or bona fides of the employer's articulated reason for its employment decision."). But see Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We have made clear that a plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment simply by making out a prima facie case. . . The plaintiff cannot carry [her burden on summary judgment to show pretext] simply by restating the prima facie case and expressing an intent to challenge the credibility of the
employer’s witnesses on cross-examination. She must produce specific facts either
directly evidencing a discriminatory motive or showing that the employer’s explanation
is not credible.

146. See Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that a plaintiff can show pretext by showing that “the [defendant’s] proffered reasons were not the true reasons for the hiring decision.”); Beck v. QuikTrip Corp., 708 F.2d 532, 535 (10th Cir. 1983) (affirming finding of discrimination where reasons defendant gave for termination were “insubstantial and unreasonable”).

147. See Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) (“In the final round of shifting burdens, it is up to plaintiff, unassisted by the original presumption, to show that the employer’s stated reason was but a pretext for age discrimination. To achieve this plateau, an ADEA plaintiff must do more than simply refute or cast doubt on the company’s rationale for the adverse action. The plaintiff must also show a discriminatory animus based on age.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)); Keyes v. Sec’y of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that it was “plaintiff’s burden not only to show that the defendants’ proffered reasons for hiring someone else were apocryphal, but that those reasons were pretexts aimed at masking sex or race discrimination” (emphasis omitted)); Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1336 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting pretext-plus standard from Keyes); White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1043 (1st Cir. 1984) (“Merely casting doubt on the employer’s articulated reason does not suffice to meet the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating discriminatory intent . . . .”).

148. See Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1417 (4th Cir. 1991) (“If the defendant articulates a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, the plaintiff must then prove that the reason given was a mere pretext for discrimination and that age was a more likely reason for the employment action.”); Goldberg v. B. Green & Co., 836 F.2d 845, 849 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the plaintiff “cannot avoid summary judgment in this case simply by refuting [his employer’s] non-age-related reasons for firing him”); Gries v. Zimmer, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (“To successfully prove pretext, the plaintiff must establish, first, that the stated reason for the employment action was not the true reason and, second, that the real reason for the employment action was discrimination.”).

149. See Bienkowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 (5th Cir. 1988) (explicitly rejecting “pretext-only standard” adopted by Third Circuit in Chipollini, noting that “[e]ven if the trier of fact chose to believe an employee’s assessment of his performance rather than the employer’s, that choice alone would not lead to a conclusion that the employer’s version is a pretext for age discrimination”); Reeves v. Gen. Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 523-24 (5th Cir. 1982) (“It was incumbent upon Reeves to introduce substantial evidence to show that General Foods’ articulated reasons were pretextual and that he had been discriminated against because of age.”). But see Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[The plaintiff] is not required to prove that the Railroad was motivated by bad reasons; he need only persuade the factfinder that the Railroad’s purported good reasons were untrue.”).

150. See North v. Madison Area Ass’n for Retarded Citizens-Developmental Ctrs. Corp., 844 F.2d 401, 406 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that a plaintiff “does not meet [his burden in the third step of McDonnell Douglas analysis] simply by showing that [his
and Eleventh Circuits adhered to a “pretext-plus” standard. Under this rule, a plaintiff cannot demonstrate pretext simply by showing that the defendant’s articulated reason was false. Rather, a plaintiff must make the further showing that the defendant’s actual reason for doing what it did was impermissible animus. In these courts’ view, pretext does not simply mean “false”; rather, it is shorthand for “pretext for discrimination.” Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate unless the plaintiff offered evidence to show that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for discrimination.

On balance, the circuits that adopted a “pretext-only” standard have had comparatively low workloads and employment discrimination filings, and the reverse is true of those courts that required a greater showing to establish pretext. As before, I observe trends consistent with my theory.

employer’s] stated reasons were pretextual; he must also show a casual chain in which race played a dispositive role”); Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 1988) (“We have held previously that pretext in this context means ‘pretext for discrimination.’” (internal citation omitted)); Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing between pretext and pretext for discrimination); Friedel v. City of Madison, 832 F.2d 965, 975 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[P]laintiffs must allege and support not only pretext, but also that the Department’s actions were pretext for discrimination based on a prohibited characteristic . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). But see Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1991) (“If the employer offers a pretext - a phony reason - for why it fired the employee, then the trier of fact is permitted, although not compelled, to infer that the real reason was age.” (citation omitted)); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990) (similarly holding that where plaintiff has offered evidence to show that where employer’s prof- fered reason is false, inference of discrimination is permissible, but not mandatory).

151. See Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 981 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Of course, merely establishing pretext, without more, is insufficient to support a finding of racial discrimination. The plaintiff must show he suffered intentional discrimination because of his race.” (internal citations omitted)); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The ultimate question in a disparate treatment case is not whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case or demonstrated pretext, but whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.” (internal quotations omitted)); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The court thus may not circumvent the intent requirement of the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persuasion by couching its conclusion in terms of pretext; a simple finding that the defendant did not truly rely on its proffered reason, without a further finding that the defendant relied instead on race, will not suffice to establish Title VII liability.”). But see Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The implausibility of the alleged justification is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Pilot Freight’s articulated reason is pretextual.” (citing Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 900 (3d Cir. 1987) (pretext-only standard)).

152. A representative case is Grabb v. Bendix Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1223, 1244 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (“[I]t is not enough to show that the employer’s reasons were not the real reasons, were false, or were merely a pretext. The plaintiff must show that they were a pretext for discrimination.” (internal citations omitted)).
In 1993, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in *St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks* to resolve this divide. Melvin Hicks, an African-American who was formerly employed as a correctional officer by St. Mary’s Honor Center, brought a Title VII suit alleging that his termination was racially motivated. After a bench trial, the District Court determined that the reasons proffered by St. Mary’s for terminating Hicks were pretextual, but that Hicks had failed to show that St. Mary’s demoted and then terminated him on the basis of race. Accordingly, the District Court entered judgment in St. Mary’s favor.

