Addressing Big Tech's Market Power: A Comparative Institutional Analysis

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ADDRESSING BIG TECH’S MARKET POWER: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Thomas A. Lambert*

ABSTRACT

This Article provides a comparative institutional analysis of the three leading approaches to addressing the market power of large digital platforms: (1) traditional antitrust law, the approach thus far taken in the United States; (2) ex ante conduct rules, the approach embraced by the European Union’s Digital Markets Act and several bills under consideration in the U.S. Congress; and (3) ongoing agency oversight, the approach embraced by the United Kingdom with its newly established “Digital Markets Unit.” After identifying the general advantages and disadvantages of each approach, the Article examines how they are likely to play out in the context of digital platforms. It first examines whether antitrust is indeed too slow and indeterminate to tackle market power concerns arising from digital platforms, as proponents of ex ante conduct rules and agency oversight have suggested. It next considers possible error costs resulting from the most prominent proposed conduct rules: (1) structural separations and line of business restrictions; (2) bans on self-preferencing by platforms; (3) requirements to allow platform users to remove pre-installed software, “side-load” apps, and use alternative payment systems to make purchases on the platform; and (4) data-portability, data-sharing, and platform interoperability mandates. It then shows how three features of the agency oversight model—its broad focus, political susceptibility, and perpetual control—render it particularly vulnerable to rent-seeking efforts and agency capture. The Article ultimately concludes that antitrust’s downsides (relative indeterminacy and slowness) are likely to be less significant than those of ex ante conduct rules (large error costs resulting from high informational requirements) and ongoing agency oversight (rent-seeking and agency capture).

* Wall Family Chair in Corporate Law and Governance and Professor of Law, University of Missouri Law School.
I. INTRODUCTION

For a number of digital platforms, a perfect storm is brewing. Commentators and policymakers across the ideological spectrum and the globe are increasingly calling for government efforts to rein in the largest platforms—most notably those operated by the “GAFA” firms: Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple.1 Politically progressive voices maintain that the dominant technology firms hurt consumers, laborers, suppliers, and small businesses; contribute to wealth inequality by earning monopoly profits for their disproportionately rich shareholders; and have amassed excessive political power that undermines democracy.2 Conservatives share some of those concerns but emphasize most prominently that the firms have become gatekeepers of speech and informa-


tion, and are biased against traditional moral values.³

In the United States, politicians as diverse as progressive U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and her culturally conservative colleague Josh Hawley (R-MO) have called for significant governmental restrictions on the dominant technology platforms.⁴ The staff of a prominent congressional subcommittee,⁵ governmental officials outside the United States,⁶ and several prominent U.S. research centers have done so as well.⁷

Policymakers are heeding the call. In June 2021, the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives advanced several bills that would radically restructure the digital landscape,⁸ and the U.S. Senate confirmed Lina Khan, an outspoken critic of several of the largest technology platforms, as a member of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC).⁹ After President Biden then elevated Khan to chair of the FTC,¹⁰ the Commission revoked its prior commitment to pursue only consumer welfare in policing “unfair methods of competition,”¹¹ paving the way for...

¹⁰. See id.
rules forbidding practices deemed unfair to small businesses even if the practices benefit consumers. Soon after the FTC's policy reversal, President Biden issued an executive order encouraging the FTC to use its now-expanded rulemaking power to rein in the major digital platforms. And in early 2022, members of the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate voted on a bipartisan basis to advance two bills that would impose digital platform restrictions similar to several of those mandated by the previously advanced House bills.

Many, though not all, of the social harms allegedly occasioned by the major digital platforms stem from their purported market power—i.e., their ability to extract surplus by imposing contract terms (prices or non-price terms governing matters like user privacy, data use, or terms of service) that they could not profitably impose if they faced the threat of losing business to more accommodating rivals. Accordingly, most of the proposals for restricting digital platforms aim somehow to reduce their market power or to limit its exercise. That raises the question of how best to constrain welfare-reducing exercises of market power by digital platforms.

Historically, governments have used several different approaches to limit welfare losses from market power. One approach is antitrust law: a set of flexible, judicially crafted behavioral standards aimed at preventing the creation or enhancement of market power by means other than competition on the merits. Another strategy is direct regulation: a set of \textit{ex ante} rules that forbid certain exercises of market power or foster market

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15. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW § 5.01 (4th ed. 2017 & 2d ed. Supp. 2019) (defining market power). A number of the concerns about the dominant technology platforms stem not from their market power but from their sheer size. For example, the concern that technology firms endanger democracy because they are so large that they have excessive political sway is not a concern about market power—i.e., the ability of a firm lacking competitive constraints to extract greater surplus by reducing market output. This Article's focus is the alternative means of addressing market power concerns, not other concerns related to size per se.


17. See generally THOMAS A. LAMBERT, \textit{HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICY-MAKERS} 145–75 (2017) (describing alternative remedies employed to address market power).

18. \textit{Id.} at 145–53. Antitrust does not forbid the creation, maintenance, or enhancement of market power by procompetitive means such as innovation or gains in productive
A third approach is to delegate to an expert agency the power to enforce behavioral standards through continual oversight of some set of firms that could attain and exercise market power. All three approaches present both advantages and disadvantages, and each is more appropriate in some circumstances than in others.

The purpose of this Article is to assess the relative merits of antitrust law, direct regulation, and ongoing agency oversight as means of addressing market power concerns arising from large digital platforms. Eschewing the "Nirvana Fallacy" of inferring that a particular regulatory approach is desirable because an idealized version would improve upon the status quo, this Article embraces a "comparative institution" approach that attempts to assess the choice between real-world regulatory options, warts and all.

The Article proceeds as follows. Part II returns to first principles and sets forth the approach policymakers should generally follow to select the optimal means of addressing defects in private ordering. That approach calls for policymakers to think like physicians by first cataloguing the remedies available to address the defect under consideration and then comparing the efficacy and side effects of each remedy.

Part III then provides a general description of the remedies traditionally used to address market power concerns—antitrust law, ex ante regulation, and continual agency oversight—and briefly identifies the typical pros and cons of each. It observes that antitrust law can avoid the error costs of one-size-fits-all rules and the political manipulation of agency oversight, but may be indeterminate and slow; ex ante regulation is more determinate and faster, but may entail high error costs because of the efficiency. Nor does it forbid a firm that has gained market power legitimately from exercising that power by charging supra-competitive prices. As the Supreme Court observed, The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts "business acumen" in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.


LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 160–75.

Id.

Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & Econ. 1, 1 (1969) (“The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing ‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in which the relevant choice is between alternative real arrangements. In practice, those who adopt the nirvana viewpoint seek to discover discrepancies between the ideal and the real and if discrepancies are found, they declare that the real is inefficient. Users of the comparative institution approach attempt to assess which alternative real institutional arrangement seems best able to cope with the economic problem; practitioners of this approach may use an ideal norm to provide standards from which divergences are assessed for all practical alternatives of interest and select as efficient that alternative which seems most likely to minimize the divergence.”).
Hayekian knowledge problem; and agency oversight may be faster and more determinate than antitrust law and less error-prone than ex ante regulation, but is more susceptible to adverse public choice concerns.

Part IV digs deeper by examining how the efficacy limitations and general side effects of each of the remedies under consideration would manifest themselves in the context of digital platform regulation. It first considers how antitrust law’s indeterminacy may be mitigated as pending cases involving digital platforms are resolved and whether the purported slowness of antitrust law has allowed adverse market power effects to accumulate. Turning to ex ante regulation, Part IV assesses potential error costs from proposed rules that would (1) mandate structural separations and line of business restrictions; (2) ban digital platforms’ preferencing of their own offerings; (3) require that platform users be allowed to remove pre-installed software, “side-load” digital applications (apps), and use alternative payment systems to make purchases on the platform; and (4) require data portability, data sharing, and interoperability. It then considers how three features of the agency oversight model—its broad focus, political susceptibility, and perpetual control—render it particularly vulnerable to rent-seeking efforts and agency capture.

II. FIRST PRINCIPLES FOR SELECTING GOVERNMENTAL FIXES FOR PRIVATE ORDERING DEFECTS

As sociologist Max Weber observed, the state possesses a right that is denied all other social entities: the right to use force to achieve its objectives. Members of liberal societies have generally agreed that government should exercise its unique coercion right sparingly. To preserve individual liberty, it should do so only to protect its citizens’ rights to person or property and to address situations in which individuals’ management of their property to maximize their private benefits—private or

22. MAJORITY STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS: MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 379 (2020) (“Structural separations prohibit a dominant intermediary from operating in markets that place the intermediary in competition with the firms dependent on its infrastructure. Line of business restrictions, meanwhile, generally limit the markets in which a dominant firm can engage.”).

23. “Side-loading” is installing third-party software on a platform—typically a mobile operating system such as Apple’s iOS or Google’s Android—without using the platform’s own app store. Adrian Croft, What Is Side-loading? Everything to Know About Tech’s Latest Flashpoint, FORTUNE (July 14, 2021, 6:00 PM), https://fortune.com/2021/07/14/what-is-side-loading-apple-ios-google-android [https://perma.cc/WHB8-3RE9].

24. Max Weber, Politics as Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958) (observing that government possesses a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (emphasis omitted)).

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...is likely to reduce overall social welfare. As Adam Smith famously explained, individuals’ pursuit of private welfare (assuming they do not violate others’ property rights) typically inures to the benefit of society as a whole. But economists have identified a number of situations in which the pursuit of private gain can systematically reduce overall social welfare even when formal property rights are respected. These so-called market failures—e.g., externalities, public goods, information asymmetry, and market power—may warrant the exercise of government’s unique coercion right.

A market failure, however, is never a sufficient condition for a governmental fix. Such interventions cannot be justified on efficiency grounds if they would themselves create losses greater than those occasioned by the market failures they are aimed at correcting. Efficiency-based policymaking therefore requires consideration of the ways in which government interventions may reduce welfare. Just as private ordering may systematically fail to maximize social welfare in particular situations (i.e., when the conditions for market failure exist), various government interventions are systematically prone to produce losses under certain circumstances. Policymakers should always compare the expected costs of market-failure-correcting government interventions to the expected benefits they would achieve in terms of market failure losses averted.

Moreover, it is not enough to assess a proposed intervention in isolation by asking whether the gains it would likely achieve exceed the losses it would likely entail in terms of compliance costs and the value of beneficial transactions thwarted. Because the true cost of pursuing one available regulatory intervention includes the opportunity cost of foregoing other available interventions, wise policymaking requires systematic

27. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776) (“As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestick industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 25–26 (“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”).
28. See generally LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 160–70 (describing market failures and examining alternative means of addressing them).
29. See generally id. (describing the typical failures of governmental interventions aimed at averting various market failures).
30. Suppose, for example, that Policy A would create benefits of $70 million while entailing compliance costs of $40 million and thwarting transactions worth $20 million. Assessed in isolation, this intervention would appear cost-justified, securing a $10 million net benefit. If, however, competing Policy B would create benefits of $50 million while
comparison of the pros and cons of all available regulatory options (including the “no intervention” option). To facilitate such analysis, policymakers should proceed like physicians: after assessing the adverse “symptoms” potentially justifying some sort of government intervention and diagnosing the culprit “disease,” they should catalogue the range of available “remedies,” consider the “side effects” of each, and select the fix that offers the highest net benefit.31

III. MARKET POWER: SYMPTOMS, DISEASE, REMEDIES, AND SIDE EFFECTS

A. The Symptoms and the Underlying Disease

Market power is the ability of a firm that faces little competition to enhance its profits by cutting back on its output, either quantitatively (reducing the number of units it produces so as to drive up the market-clearing price) or qualitatively (reducing the amount it spends on quality so as to increase its per-unit profit margin).32 While firms earn higher profits when they exercise market power, consumers experience harm in the form of higher prices and/or reduced quality.33 In addition to redistributing surplus from consumers to producers, exercises of market power occasion a “deadweight loss”—an overall reduction in social welfare—because the productive activities the monopolist foregoes (i.e., making more units or investing more in product quality) would generate benefits in excess of their costs.34 Higher prices, reduced quality, and welfare-reducing misallocations of productive resources are thus the symptoms of market power.

The disease giving rise to those symptoms is an absence of competition.35 In a competitive market, a single firm cannot cause market price to rise by reducing its output because it controls an insufficient share of overall market output to affect market price (i.e., it is a “price-taker” rather than a “price-maker”) and other producers would expand output in response to a price increase, causing prices to return to competitive

etailing compliance costs of $20 million and thwarting transactions worth $5 million, Policy A would not be cost-justified: Foregoing the $25 million in net benefits available from competing Policy B would be an additional cost (an opportunity cost) of pursuing Policy A, so the net benefits available from the latter policy would be −$15 million. By contrast, when the opportunity cost of not pursuing Policy A (lost benefit of $10 million) is added to Policy B’s cost, Policy B remains cost-justified, providing a net benefit of $15 million.

31. See generally LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 14–15.
32. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at § 5.01 (“Market power is the ability to raise price profitably by restricting output.”). Market power may also exist on the buyer side of the market, referred to as monopsony power, where a buyer exercising monopsony power may profitably withhold demand to drive down price and thereby enhance its profits. See generally Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey E. Harrison, Monopsony: Antitrust Law and Economics (1993). For ease of exposition, we focus here on monopoly (seller-side) power, but both forms of market power reduce social welfare.
34. See LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 142–44.
35. Id. at 145.
levels. Moreover, any firm that skimps on quality in a competitive market will lose sales to its rivals. Cutbacks on quantity or quality may enhance the seller’s profits, though, when the market includes only one significant seller (monopoly) or when nominal rivals agree not to compete with each other (collusion).