The Eighth Circuit reversed and entered judgment in Hicks’ favor, holding that “once [Hicks] proved all of [St. Mary’s] proffered reasons for the adverse employment actions were pretextual, [Hicks] was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

A closely divided Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit. Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Scalia unequivocally rejected the Eighth Circuit’s rule that a plaintiff who demonstrates pretext is necessarily entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Such a finding was certainly permissible, the majority observed, but could obtain only upon a determination that unlawful discrimination did in fact occur. Because the District Court found that Hicks had failed to carry his burden in this regard, his claim failed. While the majority conceded that *Burdine*’s discussion of pretext could be read to reach a contrary result (and one that the dissent urged), the majority concluded that, taken in context, these statements referred to “pretext for discrimination.” Lastly, the majority dismissed *Burdine*’s statement that a plaintiff could demonstrate pretext “by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence” without a further finding of discriminatory animus as “dictum [that] contradicts or renders inexplicable numerous other statements, both in *Burdine* itself and in our later case law.” In the end, *Hicks* stands for the proposition that when a plaintiff exposes as pretextual an employer’s proffered reasons for taking the action it did, a factfinder may, but need not, conclude that discrimi-

154. Id. at 507-08.
155. Id. at 508-09 (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992)).
156. Id. at 511.
157. Id. at 514 (“We have no authority to impose liability upon an employer for alleged discriminatory employment practices unless an appropriate factfinder determines, according to proper procedures, that the employer has unlawfully discriminated.”).
158. Id. at 515-16 (“But a reason cannot be proved to be a ‘pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown *both* that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason. *Burdine*’s later allusions to proving or demonstrating simply ‘pretext’ are reasonably understood to refer to the previously described pretext, i.e., ‘pretext for discrimination.’” (internal citations omitted)).
159. Id. at 517.
But a quizzical comment that immediately preceded the holding would soon take center stage. The majority observed:

The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.\(^\text{161}\)

Thus, while the Supreme Court buried "pretext-plus" with the one hand, it resurrected it with the other under a new name, "suspicion of mendacity." Moreover, the Court reiterated that disbelief of the employer's proffered reasons, standing alone, was insufficient to compel judgment as a matter of law. Rather, a plaintiff must show "both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason."\(^\text{162}\) Although this language could be explained by the procedural posture of the case, this apparent conflict gave lower courts the jurisprudential hook they needed to continue to require discrimination plaintiffs to shoulder heightened evidentiary burdens. This aspect of Hicks led one commentator to lament that "[i]t did not require great prescience to predict the result of [this] uncharacteristically permissive language.\(^\text{163}\) Indeed it did not.

In the years that followed, the split that the Supreme Court endeavored to resolve in Hicks reemerged largely along the same lines. Now recast as "suspicion of mendacity," several circuits continued to embrace the old "pretext-plus" jurisprudence, while others adhered to a "pretext-only" understanding of Hicks. The First,\(^\text{164}\) Second,\(^\text{165}\) Fourth,\(^\text{166}\) Fifth,\(^\text{167}\) and Eleventh\(^\text{168}\) Circuits all

160. Id. at 511.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 512 n.4.
163. Catherine Lanctot, Secrets and Lies: The Need for A Definitive Rule of Law in Pretext Cases, 61 LA. L. REV. 539, 543 (2001); see also Hicks, 512 U.S. at 535-36 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for giving credence to "pretext-plus" analysis).
164. Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260-01 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating the Supreme Court in Hicks did not mean prima facie case plus proof of pretext was always sufficient to present a jury question).
165. Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1337 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc) ("[D]iscrimination cases differ from many areas of law in that under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework a plaintiff's satisfaction of the minimal requirements of the prima facie case does not necessarily mean, even if the elements of the prima facie case go unchallenged, that plaintiff will ultimately have sufficient evidence to support a verdict on each element that plaintiff ultimately must prove to win the case. It can be readily seen, furthermore, that the essential elements of this diminished, minimal prima facie case do not necessarily support a reasonable inference of illegal discrimination. . . . The point we make here is that evidence sufficient to satisfy the scaled-down requirements of the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas does not neces-
exploited the loophole in *Hicks* to ratchet up the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs. By contrast, the Third,169 Sixth,170 Seventh,171 Eighth,172 Ninth,173

sarily tell much about whether discrimination played a role in the employment decision. The fact that a plaintiff is judged to have satisfied these minimal requirements is no indication that, at the end of the case, plaintiff will have enough evidence of discrimination to support a verdict in his favor.”); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Cmty. Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[W]e believe it important to emphasize that a Title VII plaintiff does not necessarily meet its burden of persuasion by convincing the factfinder that the employer’s non-discriminatory explanation is not credible; rather, the trier of fact must find that the plaintiff has proven its explanation of discriminatory intent by a fair preponderance of the evidence.”).

166. Vaughan v. Metrahealth Cos., Inc., 145 F.3d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 1998) (rejecting “a rule that all discrimination plaintiffs are summary judgment-proof as soon as they raise a jury question about the veracity of their employer’s explanation for the challenged employment action”); Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F.3d 676, 680 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating to avoid summary judgment, plaintiff had to prove not only that the reason the employer presented was false, but also that discrimination was the real reason).

167. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 693 (5th Cir. 1999) (disproving employer’s proffered reason for adverse employment action not necessarily sufficient to show discrimination); Bauer v. Albermarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999) (same); Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (same).

168. Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 443-44 (11th Cir. 1996) (criticizing earlier post-*Hicks* decision in *Howard*, and stating that employer would still be entitled to judgment as a matter of law even if the plaintiff “provid[ed] a basis to doubt the employer’s justification” because plaintiff had failed to adduce “significantly probative” evidence that employer’s proffered reasons were pretextual); Walker v. NationsBank of Fla., 53 F.3d 1548, 1558 (11th Cir. 1995) (affirming grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the employer in an age and sex discrimination case, even though the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and had put on evidence sufficient to permit the factfinder to disbelieve all of the employer’s proffered reasons for the adverse employment action, because plaintiff “did not produce evidence that raised a suspicion of mendacity sufficient to permit us to find on this record that the bank intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of age/or sex”). But see Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1532 (11th Cir. 1997) (characterizing *Walker* as a “mistake,” and dismissing *Isenbergh* as “dicta”); Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 527 (11th Cir. 1994) (applying pretext-only standard).

169. Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“[T]he elements of the prima facie case and disbelief of the defendant’s proffered reasons are the threshold findings, beyond which the jury is permitted, but not required, to draw an inference leading it to conclude that there was intentional discrimination.”).

170. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he only effect of the employer’s nondiscriminatory explanation is to convert the inference of discrimination based upon the plaintiff’s prima facie case from a mandatory one which the jury must draw, to a permissive one the jury may draw, provided
Tenth,¹⁷⁴ and District of Columbia¹⁷⁵ Circuits all declined to raise the evidentiary standard. As before, this post-*Hicks* divide is largely consistent with my theory of prophylactic jurisprudence. The circuits with the three highest workloads during the years following *Hicks*—the Eleventh, Fifth, and Second Circuits—all embraced heightened pretext standards. Notably, these circuits were that the jury finds the employer’s explanation unworthy of belief.” (internal quotations omitted)).

171. Wohl v. Spectrum Mfg., Inc., 94 F.3d 353, 355 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A plaintiff in an age discrimination case may defeat a summary judgment motion brought by the employer if the plaintiff produces evidence that the employer proffered a phony reason for firing the employee.”); Perdomo v. Browner, 67 F.3d 140, 146 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The district court found Perdomo’s [direct] evidence of racial discrimination unpersuasive, but . . . such evidence is not required: the trier of fact is permitted to infer discrimination from a finding that the employer’s proffered reason was spurious.”).

172. Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“[R]ejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and . . . upon such rejection, no additional proof of discrimination is required . . . .” (internal citations and quotations omitted); Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1110 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case are thus present and the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to reject the defendant’s non-discriminatory explanations. The ultimate question of discrimination must therefore be left to the trier of fact to decide.” (internal quotations omitted)). *But see* Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 152 F.3d 1018, 1022-23 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[T]o survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must: (1) present evidence creating a fact issue as to whether the employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual; and (2) present evidence that supports a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.” (emphasis added)).

173. Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1993) (“If a plaintiff succeeds in raising a genuine factual issue regarding the authenticity of the employer’s stated motive, summary judgment is inappropriate, because it is for the trier of fact to decide which story is to be believed.”).

174. Beaird v. Seagate Tech., 145 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The plaintiff may then resist summary judgment if she can present evidence that that proffered reason was pretextual, i.e. unworthy of belief . . . .” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995) (“If the plaintiff succeeds in showing a prima facie case and presents evidence that the defendant’s proffered reason for the employment decision was pretextual – i.e. unworthy of belief, the plaintiff can withstand a summary judgment motion and is entitled to go to trial.”).

175. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Under *Hicks* and other applicable law, however, a plaintiff’s discrediting of an employer’s stated reason for its employment decision is entitled to considerable weight. . . . [W]e therefore reject any reading of *Hicks* under which employment discrimination plaintiffs would be routinely required to submit evidence over and above rebutting the employer’s stated explanation in order to avoid summary judgment.”); Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“According to *Hicks*, a plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case and introduce evidence sufficient to discredit the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons; at that point, the factfinder, if so persuaded, may infer discrimination.”).

http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol73/iss2/7
also among the leaders in employment discrimination filings during this time. By contrast, the four circuits with the lowest appellate workloads at that time (as well as low district workloads and appellate employment discrimination filings) – the Third, Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits – all adopted a more permissive standard. The remaining five circuits – which had roughly average workloads and/or numbers of employment discrimination filings – divided evenly between “pretext-only” and “pretext-plus” standards.

The Supreme Court again intervened in 2000 to clear up the fray in *Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing.*[^176] After being fired from his job as a manufacturing supervisor, Roger Reeves filed suit, claiming that his employer unlawfully dismissed him on the basis of age. Reeves prevailed in a jury trial, but the Fifth Circuit set aside the verdict. The Fifth Circuit found that Reeves’s claims failed as a matter of law because Reeves did not adduce sufficient evidence to support the jury finding in his favor. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit. The *Reeves* Court chastised the Fifth Circuit for infringing on the jury’s role as finder of fact, observing that the Fifth Circuit had “disregarded critical evidence favorable to [the plaintiff],” and that it had similarly “failed to draw all reasonable inferences in [plaintiff’s] favor.”[^177] The Court also admonished the Fifth Circuit for the piecemeal manner in which it weighed plaintiff’s evidence of discrimination, reminding the Fifth Circuit that the proper approach was to consider the evidence in its entirety.[^178]

Regarding the proper standard for determining pretext, the Court affirmed *Hicks*’ core holding, ruling that “a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.”[^179] In so holding, the Supreme Court made clear that a plaintiff need not offer independent or specific evidence of discrimination above and beyond the prima facie case to survive judgment as a matter of law.

Somewhat strangely, however, the Court went on to note that this rule would not apply in every case, adding that:

> This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury’s finding of liability. Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant’s explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory.\(^{180}\)

Such instances, the Court observed, would include cases in which “the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-

[^177]: *Id.* at 152-53.
[^178]: *Id.*
[^179]: *Id.* at 148.
[^180]: *Id.*
ployer’s decision” as well as those in which “the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and [in which] there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.”

In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the narrow scope of this loophole, noting that a plaintiff who made the requisite evidentiary showing described above would lose on summary judgment only in “atypical” cases, but provided no further elaboration on what might constitute an atypical case.

Some of the more burdened circuits – the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits – appeared to receive Reeves coolly, reaching results that seemingly contravened Reeves. Nonetheless, these circuits now uniformly appear to have fallen in line with their sister circuits in following Reeves.

With its opinion in Reeves, the Supreme Court effectively settled the debate among the circuits about what quantum of evidence of pretext a plaintiff must adduce to survive summary judgment. As evidenced by the divide among the circuits both before and after Hicks and Reeves, however, courts’ willingness to require heightened pretext showings appears to correlate with their respective workloads and numbers of employment discrimination filings. But, as noted previously, the overwhelming majority of employment discrimination claims do not turn on the resolution of any novel legal issue. Most claims involve allegations of behavior which, if proven, is plainly illegal, such as a hir-
ing or promotion decision based on race or sex. Accordingly, the central issue in many employment discrimination cases is whether a plaintiff has presented enough to survive a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. In the final section, I examine whether this pragmatic jurisprudence transcends interpretation of substantive law and manifests itself in various circuit interpretations of procedural rules.

V. MANIPULATION OF PROCEDURAL RULES

A. Heightened Pleading Standards Under Rule 8

Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, a complaint need only include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."\(^{186}\) Under Rule 8's notice pleading standard, simplicity and brevity are the order of the day. Rule 8 thus represents a sharp departure from the byzantine, hypertechnical pleading standards synonymous with both the Field Code and the common-law regime before it.

With the narrow exception of claims predicated on fraud or mistake,\(^{187}\) a plaintiff may "sue now and discover later."\(^{188}\) The theory underlying Rule 8 is simple: The dual purposes of the complaint are (i) to put the opposing party on notice that they have been sued and (ii) to provide a general understanding of the nature of the claim(s) being asserted. Other details can be fleshed out later through the discovery process.

But old standards died hard. Many lower courts continued to require heightened pleading to a greater or lesser degree even after the enactment of Rule 8. The Supreme Court's first look at pleading practice under Rule 8 came in 1957 in Conley v. Gibson.\(^{189}\) Conley involved a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of African-American workers, who alleged that their union had discriminated against them in violation of its duty of fair representation. The union moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the complaint failed to set forth specific facts supporting the discrimination allegations in the complaint. The District Court granted the motion, and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal.

The Supreme Court reversed. The Court began by noting that a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "should not be [granted] ... unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."\(^{190}\) Nor, the Court held, did it matter that plaintiffs had failed to set out specific facts supporting each allegation of discrimination. To the union's argument that the plaintiffs had failed to al-

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186. FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
188. Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1482-83 (5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J, concurring).
190. Id. at 45-46.
lege the facts that would support their claim, the Court responded that “[t]he decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.”

Rather, “all the Rules require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” In the Court’s view, this “simplified notice pleading” was enabled by the “liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules” that would ensure that, in due course, the parties would have to exchange fully information pertaining to their claims and defenses.

Notwithstanding Conley’s unequivocal endorsement of notice pleading, in the years that followed, the circuits uniformly adopted heightened pleading requirements in cases arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, chiefly cases arising under § 1983. Several commentators have opined that this departure from notice pleading reflected judges’ collective belief that such suits were generally frivolous. In 1993, the Supreme Court attempted to put a stop to this practice of heightened pleading in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, which involved a § 1983 lawsuit against a municipal entity. A unanimous Supreme Court struck down the Fifth Circuit’s requirement that so-called Monell actions be pled with factual specificity. Citing both Rule 8 and its prior decision in Conley, the Supreme Court again reminded lower courts that heightened pleading requirements were inconsistent with the text of Rule 8 as well as the policy aims that underlay it. The Court was not without sympathy for judges’ need to dispose of frivolous cases expeditiously, but observed that heightened pleading was not the proper method to cull dead weight from the docket. “In the absence [of a Congressional amendment to Rule 8],” the Supreme Court noted that “federal courts

191. Id. at 47.
192. Id.
194. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 995 (2003) (arguing that “judicial concern over the rise in frivolous civil rights litigation led the federal courts to require heightened pleading”); Tobias, supra note 193, at 298-99 (also citing skepticism of meritless claims as impetus for judicial adoption of heightened pleading standard).
196. Monell actions refer to the species of § 1983 litigation in which a municipality is a defendant, after Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
197. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (“We think that it is impossible to square the ‘heightened pleading standard’ applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules.”).
and litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later. 198

Although heightened pleading requirements persisted to some degree in other substantive areas following Leatherman, 199 the circuits, with one exception, faithfully applied Rule 8 in the employment discrimination context. The sole holdout was the Second Circuit. Unlike the D.C., 200 Third, 201 Fourth, 202 Seventh, 203 Eighth, 204 and Ninth 205 Circuits, all of which rejected a heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination cases following Leatherman, the Second Circuit required the plaintiff proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas framework to plead each of the requisite four elements to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. 206

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A. 207 to resolve this conflict and unanimously reversed the Second Circuit. Just as it had in Conley and Leatherman, the Supreme Court began by noting that Rule 8 meant what it said: All that the rule required was "'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" 208 And, perhaps in an effort to clear up any vestige of doubt that may have remained after Conley

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198. Id. at 168-69.
199. See Fairman, supra note 194, at 995-96 (canvassing resilience of heightened pleading in numerous substantive areas post-Leatherman).
200. Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Sparrow did not have to make out a prima facie case of discrimination in his complaint . . . .").
201. Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 423 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing in part district court's dismissal of complaint pursuant to 12(b)(6) motion "in light of the liberal notice pleading requirements").
203. Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998) ("'I was turned down for a job because of my race' is all a complaint has to say.").
204. Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he prima facie case . . . analysis is an evidentiary standard – it defines the question of proof plaintiff must present to create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination . . . . Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an evidentiary standard is not a proper measure of whether a complaint fails to state a claim.").
205. Ortez v. Wash. County, 88 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[A] plaintiff need not make a prima facie showing to survive a motion to dismiss provided he otherwise sets forth a short and plain statement of his claim showing he is entitled to relief.").
208. Id. at 512 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
and Leatherman, the Court stated that Rule 8’s “simplified pleading standard” governed “all civil actions,” with the exception of those causes of action – and only those causes of action – specifically enumerated in Rule 9.209 Citing Leatherman, the Court again signaled that summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss, was the appropriate procedural vehicle to dispose of meritless complaints.210

With scattered exceptions,211 the Second Circuit has generally fallen in line with the other circuits regarding notice pleading in the employment discrimination context following Swierkiewicz.212 Commentators have expressed amazement at lower courts’ defiance of the Supreme Court’s repeated admonitions that heightened pleading is inconsistent the text and purpose of Rule 8.213 Strictly from a jurisprudential standpoint, this intransigence is surely amazing, given the clarity and the unanimity of Conley and its progeny. Viewed pragmatically, however, the Second Circuit’s heightened pleading requirement was anything but amazing, at least insofar as employment discrimination claims are concerned. Figures 17 and 19 show that in the years leading up to Swierkiewicz, judges in the Second Circuit not only had some of the highest workloads, but also some of the highest volumes of employment discrimination filings per
capita judge – a combination rivaled by few other circuits during that period. It was therefore unsurprising to see the Second Circuit – notwithstanding its liberal reputation – construing Rule 8 to require more in the employment discrimination context relative to many of its more conservative, less burdened brethren elsewhere.

There is fresh confusion surrounding Rule 8. The Supreme Court recently revisited the issue of notice pleading in *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*. In *Twombly*, a putative class of local telephone and internet service subscribers sued a group of telephone service providers pursuant to Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to restrain trade by unlawfully suppressing competition, and that this parallel conduct resulted from defendants' unlawful "agreement."

Citing *Conley*, the Supreme Court observed that the purpose of the complaint is to "give the defendant fair notice... of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must include factual allegations sufficient to "raise the right to relief above the speculative level"; conclusory legal allegations will not do. In other words, the "plain statement" Rule 8(a)(2) requires must "possess enough heft to 'show that the pleader is entitled to relief.'"