Numerous digital markets currently feature a dominant provider—e.g., Google for internet search, YouTube for hosting user-generated videos, Amazon for online retailing, Google’s suite of advertising technology services for buying and selling digital advertisements, Facebook for social networking, and Apple’s and Google’s proprietary app stores for their respective mobile operating systems (iOS and Android). Many voices maintain that the absence of competition in these markets has resulted in predictable market-power harms: higher prices and reduced quality. Currently pending lawsuits, for example, allege that monopoly has produced supracompetitive prices for mobile-app distribution and digital-advertising services. With respect to reduced quality (a more common complaint in digital platform markets given that the services provided are often free to users), alleged monopoly harms include: less consumer privacy in social networking, search, and web browsing; more onerous speech restrictions on platforms that host user-generated content; less favorable “offering placement” for firms operating on platforms (e.g., sellers on Amazon and publishers that allow their content to be indexed


37. LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 159.

38. See Sullivan & Hovenkamp, supra note 36, at 55–58.


42. STIGLER CTR. REPORT, supra note 7, at 274.
on Google Search);\footnote{Id. at 61–64; U.S. v. Google Complaint, supra note 40, ¶ 170.} reduced innovation by third-party creators who will invest less in developing new offerings if they can be relegated to less prominent positions on essential platforms;\footnote{STIGLER CTR. REPORT, supra note 7, at 74–78; U.S. v. Google Complaint, supra note 40, ¶¶ 166, 170.} and lower quality platforms, as platform operators deliberately deny product-enhancing features such as interoperability and data portability in order to preclude competition and protect their market power.\footnote{See U.S. v. Google Complaint, supra note 40, ¶ 170. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger & Orly Lobel, Platform Market Power, 32 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1051, 1069 (2017); THOMAS M. LENARD, TECH. POL’Y INST., IF DATA PORTABILITY IS THE SOLUTION, WHAT’S THE PROBLEM? 3–5 (2020), https://techpolicyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Lenard_If-Data-Portability.pdf [https://perma.cc/TBS2-EN3Q].} With all these purported harms, the alleged culprit is the absence of competition facing the dominant firm.

B. AVAILABLE MARKET POWER REMEDIES AND THEIR EFFICACY LIMITATIONS AND SIDE EFFECTS

I. Three Remedies

Traditionally, governments have employed three means to address market power concerns. The most widely used approach is antitrust law—a set of judicially crafted behavioral standards aimed at remedying the two situations in which market competition breaks down: collusion and monopoly.\footnote{See generally, LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 145–47.} In the United States, the genesis of these judicial standards was the Sherman Act of 1890.\footnote{Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)).} Section 1 of the Sherman Act addresses collusion by proclaiming that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be illegal.”\footnote{Id. § 1.} Section 2 addresses monopolies by making it a felony to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire to monopolize a market.\footnote{Id. § 2.}

Because these statutory prohibitions are quite bare-boned (and literally nonsensical, as a ban on contracts in restraint of trade would outlaw most private contracts),\footnote{See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (reasoning that the term "restraint of trade" in § 1 cannot possibly refer to any restraint on competition because "[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains" and because "[t]o bind, to restrain, is of their very essence").} federal courts quickly put interpretive glosses on them. Today, § 1 is taken to forbid agreements that “unreasonably” restrain trade,\footnote{Id. (“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”).} and § 2 precludes unreasonably exclusionary conduct.
that could create market power. In all cases, the reasonableness of a challenged act turns on its probable effect on market output: if the act is likely to enhance market output for the benefit of consumers, it is reasonable; if output reduction and consumer harm are likely, the act is unreasonable and thus illegal.

As courts have gained experience with particular business practices, they have calibrated the showings required to establish antitrust liability. Some particularly pernicious practices are conclusively presumed unreasonable (i.e., are per se illegal); others are effectively subject to a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness (i.e., are subject to “quick-look” review); and most are presumed reasonable unless the plaintiff can establish certain facts suggesting that the practice is likely to reduce market output (i.e., are assessed under the full-blown rule of reason).

Antitrust law does not—with very few exceptions—attempt to specify ex ante exactly what a firm is allowed or forbidden to do. Opting instead

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54. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.”).

55. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (observing that quick-look analysis was appropriate when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets”); id. at 775 n.12 (observing that quick-look analysis effectively requires “shifting to a defendant the burden to show empirical evidence of procompetitive effects”).

56. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[M]ost antitrust claims are analyzed under a ‘rule of reason,’ according to which the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” (citing Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)); Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (observing that the plaintiff has the initial burden to prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers in the relevant market” under the rule of reason). See generally Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 80, 83 (2018); Edward D. Cavanagh, Whatever Happened to Quick Look?, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 39, 39-42 (2017).


58. The exceptions are antitrust’s rules of per se illegality for practices, such as naked horizontal price-fixing, that experience has shown are always or almost always anticompetitive. See Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2283 (“A small group of restraints are unreasonable per se because they ‘always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.’” (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988))).
to evaluate, *ex post*, a firm’s compliance with a general directive to avoid restraining market output, antitrust law is “standards-based.” The specific contours of its standards are fleshed out by politically insulated courts. Antitrust law is also a “therapeutic” market power remedy, meaning that it seeks to cure the disease causing adverse market effects—a lack of competition—and does not merely treat the symptoms of softened competition (e.g., increased prices and reduced quality) as a “palliative” remedy.

A second way to address market power concerns is through the imposition of conduct rules that specify *ex ante* precisely what conduct is forbidden or permitted. The rules may seek to force the outcome that would result if the market were competitive, as when natural monopoly utilities are required to charge rates resembling those that would prevail under competitive conditions. Such rules are a palliative remedy for market power in that they seek to alleviate market power symptoms (e.g., supra-competitive prices) without curing the underlying disease (the lack of competition). Other sorts of conduct rules may mandate behaviors designed to foster competition, as when telephone networks are required to provide potential rivals with access to their facilities.

Because they are more rigid and prescriptive than antitrust law’s flexible standards, and thus less likely to be appropriate for a broad range of diverse firms, *ex ante* rules addressing market power concerns tend to be

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59. Whereas a rule specifies before the actor acts exactly what behaviors are forbidden and permitted, a standard posits a somewhat amorphous behavioral directive and then assesses an act’s compliance after the act has occurred. For example, a posted speed limit is a rule, while tort law’s directive to use reasonable care (i.e., to avoid negligence) is a standard. See Lambert, supra note 17, at 101.


61. Id.

62. See generally Lambert, supra note 17, at 153–58. Natural monopolies exist when the economies of scale in an industry continue for so long that minimum efficient scale—the point at which scale economies are exhausted—occurs beyond the output level that would satisfy competitive market demand. In such a market, having multiple producers and dividing market demand among them would result in each firm’s producing at a less efficient scale than if a single firm supplied the whole market. To minimize production costs, a single firm should supply the market, so the law should not encourage entry as antitrust law does. The single producer, though, will be a monopolist and, left to its own devices, would charge monopoly prices. Given this dilemma—the need for a single seller to maximize productive efficiency but a likelihood that such a seller would charge allocatively inefficient monopoly prices—policymakers have typically displaced antitrust law in natural monopoly markets with a direct regulatory regime that protects the producer’s monopoly status but mandates that the producer not charge monopoly prices. Prices are usually capped at a level that allows the recovery of the producer’s costs, including its costs of capital. Natural monopolies may also exist when the market-satisfying output level occurs beyond the point of minimum efficient scale, but adding a second producer and splitting production among them would drive production costs above the level that would prevail with a single producer. See id.; W. Kip Viscusi, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., & John M. Vernon, *Economics of Regulation and Antitrust* 401–08 (4th ed. 2005).

63. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (imposing interconnection requirements on incumbent local exchange carriers).
limited in scope. They are usually tailored for a particular industry or group of firms. By contrast, antitrust law’s standards are focused on ends rather than specific means, are therefore less likely to “misfire” when applied broadly, and are thus assumed to govern a firm’s behavior in the absence of direct regulation addressing competitive concerns. Antitrust law can be said to be the “residual regulator” of market power—the body of law that governs unless it is displaced by more tailored competition rules.

A third approach to addressing market power concerns would retain the standards-based approach of antitrust law but delegate the task of fleshing out and implementing the relevant standards not to generalist courts resolving discrete disputes but to expert agencies exercising continued oversight of the firms subject to the standards. The expert agency could issue, and update as needed, specific orders and rules to ensure compliance with the standard.

This model resembles the approach taken by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which issues broadcast licenses on the condition that the licensee serve the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” and promulgates orders and rules to achieve that end. A traditional justification for the FCC’s broad authority to interfere with broadcasters’ business decisions—including speech-restricting decisions about what programming to feature—was the power conferred by a broadcast license given the scarcity of the airwaves. Because a licensee would face little competition, the FCC was authorized to oversee licensees’ decision-making—even decisions concerning speech—in the hopes of producing the sort of market outcomes (programming variety, diverse viewpoints, etc.) that would prevail in a competitive market.

Across the globe, all three approaches—antitrust law, ex ante regulation, and continual agency oversight—have been used or proposed as means of addressing market power concerns arising from dominant digital platforms. In the United States, each of the GAFA firms is currently

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64. See generally Lambert, supra note 17, at 100-01.
65. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1822, 1863–64 (discussing ongoing agency supervision in the telecommunications market).
67. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 335, 341 (2004) (“One consequence of regulation is a reduced role for the antitrust laws. When the government makes rules about price or output, market forces no longer govern. To that extent antitrust is shoved aside. A corollary is that as an industry undergoes deregulation, or removal from the regulatory process, antitrust re-enters as the residual regulator.”).
68. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 65, at 1863–64.
defending major antitrust lawsuits.\textsuperscript{72} In Europe, the European Commission proposed a Digital Markets Act\textsuperscript{73} that would impose a set of common \textit{ex ante} rules on large digital platforms deemed to be economic “gatekeepers,” a group that would include each GAFA firm (while notably excluding the largest European-based technology platform, Spotify).\textsuperscript{74} Several of the bills recently advanced by the Judiciary Committees of the U.S. House and Senate would impose a similar regime in the United States.\textsuperscript{75} In the United Kingdom, policymakers have recently launched a Digital Markets Unit that will provide continual agency oversight and tailored, platform-specific rules for large digital platforms.\textsuperscript{76}

2. \textit{Efficacy Limitations and Side Effects}

Like alternative medical treatments for a physical disease, the different approaches to addressing market failures vary in their efficacy and pro-

\textsuperscript{72} Google has been sued by the Justice Department for monopolizing internet search, see U.S. v. Google Complaint, supra note 40, and by two coalitions of states for monopolizing certain ad tech markets, see Texas v. Google Complaint, supra note 40; Colorado v. Google Complaint, supra note 40. Amazon has been sued over contracts with publishers that preclude them from offering lower prices on competing retail platforms. See Class Action Complaint ¶ 8, Cook v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-01369 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2021) [hereinafter Cook v. Amazon Complaint]. The company is also under investigation by E.U. antitrust officials for using data about third-party vendors’ sales in crafting its own private label offerings and for preferencing its own offerings and those of third-party vendors that choose to use its logistics and fulfillment services. See European Commission Press Release IP/20/2077, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for the Use of Non-Public Independent Seller Data and Opens Second Investigation into Its E-Commerce Business Practices (Nov. 10, 2020). Facebook is defending a lawsuit by the FTC for monopolizing the market for general social networking. See FTC v. Facebook Amended Complaint, supra note 40. Apple has been the subject of legal challenges by both Spotify in Europe, see European Commission Press Release, IP/20/1073, Antitrust: Commission Opens Investigations into Apple’s App Store Rules (June 16, 2020), and Epic Games in the United States, see Epic v. Apple Complaint, supra note 39, over its allegedly exclusionary app store policies.


\textsuperscript{75} See Ending Platform Monopolies Act, H.R. 3825, 117th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2021) (mandating structural separations/line of business restrictions for large digital platforms); Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Services Switching Act of 2021, H.R. 3849, 117th Cong. §§ 2(a)-(b) (2021) (mandating data portability and platform interoperability); American Choice and Innovation Online Act, H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. (2021) (precluding covered platforms from discriminating among offerings, preferencing their own offerings, or restricting software uninstallation, data porting by business users, side-loading of apps, or certain communications between business users and their customers); American Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. (2022) (precluding limitations on side-loading and the use of third-party payment systems for in-app purchases).

duce different side effects. The primary limitation of antitrust law as a market-power remedy is an efficacy concern: it can be indeterminate and slow. Antitrust law can be indeterminate because it forbids only “unreasonable” instances of certain business behaviors (trade-restraining agreements and exclusionary acts) and typically assesses reasonableness on a case-by-case basis according to a practice’s effect on overall market output. Antitrust can be slow because it is enforced through court orders that require time-consuming lawsuits.

It is important, however, not to overstate these limitations. As precedents develop, antitrust becomes both more determinate (as business planners, enforcers, and courts may look to past judgments to predict how courts will assess the reasonableness of a challenged practice) and faster (as the growing pattern of precedents deters conduct likely to generate an adverse judgment). In the early days of new business models and market structures, legal expectations are unclear, and adjudication is required to establish them. Antitrust law’s directives become clearer and generate more immediate effects as precedents develop around novel markets and practices.

Relative to antitrust law, ex ante regulation is more determinate and may achieve its goals more quickly. For example, regulators may posit immediately effective, bright-line rules that preclude dominant firms from exercising their market power or that facilitate market entry. But ex ante regulation threatens a significant side effect that is less of a concern with flexible antitrust standards: error costs resulting from high informational requirements.

In setting forth prospective conduct rules, regulators engage in a form of centralized economic planning by dictating how productive resources are—and are not—allocated. If the rules imposed unwittingly misallocate resources away from their highest and best ends, social welfare will be reduced. And as rules become less flexible, increasingly prescriptive (i.e., dictating more precise arrangements), and more generally applicable, the information required for assuring that they do not “misfire” grows. As F.A. Hayek observed, centralized economic planning entails “the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality.” An authority seeking to enhance social welfare by imposing a gen-

77. See generally Lambert, supra note 17, at 145–53 (cataloguing alternative remedies for classic market failures—e.g., externalities, public goods, information asymmetry, market power—and assessing their efficacy limitations and side effects).
78. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
79. Lambert, supra note 17, at 151.
81. Lambert, supra note 17, at 178–79.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 31–32.
84. Id. at 178–83.
85. See id. at 178–79.
86. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 520 (1945).
erally applicable prohibition must know, for example, which instances of future behavior its ban would preclude; the value the forbidden behaviors would have created given citizens’ subjective preferences (to which only they are privy); and the amount of welfare loss the prohibition is likely to avert—a matter that also turns on people’s private preferences. Similar informational requirements apply when regulators seek to enhance welfare through imposition of a generally applicable mandate—a “thou shalt,” as opposed to a “thou shalt not.”

Like antitrust law, the third approach to addressing market-power concerns—ongoing agency oversight—involves flexible standards whose precise requirements are determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the totality of the circumstances. The approach thus entails fewer of the Hayekian “knowledge problem” concerns that bedevil ex ante conduct rules. But by delegating the authority to determine specific requirements to a politically constituted expert agency rather than to apolitical, generalist courts, the approach threatens losses from what we may term “public choice concerns.”

The branch of economics known as public choice applies economic analysis to political decision-making. Eschewing the romantic vision of politics in which political actors set aside their personal preferences to pursue some version of the public good, public choice assumes that people act in the political arena as they do in non-political realms: as rational self-interest maximizers. Thus, citizens “vote their pocketbooks”; politicians pursue election and reelection; unelected bureaucrats seek to enhance their job prestige, their salaries, the resources at their disposal, and their future earnings prospects; and members of interest groups seek to maximize their private returns. Two key insights of public choice are that private actors will often seek to coopt government’s unique coercion right in order to increase their private returns—a process called “rent-seeking”—and that government entities with significant discretionary authority will frequently acquiesce to those private actors’ demands as the authorities become “captured” by private concerns.

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87. Lambert, supra note 17, at 31–32.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 161–65.
90. See Hayek, supra note 86, at 520.
91. Id. at 158–69.
96. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3, 3 (1971) (observing that “regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit” in regulated industries).
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for welfare losses resulting from (1) the squandering of resources on non-productive rent-seeking activity and (2) the loss of market competition as rent-seekers co-opt government’s power to hobble their rivals constitute public-choice concerns. Experience has shown that both rent-seeking and agency capture are especially likely when politically constituted expert agencies have substantial discretionary authority over firms with which they have continual contact.

In the end, each of the available remedies for market power entails pros and cons. Antitrust law avoids many knowledge problems and public-choice concerns, but it is less determinate and operates more slowly, at least when business models are new. Ex ante conduct rules are determinate and take effect quickly, but they entail a substantial knowledge problem. The agency oversight approach may be quicker and more determinate than antitrust and may raise fewer knowledge-problem concerns than do ex ante rules, but the approach raises significant public-choice concerns.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED REMEDIES IN THE CONTEXT OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS

Having catalogued the remedies available for addressing market power and identified the typical efficacy limitations and side effects of each, we turn to consider how the remedies would fare in addressing market power concerns arising from dominant digital platforms. We focus primarily on the chief limitation(s) of each proposed remedy.

A. ANTITRUST LAW

As explained, the primary limitations of antitrust law as a remedy for market power are that it is somewhat indeterminate and proceeds slowly, as it requires often-complicated lawsuits to establish and enforce specific conduct standards. As Mike Walker, chief economist of the United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority, recently testified before the U.S. Congress, “[t]here are two main problems with relying on [antitrust law]” in markets involving digital platforms: “It is too slow,” and “[i]t is primarily backward looking [so that] you run the risk of playing wack-

98. See Lambert, supra note 17, at 168-69.
99. Even antitrust courts may face a knowledge problem in crafting remedies, particularly conduct remedies that prescribe or forbid particular behaviors and entail a measure of central planning. See id. at 152-53 (describing error costs in antitrust adjudication). Antitrust actions may also be means of rent-seeking by private concerns. See Lambert, supra note 97, at 519-30 (arguing that lawsuits challenging app store policies of Apple and Google are rent-seeking endeavors).
100. Ex ante conduct rules may also entail public choice concerns, given that the legislatures and regulatory bodies that impose them are subject to political manipulation by private interests.
101. Agencies with continual oversight authority may still face a knowledge problem when promulgating widely applicable prospective rules.
The essence of this latter criticism is that antitrust does not provide prospective guidance—i.e., that it is indeterminate. It is doubtful, however, that these concerns are as grave as Walker and other proponents of non-antitrust market power remedies suggest.

With respect to indeterminacy, a number of cases are currently pending that will soon increase the clarity of antitrust’s directives in the digital platform space. At the time of this writing, Google is defending government lawsuits challenging (1) its efforts to secure default status for its search engine on various “search access points” and (2) a number of its purportedly exclusionary actions taken in markets for digital advertising services (ad tech). Facebook is facing claims challenging its acquisitions of firms that could have emerged as competitors (Instagram and WhatsApp) and its refusal to grant developers of apps access to its platform unless they agreed neither to compete with it nor to work with its competitors. Amazon is facing challenges to its use of “most favored nations” clauses that allegedly reduce price competition and to its use of data on third-party sales to inform its own product decisions. Apple is defending challenges to its refusal to permit side-loading of third-party apps (i.e., installation outside its proprietary App Store) and its requirement that purchases made while using apps running on its mobile operating system, iOS, utilize its proprietary In-App Purchase payment system; and its refusal to allow iOS apps to evade revenue sharing by directing users outside the apps to make purchases. Google is defending similar challenges to actions that purportedly discourage side-loading—unlike Apple, Google technically permits the practice—and to its insistence that in-app purchases be made using its proprietary payment system.

The resolution of these lawsuits, which are just some of the pending antitrust actions against digital platforms, will provide guidance on a number of open issues, including (1) the propriety of digital defaults and the appropriate means of securing default status, (2) the acquisition of nascent or potential competitors, (3) the propriety of most favored nations clauses involving digital retailers, (4) limits on the use of “closed” platform ecosystems, (5) limits on the use of data derived from one digital

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104. See Texas v. Google Complaint, supra note 40, ¶ 262; Colorado v. Google Complaint, supra note 40, ¶¶ 8–16.
105. See FTC v. Facebook Amended Complaint, supra note 40, ¶¶ 225–27.
109. Id. ¶ 10.
offering to inform or enhance another, and (6) a platform operator’s permissible means of extracting surplus from platform users. Displacing antitrust on grounds of its indeterminacy seems improvident when antitrust precedents in the area of digital platforms are soon to accumulate.\textsuperscript{112}

But what about antitrust’s purported slowness? The implicit assumption here is that the protracted nature of antitrust enforcement and adjudication has allowed social welfare losses from market power to proliferate in digital markets.\textsuperscript{113} The soundness of that assumption, however, is questionable.