These principles, applied to a Sherman Act Section 1 claim, meant that the plaintiff must allege facts "plausibly suggesting" the existence of a conspiracy. This "plausibility" standard, while not a "probability" standard, "calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement." Because plaintiffs had alleged only the existence of an unlawful conspiracy – as distinguished from facts that, if proven, would tend to show the existence of such a conspiracy – the Court held that plaintiffs "ha[d] not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," and therefore could not survive a motion to dismiss.

Additional fact pleading, the Court explained, was particularly essential in an antitrust complaint because antitrust discovery can be extremely expensive. Because "the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases," fact pleading is necessary to weed out, at the pleading stage, those cases "with no reasonably founded hope that the [discov-
ery] process will reveal relevant evidence to support a [Section] 1 claim." In so holding, the Supreme Court expressly disavowed Conley's "no set of facts" maxim. Observing the tension between Conley's "no set of facts" language and its requirement that a plaintiff must provide the "grounds" for relief, the Court dismissed Conley's "no set of facts" language as "best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard." Following Twombly, it remains an open question whether additional fact pleading is required outside the antitrust context, and if so, how much. Seemingly seeking to quell rumblings that Twombly represented a sharp break with longstanding principles of notice pleading, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion in Erickson v. Pardus reversing the dismissal of a prisoner's § 1983 claim. Court watchers speculated that this decision, issued a short time after Twombly, represented the Supreme Court's effort to reassure litigants that Twombly had not ushered in heightened pleading across the board. Nonetheless, given the Court's concern for avoiding discovery costs in futile claims, it would seem that Twombly should extend at least to those areas in which discovery is particularly complex and costly, such as securities litigation.

It is unclear what effect Twombly will have on pleading standards in the employment discrimination context. In view of the Court's effort to distinguish Swierkiewitz, as well as its insistence that it was not requiring "heightened fact pleading of specifics," it would seem that Twombly should have no impact on employment discrimination claims.

223. Id. at 1967.
224. Id. at 1959-60.
226. See, e.g., Posting of Mike O'Shea to Concurring Opinions blog, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/06/how_cautionary_l.html (June 6, 2007) (arguing that the significance of Pardus "was to caution lower courts from overreading Twombly, released two weeks earlier"). Judges have viewed Pardus similarly. See, e.g., Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (characterizing Twombly and Pardus as "contemporaneous" opinions); Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Village of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008) (implicitly making similar observation).

227. Indeed, the Second Circuit and Seventh Circuits have expressly reached this conclusion. See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating in a Bivens action that "[s]ome of [Twombly's] language relating generally to Rule 8 pleading standards seems to be so integral to the rationale of the Court's parallel conduct holding as to constitute a necessary part of that holding"); ASTI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Inc., 493 F.3d 87, 98 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating in a securities fraud case that "[w]e have declined to read Twombly's flexible 'plausibility standard' as relating only to antitrust cases" (citing Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 158)); Limestone Dev. Corp., 520 F.3d at 803 (concluding that Twombly's rationale was to prohibit "the expense of big-case discovery on the basis of a threadbare claim" and thus interpreting Twombly to impose greater pleading requirements in complex or discovery-intensive cases).

But that has not proven to be the case. Two of the more burdened circuits—the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits—have cited Twombly to dismiss insufficiently articulated claims of discrimination. Following Twombly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a Title VII retaliation claim, holding that the plaintiff’s complaint had failed to provide the employer with sufficient specifics about the nature of the protected activity that prompted the alleged retaliation.\(^{229}\) Although the majority held that Twombly did not disturb the Seventh Circuit’s notice pleading jurisprudence, Judge Flaum disagreed. In his view, the complaint would have survived a motion to dismiss pre-Twombly, but because the plaintiff’s complaint did not raise relief “above the speculative level,” it should be dismissed under Twombly.\(^{230}\) Accordingly, Judge Flaum concurred in the judgment.

Judge Flaum appears to have the better of the argument. If the majority is correct, and Twombly did not change the Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence, it is difficult to see how the majority could have affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, given its liberal pleading standards in discrimination cases pre-Twombly.\(^{231}\) Although it remains unclear how other circuits will apply Twombly, it is not surprising that the Seventh Circuit has required employment discrimination plaintiffs to plead with greater specificity given its high volume of employment discrimination cases.

The Eleventh Circuit has similarly invoked Twombly to dismiss insufficiently specific discrimination claims. In Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company,\(^{232}\) plaintiffs represented a class of African-American Coca-Cola employees. Plaintiffs alleged that Coca-Cola unlawfully maintained a pattern or
practice of discriminating against black employees with respect to hiring, promotion, pay, and work assignments, and that Coca-Cola unlawfully retaliated against plaintiffs for challenging this alleged discrimination. The District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims on various grounds and plaintiffs appealed.

In a scathing opinion that spared none of the parties, the Eleventh Circuit railed against the shoddiness of the pleadings, stating that “[i]f the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could read the record in this case-beginning with the plaintiffs’ complaint and [Coca-Cola’s] answer and continuing to the district court’s final order granting [Coca-Cola’s] summary judgment—they would roll over in their graves.”

Derisively dubbing the plaintiffs’ complaint as “shotgun pleading,” the Eleventh Circuit stated that “[n]o competent lawyer—whether skilled in Title VII litigation or not—could compose an answer to these sweeping and multifaceted acts of discrimination that would be in keeping with what the framers of the Rules envisioned in fashioning Rule 8(b).”

Plaintiffs protested that they had sufficiently pled their claims of discrimination in promotion, noting that their complaint stated that plaintiffs were “denied promotions . . . and treated differently than similarly situated white employees solely because of race.” This was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 8, the court held, because it “epitomizes speculation and therefore does not amount to a short and plain statement of their claim under Rule 8(a).”

In a diatribe that spanned several pages, the Eleventh Circuit cataloged the harms caused by “shotgun” pleading. These ills included “lessen[ing] the time and resources the court has available,” “wreak[ing] havoc on appellate court dockets,” “undermin[ing] the public’s respect for the courts,” and “undercut[ting] the purpose of Congress’s enactment of Title VII.” But “[f]irst and perhaps foremost” among these harms was that “shotgun pleading inexorably broadens the scope of discovery,” dramatically increasing the cost of litigation. In the court’s view, this wastefulness was no accident; rather, it was a “deliberate, calculated” strategy whereby plaintiffs “file shotgun complaints and include frivolous claims . . . to extort the settlement of unmeritorious claims.”

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Davis echoes the statements of numerous commentators who believe that many employment discrimination claims are much more about obtaining lawyer’s fees than about eradicating discrimination. Given that the Eleventh Circuit hears more employment discrimina-

233. Id. at 979.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 974.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 982-83.
238. Id. at 981.
239. Id. at 980, 982.
240. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
tion claims and shoulders a greater workload than any other circuit on a per judge basis, it is a small wonder that the Eleventh Circuit seized on \textit{Twombly} to cull some of the weaker cases from its docket. In this regard, the tone of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is perhaps even more significant than its substance. To the extent that the Eleventh Circuit is correct in its suspicion that lawyer’s fees are the tail wagging the dog of discrimination claims, \textit{Davis} serves as a warning to would-be advocates: Do a shoddy drafting job, and you too may find your work product and your Martindale-Hubbell rating trashed in the pages of the Federal Reporter.\textsuperscript{241}

\textbf{B. Relaxed Standards for Summary Judgment}

The story is much the same with respect to summary judgment. As discussed previously, grants of summary judgment were rare prior to the \textit{Celotex} trilogy, particularly in employment discrimination cases. Since then, summary judgment has become much more common across the board. Employment discrimination cases are no exception to this trend. Both before and after the trilogy, however, most discrimination cases turned on disputed questions of intent - why the employer took the action it did. Because these are factual determinations properly reserved for the factfinder, numerous commentators have decried judges’ increasing use of summary judgment in the discrimination context.\textsuperscript{242}

Whatever the merits of these criticisms, many judges have either strongly implied or stated outright their belief that summary judgment is a valuable procedural device that allows them to winnow marginal cases from the docket. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly eschewed a literal application of the summary judgment standard in discrimination cases, instead applying a more pragmatic interpretation of Rule 56 whereby summary judgment is appropriate when, in the court’s opinion, the plaintiff does not have “a reasonable possibility” of winning at trial,\textsuperscript{243} or when the plaintiff failed to bring disputed facts to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[241] See \textit{Davis}, 516 F.3d at 980 n.55.
\item[243] See Laird v. Cragin Fed. Bank, 41 F.3d 1510, at *4 (7th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision) (“As a practical matter, the test is whether the non-movant has a fighting chance at trial.” (internal quotations omitted)); Mason v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir. 1983) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim on motion for summary judgment because “[i]t is a gratuitous cruelty to parties and their witnesses to put them through the emotional ordeal of a trial when the outcome is foreordained”); Haeger v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 92 C 6947, 1994 WL 63053, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 1994) (“[T]he non-movant must cast more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material
\end{footnotes}
the district judge's attention. The Seventh Circuit has made no secret of the fact that its application of a "summary judgment-plus" standard in the discrimination context stems from its view that a great number of discrimination claims are frivolous and allowing them to go to trial would further strain an already overburdened judiciary. In this respect, the Seventh Circuit observed in Pa-lucki v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co:

The workload crisis of the federal courts, and realization that Title VII is occasionally or perhaps more than occasionally used by plaintiffs as a substitute for principles of job protection that do not yet exist in American law, have led the courts to take a critical look at efforts to withstand defendants' motions for summary judgment.

These increased pressures, the Seventh Circuit noted, impelled its pragmatic view of summary judgment:

But we would not want to rest our decision on a technicality about the admissibility of evidence. A more important principle is at stake. Rule 56 is a practical tool of governance. Its purpose is to head off a trial, with all the private and public expenses that a trial entails, if the opponent (usually although not always the plaintiff) of summary judgment does not have a reasonable prospect of prevailing before a reasonable jury—that is, a jury that will base its decision on the facts and the law, rather than on sympathy or antipathy or private notions of justice.

facts. As a practical matter, the test is whether the non-movant has a fighting chance at trial.” (internal citations and quotations omitted).

244. See Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2003) (“While it may seem unfair to hold [the plaintiff] to the evidence he cited to the district court, it is not. Discovery is notorious for producing far more material than the parties will ultimately use. We have repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not required to scour every inch of the record for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them.”); Greer v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[A] lawsuit is not a game of hunt the peanut. Employment discrimination cases are extremely fact-intensive, and neither appellate courts nor district courts are obliged in our adversary system to scour the record looking for factual disputes . . . .” (internal quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in original)).

245. 879 F.2d 1568, 1572 (7th Cir. 1989).

246. Id.; see also Krist v. Eli Lilly & Co., 897 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting “the orthodox view that treats the issue on summary judgment as whether the moving party would be entitled to directed verdict if the proceeding were a trial rather than a summary judgment proceeding” in favor of “the ‘realist’ view that treats the issue on summary judgment as whether the nonmovant has a prayer of winning at trial”). Although Krist was a products liability case, it has been predominantly cited for a relaxed summary judgment standard in employment discrimination cases. See Trowbridge v.
Even in cases where it reversed a grant of summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit expressed its skepticism not only about the merits of the claim in issue, but about certain aspects of the antidiscrimination regime generally, stating:

So we must reverse. We are not entirely happy in doing so, being perplexed that the middle-aged should be thought an oppressed minority requiring the protection of federal law. But that is none of our business as judges. We also are sympathetic to the argument that if [the employer discriminated, it would] pay a price in the competitive marketplace, and that the threat of such market sanctions deters age discrimination at lower cost than the law can do with its cumbersome and expensive machinery, its gross delays, its frequent errors, and its potential for rigidifying the labor market. But this sanguine view of the power of the marketplace was not shared by the framers and supporters of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and we shall not subvert the Act by upholding precipitate grants of summary judgment to defendants.\(^{247}\)

It should come as little surprise that the Seventh Circuit has been among the most vocal skeptics of employment discrimination claims given that, at both the district and the circuit level, it hears more employment discrimination claims than a wide majority of its sister circuits. Yet the Seventh Circuit is hardly alone in applying a more robust summary judgment standard in discrimination cases. Judges in the First,\(^{248}\) Sixth,\(^{249}\) and Eleventh\(^{250}\) Circuits

\(^{247}\) Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 406-07 (7th Cir. 1990).