To be sure, digital platforms have grown quite large over the past two decades.\textsuperscript{114} But size alone does not generate adverse market power effects—i.e., higher prices, lower quality, and deadweight loss from failure to engage in welfare-enhancing production. In industries featuring significant economies of scale and network effects, larger firms will be able to offer a better deal for consumers and will thus succeed relative to their smaller rivals.\textsuperscript{115} In such industries, using state power to “force smallness” will cause a reduction in overall market output—the ultimate symptom of market power and the harm antitrust is designed to avert.\textsuperscript{116} Moreover, in markets in which one firm is likely to dominate because of economies of scale and network effects, firms, even dominant ones, often compete “for the market” by continually enhancing output both quantitatively and qualitatively.\textsuperscript{117} The mere fact that digital platforms have grown large, then, does not by itself suggest that antitrust is not working.\textsuperscript{118}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{112} This point echoes FTC Commissioner Christine Wilson’s recent call for Congress to await resolution of the major pending antitrust lawsuits against digital platforms before making sweeping changes to the U.S. antitrust laws. See Alex Wilts, \textit{Wilson: Resolve Big Tech Cases Before Reforming Antitrust Laws}, \textit{GLOB. COMPETITION REV.} (April 12, 2021), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/gcr-usa/digital-markets/wilson-resolve-big-tech-cases-reforming-antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/H7KK-VY88].
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Hovenkamp, \textit{supra} note 60, at 1958–60.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Economies of scale exist when producers’ long-run average cost could drop by expanding productive capacity. In industries in which firms face high fixed costs, the output range in which economies of scale exist may be great. See \textit{generally} Lambert, \textit{supra} note 17, at 153–56. For production within that range, firms that have greater productive capacity can achieve lower per-unit costs and can thus charge lower prices sustainably. See \textit{id.} Network effects exist where a firm’s offering is more attractive as it serves more customers, as with an internet messaging service or social media platform. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, \textit{Systems Competition and Network Effects}, \textit{S J. ECON. PERSPS.} 95, 94 (1994) (observing that network effects exist when “the value of membership to one user is positively affected when another user joins and enlarges the network”). Both economies of scale and network effects reward scale and thus encourage larger firms with greater market shares.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} \textit{See generally} Lambert, \textit{supra} note 17, at 153–56.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} For a period in the mid-twentieth century, antitrust law did look beyond market output effects to police bigness per se, and a number of contemporary commentators—so-called Neo-Brandeisians—favor a return to that “big is bad” approach. See, e.g., Wu, \textit{supra} note 2, at 16–17; Khan, \textit{supra} note 2, at 716; Hawley, \textit{supra} note 3. I have elsewhere explained why such a policy transition would be misguided. See Thomas A. Lambert, \textit{The...}
\end{itemize}
The key question is whether we are witnessing an epidemic of actual market power symptoms in markets involving digital platforms. It is far from clear that we are. Many of the most prominent services provided by the dominant digital platforms (e.g., search services, social networking, email, digital photo storage) are free, or at least offered at zero monetary cost, to one set of users, who obviously experience no adverse price effects. Of course, the services a platform provides for free to one set of consumers are often financed by payments from someone else, most often advertisers. But there is little evidence that advertising prices are rising. Indeed, overall advertising spending as a percentage of GDP has fallen since the advent of the major digital platforms, and prices for digital advertising have dropped steadily.

When it comes to product and service quality, digital platform markets appear to be performing remarkably well. The GAFA firms are hardly fat monopolists enjoying the quiet life that results from a lack of competition. They are better characterized as relentless innovators that continually improve their offerings for the benefit of consumers. Even on the matter of user privacy, the quality aspect most often alleged to be deficient as a result of platforms’ market power, consumers increasingly have options that satisfy their preferences. In search, DuckDuckGo, Startpage,


120. See News by the Ton: 75 Years of U.S. Advertising, Benedict Evans (June 15, 2020), https://www.ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2020/6/14/75-years-of-us-advertising [https://perma.cc/QQ89-8NUL] (observing that the “advertising share of GDP started sliding immediately after the Dotcom bubble, had a major step down in the financial crisis and has been suspiciously flat ever since. . . . The economy grew and advertising didn’t get its historic share of that growth.”).


122. In 2018, Amazon was the top global spender on R&D ($22.6 billion); Google parent Alphabet was second ($16.2 billion); Microsoft was sixth ($12.3 billion); Apple, seventh ($11.6 billion); and Facebook, fourteenth ($7.8 billion). See M. Szumigier, Ranking of the 20 Companies with the Highest Spending on Research and Development in 2018, Statista (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/265645/ranking-of-the-20-companies-with-the-highest-spending-on-research-and-development [https://perma.cc/3MSA-NGMD].
and Ecosia offer enhanced privacy. On web browsers, consumers can select between products that allow third-party cookies by default and those that block them, and if they do not like the preset default on their preferred browser, they can typically change it. While it is of course possible that product and service quality might be even better in digital markets if there were greater competition, the existing and ever-improving product and service quality in such markets does not indicate that antitrust law’s slowness has allowed market power to run amok.

Nor does it appear that reliance on antitrust law has permitted harms in the form of reduced innovation and entrepreneurship in digital markets. In its recently released report on competition in digital markets, the Antitrust Subcommittee of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee asserted that since the advent of the major digital platforms: (1) “[t]he number of new technology firms in the digital economy has declined”; (2) “the entrepreneurship rate—the share of startups and young firms in the [high technology] industry as a whole—has also fallen significantly”; and (3) “[u]nsurprisingly, there has also been a sharp reduction in early-stage funding for technology startups.” Examined closely, however, those claims do not withstand scrutiny. In support of the first two, the House Judiciary Report cited a study based on data ending in 2011. As Benedict Evans has observed, “standard industry data shows that startup investment rounds have actually risen at least 4x since then.” In support of the third claim, the House Judiciary Report cited statistics from an article noting that the number and aggregate size of the very smallest venture capital deals—those under $1 million—fell between 2014 and 2018 (after growing substantially from 2008 to 2014). The House Re-


124. See Michal Wlosik, How Different Browsers Handle First-Party and Third-Party Cookies, CLEARCODE (Dec. 17, 2020), https://clearcode.cc/blog/browsers-first-third-party-cookies/#C1 [https://perma.cc/BMY7-Q9S6]. Ironically, legal efforts to enhance platform competition may pose a hurdle to further privacy innovation, as smaller ad tech companies are now accusing Google of impairing their ability to compete by providing privacy protections its users are demanding. See Ronan Shields, Google Kills the Cookie, Leaving Digital Media Companies Craving a New Way Forward, ADWEEK (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.adweek.com/programmatic/google-kills-the-cookie-leaving-digital-media-companies-craving-a-new-way-forward [https://perma.cc/L8RK-8WZK].


port failed to note, however, the cited article’s observation that small venture deals ($1 million to $5 million) had not dropped and that larger venture deals (>5 million) had grown substantially during the same time period. Nor did the House Report acknowledge that venture capital funding has continued to increase since 2019. The House Report authors appear to have cherry-picked a small and isolated data set to support their claim that the advent of the digital platforms has led to a “sharp reduction” in funding for technology start-ups.

None of this is to suggest that there are no competitive problems in markets involving digital platforms. The question at hand is simply whether antitrust law is “too slow” for such markets, as CMA economist Walker and other advocates of direct regulation have suggested. If market-power symptoms indeed grew prevalent in such markets before antitrust law could do its job, antitrust law’s slowness could warrant a different, perhaps more error-prone approach. But despite the sheer size of today’s digital platforms, the markets in which they participate have yet to exhibit severe market-power symptoms, and antitrust adjudication is proceeding apace. It seems, then, that neither a lack of determinacy nor excessive slowness justifies jettisoning antitrust law as the remedy for market power in markets involving digital platforms—at least not at the current moment.

B. Ex Ante Conduct Rules

The chief limitation of ex ante conduct rules is that they often generate costly errors because the planners promulgating generally applicable, resource-allocating directives outside a particular, examinable factual context lack the information needed to determine in advance which precise behaviors will reduce market output and which will enhance it. When it comes to conduct rules that apply uniformly to disparate digital platforms, this Hayekian knowledge problem is likely to be severe.

Of course, efforts to predict how the knowledge problem will bedevil particular conduct rules are themselves subject to knowledge problem concerns. It is not difficult, however, to identify risks of errors that particular conduct rules may generate. We therefore briefly consider how several of the leading proposed conduct rules for digital platforms could end

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129. See Teare, supra note 128.
131. See Reviving Competition Hearing, supra note 102, at 1–2 (testimony of Dr. Mike Walker, Chief Economic Advisor, U.K. Competition and Markets Authority).
133. See Hovenkamp, supra note 60, at 1956 ("[B]road regulation is ill-suited for digital platforms because they are so disparate.").
up reducing social welfare by wrongly forbidding output-enhancing conduct or wrongly requiring behaviors that reduce market output.

1. Structural Separations

In her presidential campaign, Senator Elizabeth Warren famously proposed to ban companies operating major digital platforms from competing on their own platforms. The staff of the House Judiciary Committee later recommended that Congress consider “structural separation and line of business restrictions,” explaining that “[s]tructural separations prohibit a dominant intermediary from operating in markets that place the intermediary in competition with the firms dependent on its infrastructure. Line of business restrictions, meanwhile, generally limit the markets in which a dominant firm can engage.” In June 2021, members of the House Judiciary Committee responded by advancing a bill that would mandate structural separations and line of business restrictions for the largest digital platforms.

Under the proposed Ending Platform Monopolies Act, Amazon could not sell its private label Amazon Basics products on Amazon.com, Google could not feature its own content on Google Search, and Apple could not provide apps that compete with those for sale in its App Store. The thinking is that, by insulating third-party sellers on a plat-
form from competition with the platform provider that may have a competitive advantage derived from its access to information about platform transactions, the restrictions will encourage third-party sellers to invest more in innovation, production, and marketing. Of course, banning platform operators from competing with firms that use their platforms reduces immediate competition in the markets from which platform operators are excluded. Line of business restrictions may even entrench dominant incumbents by preventing large digital platforms—the very firms best positioned for success—from entering the incumbents’ markets. Apple, for example, could not create a search engine to compete with Google on the iPhone, as it has apparently contemplated. Proponents of structural separations apparently assume that these reductions in competition will be outweighed by an increase in future competition as third-party sellers, freed from concern about being undersold or disadvantaged by the platforms they utilize, innovate and grow. But that is a speculative gamble. Regulators have no way of knowing that the “bird in the hand” of increased competition from platform operators’ market participation is of less social value than the “bird in the bush” of having stronger and more innovative third-party sellers in the future. Indeed, given platform operators’ interest in assuring high-quality offerings on their platforms, it seems unlikely that they would take steps today that would reduce future innovation by or substantially weaken platform participants. That would suggest that the marginal benefits of a structural separations rule could be meager, while the marginal cost of precluding platform operators from competing today appears to be great. To continue with the bird analogy, mandating structural separations may be like releasing a resplendent quetzal to chase after a common sparrow.

business or a business that constitutes nascent or potential competition to the covered platform operator; or
(B) exclude from, or disadvantage, the products, services, or lines of business on the covered platform of a competing business or a business that constitutes nascent or potential competition to the covered platform operator.

Id. § 2(b). The term “covered platform” includes any online platform that (1) has at least 50 million monthly active U.S. users or 100,000 monthly active U.S. business users, (2) is owned or controlled by a company with net annual sale or a market capitalization of at least $600 billion (adjusted for inflation), and (3) “is a critical trading partner for the sale or provision of any product or service offered on or directly related to the online platform.” Id. § 5(5)(B).


141. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 139, at 1085.
In any event, whether banning platform operators from competing on their platforms would occasion a net loss or gain would vary from platform to platform and market to market.\footnote{142} Many Amazon Basics offerings, for example, are commodity products sold in markets featuring strong brands with high profit margins (e.g., Amazon Basics batteries are commodities that compete with high-margin brands like Energizer and Duracell).\footnote{143} Amazon’s participation as a seller in such markets is highly unlikely to discourage valuable innovation—there is little to be had on basic commodity products—but it creates valuable price competition by offering consumers a less expensive option from a trusted supplier. The sort of structural separations rule promoted by Senator Warren and imposed by the Ending Platform Monopolies Act would misfire badly in this particular context.

2. Self-Preference Bans

The information and offerings presented to consumers on user home screens, search engines, social networks, app stores, or e-commerce sites must always be displayed in some order, and consumers typically pay most attention to the most conspicuous offerings.\footnote{144} “Self-preferencing bans” preclude digital platforms from affording a more favorable ranking or offering placement to the platform’s own products or services than to similar products and services offered by third-parties participating on the platform.\footnote{145} Such bans are a key component of the Digital Markets Act currently under consideration in the European Union\footnote{146} and two bills recently advanced by the respective Judiciary Committees of the U.S. House and Senate.\footnote{147}

\footnote{142} See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 60, at 1956 (highlighting key differences among dominant platforms as “broad regulation is ill-suited for digital platforms because they are so disparate”).


\footnote{146} See Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 6(1)(d) (“[A] gatekeeper shall . . . refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and nondiscriminatory conditions to such ranking.”).

\footnote{147} See American Choice and Innovation Online Act, H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(a) (2021) (precluding operator of a covered platform from “(1) advantag[ing] the covered platform operator’s own products, services, or lines of business over those of another business user; (2) exclud[ing] or disadvantag[ing] the products, services, or lines of business of another business user relative to the covered platform’s own products, services, or lines of business; or (3) discriminat[ing] among similarly situated business users”); id. § 2(b)(7) (making it unlawful “in connection with any user interfaces, including search or ranking
Proponents of self-preferencing bans contend that they are needed to preserve platform participants’ incentives to innovate and enhance the quality of their offerings; why do so if your offering may be unfairly buried? But self-preferencing bans do not preclude platforms from elevating their own offerings when they deserve more favorable placement—preventing this would harm consumers by obscuring the most attractive options and reducing the platform’s incentive to offer consumers a better deal. Prohibitions on self-preferencing, therefore, require the regulator to develop some sort of “deservingness” criteria.

That is a tall order. Any such criteria would have to assess multiple factors, and the identity and relative weight of those factors would vary from offering to offering and platform to platform. The popularity of an offering (the number of user clicks, etc.) could not be the sole criterion for determining deservingness and thus display prominence because past display prominence may itself have influenced an offering’s popularity. For one thing, it is more convenient for users to avail themselves of prominently displayed offerings. In addition, many offerings, such as those for dating apps, exhibit network effects where their value to users depends on how many other users have adopted them, which in turn depends on display prominence. Thus, determining true deservingness, which must be done to identify instances of illicit (undeserved) self-preferencing, requires regulators to specify ex ante what would make one offering superior to another in the absence of any benefits from favorable placement. Regulators are not well-placed to make these sorts of judgments, and if they get the deservingness formula wrong or if their formula becomes outdated, offerings will be displayed in a way that degrades the user experience.

Platform operators already have an incentive to afford prominent placement to the most deserving offerings, as users are more likely to return to the platform if they can easily find the offerings that best meet their needs. It is perhaps possible that a platform might reason that its benefits from promoting its own inferior offering exceed its benefits from functionality offered by the covered platform, [to] treat the covered platform operator’s own products, services, or lines of business more favorably than those of another business user”); American Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2021) (making it unlawful for a person operating a covered platform to “unfairly prefer the covered platform operator’s own products, services, or lines of business over those of another business user on the covered platform in a manner that would materially harm competition on the covered platform”).