\(^{248}\) See, e.g., Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Because courts should not encourage long, expensive trials merely to discover whether any evidence exists to support a claim, we decline to disturb the entry of summary judgment.”); Keyes v. Sec'y of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988) (conceding record evidence probative of discrimination, but affirming summary judgment because “there was more than chopped liver in the other pan of the scales,” and noting that relaxed summary judgment standard is “crucial . . . in order to insure that [Title VII] does not become a cloak which is nonchalantly spread across the record in every instance where one employee (or prospective employee) loses out to a rival of contrary race or gender” (internal quotations omitted) (bracket alteration in original)). But see Rossy v. Roche Prods., Inc., 880 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1989) (reserving question of defendant’s intent for ultimate trier of fact).

\(^{249}\) See Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1068 (6th Cir. 1990) (Nelson, J., concurring) (upholding a grant of summary judgment in a case that the majority termed a “close case,” stating that “[g]iven the demands now being made on
have also sanctioned a “no reasonable chance” standard for summary judgment in employment discrimination cases. Conversely, the Third and District of Columbia Circuits, both of which have relatively light workloads and appellate discrimination filings, both declined to lessen the summary judgment standard in employment discrimination cases.

While the data is too impressionistic to support particularly strong assertions, it does support my theory of prophylactic jurisprudence. Of the four circuits that have explicitly declined to apply Rule 56 literally in employment discrimination cases, the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits are among the busiest circuits. Appellate judges in the Eleventh Circuit have both the highest workload and number of employment discrimination filings of any circuit. The same is largely true of district judges within the Eleventh Circuit. Both district and appellate judges in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have workloads at or above the average, and their respective volumes of employment discrimination filings put them near the top of the circuits.

By the same token, the Third and District of Columbia Circuits – both of which have relatively light workloads and, in the case of the District of Columbia Circuit, few discrimination claims – have continued to apply Rule 56 more literally. Taken together, this evidence suggests that some of the more bur-

250. Judge Sam C. Pointer, who served as United States District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama between 1970 and 2000, had this to say about summary judgment in marginal cases, including those in the employment discrimination context:

The mere fact that there is some conflict in the evidence shouldn’t be the determinative factor [in deciding whether to grant summary judgment.] Where the evidence is overwhelming and no reasonable, impartial jury [that had been] properly instructed on the law could find for the plaintiff, there is no point in going to trial. In cases where a reasonable jury that had fairly reviewed the evidence could only reach one result (i.e. a verdict for the employer), some squabble over a few minor points should not preclude summary judgment. A judge that granted summary judgment on this basis would probably be affirmed on appeal.


251. See, e.g., Sorba v. Pa. Drilling Co., 821 F.2d 200, 205 (3d Cir. 1987) (reversing grant of summary judgment that improperly addressed credibility of proffered evidence); Jackson v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 826 F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that a disputed material fact precluded the court from granting summary judgment).

252. See, e.g., Breen v. Dep’t of Transp., 282 F.3d 839, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reversing grant of summary judgment where plaintiff had raised disputed material fact pertaining to her claim of employment discrimination).
dened circuits view summary judgment as an opportunity to cull marginal cases from the docket, while less burdened circuits remain more vigilant about preserving the role of the factfinder.

As with substantive issues in antidiscrimination law, then, there is evidence of prophylactic jurisprudence. Relative to their less burdened counterparts, judges in busier circuits and circuits with higher numbers of discrimination cases have required plaintiffs to make greater showings to survive pretrial dispositive motions. These thumb-on-the-scale, opportunistic interpretations of Rules 8 and 56 seem questionable from a strictly procedural viewpoint. Viewed pragmatically, however, these interpretations make perfect sense. For judges faced with increasingly unmanageable dockets, a modest infringement on the factfinder's role is an acceptably small price to pay to winnow some of the weaker cases from the docket.

CONCLUSION

Having taken two steps forward toward a non-ideological explanation of recent trends in employment discrimination jurisprudence, I ought to take at least one moderate step back. It bears repeating that ideology surely plays some role in judicial decisionmaking writ large, and there is no reason to believe that a different result obtains in discrimination cases. To argue that it does not, and that workload is dispositive, would be as overbroad and simplistic as the claims of those who allege that ideology is outcome determinative.

At the same time, even those who subscribe to an ideological theory of judicial decisionmaking must concede that judges across the ideological spectrum agree on the proper outcome in employment discrimination cases much more often than they disagree. This consensus undoubtedly reflects the great progress that our nation has made in terms of recognizing, confronting, and eliminating unlawful discrimination in the workplace.

It is at this juncture that the public policy debate about employment discrimination breaks down. The predominant issue in politics today vis-à-vis judges and employment discrimination is whether the federal bench is sufficiently sensitive to allegations of discrimination. On this score, conservatives and liberals (labeled as such for ease of characterizing their respective positions) quickly pass over their limited agreement that some employment discrimination claims are frivolous, and begin bleating familiar refrains about lack of personal responsibility and indifference to injustice and bigotry, respectively. Battle lines drawn, anecdotes are the weapons of choice. Conservatives point to some meritless discrimination suit brought by an almost unfathomably bad employee; liberals counter with the latest court decision backhanding claims of a seemingly deserving victim. These vignettes reassure sympathetic listeners that theirs is the virtuous position, while doing little to persuade skeptics, who reflexively dismiss such stories as one-offs unrepresentative of the big picture. Worse still, skeptics may turn on the speaker. For many, the topic of discrimination implicates deeply held beliefs, and blasphemy against these convictions cannot be abided. Those who dare cast such aspersions are reviled
as either sympathizers for professional victims and con artists or as closet bigots, depending on the listener's perspective. This is hardly the stuff of productive discourse.

But so it goes. A sort of intellectual junk food, anecdotes soothe consciences and inflame passions, while affording virtually no insight into broader trends. They thus obscure what is a critical threshold question facing policymakers concerned about the trends discussed in this Article.

The question is not whether employment discrimination continues (surely it does), or whether judges must remain vigilant to guard against new manifestations of animus (surely they must); it is whether the recent volume of employment discrimination claims bears a reasonable relationship to the discrimination that remains. In view of the explosive growth in employment discrimination filings in recent years, and in view of the substantial progress our nation has made in eliminating discrimination over the last forty years, it is hard to see how the answer could be yes, even under the most generous assumptions about residual discrimination. Put another way, the consistently high volume of employment discrimination claims has outstripped even the most aggressive estimates of employment discrimination that remains. Under any analysis, it necessarily follows that a considerable number of employment discrimination claims are meritless, if not frivolous. While the precise percentage of meritless discrimination claims is past knowing, even Sunstein's study shows that judges of both political parties believe that a majority of employment discrimination claims are invalid.

And assuming that the proportion of meritless claims is normally distributed across the circuits, the variations I have observed in terms of judicial receptiveness toward employment discrimination claims suggest that the wages of crying wolf are very real. To the extent that judges come to believe that discrimination claims have become unmoved from actual instances of discrimination, it is perhaps inevitable that they would begin to view all such claims in a jaundiced light. Accordingly, it will become increasingly difficult for plaintiffs with valid discrimination claims to prevail, and the baby may well be thrown out with the proverbial bathwater. This result appears to be especially probable if the judge labors under a strenuous workload, as he or she will likely come to resent spending time on cases that are frivolous to the detriment of other, more deserving cases.

The bipartisan skepticism Sunstein observed with respect to employment discrimination claims is an ominous signal for those who believe that plaintiffs' salvation lies in a Democratic White House. In other words, even should the Democrats win the White House in the next election (or next several), a fresh infusion of Democratic appointees into the lower federal courts is unlikely to spark a wholesale reversal of fortune for employment discrimination plaintiffs. A new cohort of Democratic judges would, to be sure, make a difference in cases on the margin, but those who hope for a broader impact will likely be disappointed if past voting patterns are any indication.

It should by now be clear that the extent to which discrimination remains is only part of the story. Of considerable importance is the degree to which
discrimination is alleged where none exists (or, at least, is not substantiated), as well as the other demands on judges’ time. So what now?

As it happens, the debate sparked by the quintet of decisions from the 1988 Term has recently been rekindled. In 2007, the Supreme Court held in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. that a plaintiff asserting a disparate pay claim under Title VII must file suit within 180 days of the allegedly discriminatory action.\(^\text{253}\) Lilly Ledbetter, a retired Goodyear employee, alleged that her former supervisors discriminated against her on the basis of sex in setting her pay rate early in her career.\(^\text{254}\) Because this initial decision impacted her each time she received a paycheck between 1979 and her retirement in 1998, Ledbetter argued that her disparate pay claim re-accrued upon the issuance of each paycheck. Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Alito rejected Ledbetter’s argument that the statute of limitations for filing a discrimination claim reset each time Goodyear issued a paycheck to Ledbetter. “Current effects alone,” Justice Alito wrote, “cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination.”\(^\text{255}\) In the majority’s view, the “paycheck accrual” rule Ledbetter urged would improperly contravene Congress’s “strong preference for the prompt resolution of employment discrimination allegations” embodied in the 180-day deadline for filing an administrative grievance with the EEOC.\(^\text{256}\) Because Ledbetter had not filed her claim within 180 days of Goodyear’s discriminatory pay decision, the majority held that her claim was time barred.

Writing for the four dissenting justices, Justice Ginsburg chided the majority for its “parsimonious” reading of Title VII, asserting that the majority “does not comprehend, or is indifferent to, the insidious way in which women are victims of pay discrimination.”\(^\text{257}\) In a dissent littered with references to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the events that animated its passage, Justice Ginsburg expressly called on Congress to overrule Ledbetter, observing that “[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress’ court.”\(^\text{258}\)

The reaction to Ledbetter was nothing if not predictable. Many conservatives were thrilled with Ledbetter, while liberals decried the decision as a disaster. For its part, a Democratically-controlled Congress wasted no time moving on Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion. Within hours of the Supreme Court’s decision, Democratic members of both the Senate and House of Representatives promised to introduce legislation to amend Title VII to undo Ledbetter. The House of Representatives subsequently passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay

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255. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169.
256. Id. at 2170–71.
257. Id. at 2188 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
258. Id.
Act in July 2007, but the bill was tabled after a failed cloture vote in the Senate.

What will ultimately come of Congress’s efforts to override Ledbetter remains an open question. What is clear, however, is that both parties have (at least so far) squandered the opportunity Ledbetter provided to have a broader, meaningful policy debate about employment discrimination. In all of the partisan bickering following Ledbetter, no one appears to have considered how well at the aggregate level the current legal apparatus accords with the realities of employment discrimination and employment discrimination litigation today.

The absence of any Congressional debate on this score, while disappointing, should come as no particular surprise. Any serious effort to reform employment discrimination laws would necessarily implicate some of the most sensitive and divisive issues of our times. Given that the current discourse about civil rights is rarely burdened by an overabundance of nuance, any politician who dared broach any reform proposal that was not uniformly pro-plaintiff would almost certainly be tarred as hostile to civil rights. Any politician saddled with that albatross will likely find himself out of office pronto. So no one asks the hard questions. Better to let sleeping dogs lie, so the thinking goes, even if they do have fleas.

Unwilling to venture into the political no-man’s-land of civil rights reform, Republicans and Democrats instead hunker down to the relative safety of partisan trench warfare. Empty platitudes and faux indignation pass for legislative heavy lifting. The parties remain perfectly pleased to talk past each other, trading made-for-TV sound bites which give not even a polite nod to the complexity of the issues at hand. With Congress more or less evenly divided, this is a formula for getting nothing done.

When the inevitable stalemate results, the blame game is on. In the stampede for the moral high ground, the parties with depressing predictability seek to gin up outrage by recycling tired, overwrought half-truths. The endless cycle of gridlock and finger pointing thus plods on.

Congress must do far better if there is to be any hope of addressing the complicated problems this Article identifies. Determining how to deter the filing of frivolous discrimination claims while simultaneously permitting meritorious ones is admittedly a tall order, if not an impossible one. These ca-

259. H.R. Res. 2831, 110th Cong. (2007) (legislatively overruling Ledbetter and amending Title VII to include a “paycheck accrual” rule for disparate pay claims).
261. In this vein, some commentators have noted that Congress should be expected to shrink from controversial issues to avoid angering voters. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 324 (1988) (observing that “legislators have strong incentives to pass hard policy questions on to unelected bureaucrats and judges rather than to resolve them . . . in large part because taking a position on the hard issues can harm their reelection chances”).
veats notwithstanding, unless and until conservatives and liberals are willing to have a frank and unsentimental discussion about the degree to which employment discrimination still exists on the one hand, and the degree to which the current legal regime encourages frivolous lawsuits on the other, employers, employees, and the judges who resolve their disputes will all limp along unhappily under the status quo.