148. See Majority Staff of Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com. & Admin. L. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong., Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets: Majority Staff Report and Recommendations 382 (2020) (“Without the opportunity to compete fairly, businesses and entrepreneurs are dissuaded from investing and, over the long term, innovation suffers.”).

149. For example, the American Innovation and Choice Online Act precludes “unfairly preferring the covered platform operator’s own products, services, or lines of business.” S. 2992 § 2(a)(1) (emphasis added).

providing the best arrangement of offerings to its users, but it seems unlikely that a platform operator would often run the risk of losing platform users to secure marginally more sales or uses of its own inferior offering. Accordingly, a self-preferencing ban would likely provide little benefit to consumers. And because such a ban would require regulators to create a myriad of complicated deservingness formulae that they are ill-equipped to craft and maintain over time, such a ban is likely, in the end, to require offering placements that do not optimize users' platform experiences.151

3. Requirements that Platform Users Be Permitted to Remove Pre-Installed Software, Side-Load Apps, and Use Alternative Payment Systems

Several ex ante conduct rules appearing in the European Union’s Digital Markets Act and recently advanced U.S. House and Senate bills, though seemingly minor, would undermine business models currently in use in digital platform markets. The planners’ apparent assumption is that the benefits of upending those models would exceed any resulting costs. But that is far from clear.

One of the proposed rules would ban platforms from preventing users from uninstalling any pre-installed software or apps if they wish to do so.152 The planners’ theory is that users are unlikely to install software competing with a pre-installed offering if doing so would reduce available memory on a device.153 For example, if the Google Search app or Google’s Chrome browser cannot be removed from an Android phone or tablet, freeing up available memory, a user is less likely to install DuckDuckGo’s search app or Mozilla’s Firefox browser. And, of course,

151. Self-preferencing bans may also undermine business models that have proven quite attractive to consumers. For example, platform operators sometimes provide access to their platforms for free but then earn revenues from additional services they provide on the platforms, as when Google gives free access to its Android mobile operating system but earns search advertising revenue from the use of Google Search on the Android platform. See infra notes 164–70 and accompanying text. Absent the ability to preference its revenue-generating offerings on its platform, a platform operator would be less likely to offer its platform for free. See infra notes 166–70 and accompanying text. See also Adam Kovacevich, A Closer Look: How Senator Klobuchar’s Bill Would Ban Amazon Prime, MEDIUM (Nov. 2, 2021), https://medium.com/chamber-of-progress/a-closer-look-how-senator-klobuchars-bill-would-ban-amazon-prime-aa57dd5d22e0 [https://perma.cc/4XJ2-LV7F] (arguing that self-preferencing ban in American Innovation and Choice Online Act would effectively preclude Amazon’s popular free-shipping subscription service).

152. See Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 6(1)(b) (requiring that a gatekeeper “allow end users to un-install any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service’’); H.R. 3816 § 2(b)(5) (making it illegal for operators of covered platforms to “restrict or impede covered platform users from un-installing software applications that have been preinstalled on the covered platform or changing default settings that direct or steer covered platform users to products or services offered by the covered platform operator’’); S. 2992 § 2(b)(5) (making it illegal “unless necessary for the security or functioning of the covered platform, [to] materially restrict or impede covered platform users from un-installing software applications that have been preinstalled on the covered platform or changing default settings that direct or steer covered platform users to products or services offered by the covered platform operator’’).

153. Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, ¶ 47.
the more difficult it is for rivals to secure installation of their offerings, the less likely they are to invest in them.

An additional set of proposed rules would restrict how digital platforms may manage and earn revenue from their app ecosystems. Under the European Union’s Digital Markets Act, the American Choice and Online Innovation Act pending in the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Open App Markets Act recently advanced by the Senate Judiciary Committee, digital platforms must allow users to download apps produced by third parties outside the platform’s own app store (side-loading),\(^{154}\) allow any third-party app developer to direct users outside its app to complete a transaction initiated within the app,\(^ {155}\) and permit users to utilize a third-party payment system to close any in-app purchases.\(^ {156}\) The Digital Markets Act further requires that platform operators allow free use on an app of any digital goods purchased outside the app or without using the platform’s in-app purchasing system.\(^ {157}\) So, for example, Apple could not preclude iPhone users from downloading apps like Epic Games’ Fortnite app outside Apple’s proprietary App

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\(^{154}\) Id. art. (6)(1)(c) (requiring gatekeeper to “allow the installation and effective use of third party software applications or software application stores using, or interoperating with, operating systems of that gatekeeper and allow these software applications or software application stores to be accessed by means other than the core platform services of that gatekeeper”); H.R. 3816 § 2(b)(9) (making it illegal for operators of covered platforms to “restrict or impede a business user, or a business user’s customers or users, from interoperating or connecting to any product or service”); Open App Markets Act, S. 2710, 117th Cong. § 3(d) (2022); Rebecca Klar, Senate Panel Advances Bill Targeting Apple, Google App Store Power, THE HILL (Feb. 3, 2022, 1:53 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/592692-senate-panel-advances-bill-targeting-apple-google-app-store-power [https://perma.cc/4PCE-FT4L].

\(^{155}\) Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 5(c) (requiring gatekeepers to “allow business users to promote offers to end users acquired via the core platform service”); H.R. 3816 § 2(b)(6) (making it illegal for operators of covered platforms to “restrict or impede business users from communicating information or providing hyperlinks on the core platform to covered platform users to facilitate business transactions”); S. 2710 § 3(b) (“A Covered Company shall not impose restrictions on communications of developers with the users of the App through an App or direct outreach to a user concerning legitimate business offers, such as pricing terms and product or service offerings”).

\(^{156}\) Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 5(c) (requiring gatekeepers to “allow business users to . . . conclude contracts with . . . end users regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not”); id. art. 5(b) (requiring gatekeepers to “allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the core online intermediation services of the gatekeeper”); H.R. 3816 § 2(b)(9) (making it illegal for operators of covered platforms to “restrict or impede a business user, or a business user’s customers or users, from interoperating or connecting to any product or service”); S. 2710 § 3(a)(1) (prohibiting each covered company from “requiring developers to use an In-App Payment System owned or controlled by the Covered Company”).

\(^{157}\) Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 5(c) (requiring gatekeepers to permit “users to access and use, through the core platform services . . . content, subscriptions, features or other items by using the software application of a business user, where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper”).
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Nor could it require users of the Fortnite iPhone app to employ Apple’s In-App Purchase system to make purchases (e.g., of game add-ons like “skins”) while using the app. \(^{159}\) It also could not preclude streaming music provider Spotify from directing users of its iPhone app to its own website to purchase an upgraded Spotify Premium subscription. \(^{160}\)

The goal of these rules is to prevent dominant digital platforms from exercising their market power to collect a supracompetitive share of revenues from sales of digital amenities used on the platforms. \(^{161}\) Apple, for example, currently collects a revenue share—usually 30% but sometimes less—on sales of paid iOS apps sold through its App Store (it receives nothing for distributing free apps) and on in-app purchases of digital goods bought within iOS apps. \(^{162}\) Google collects similar revenue shares on sales of paid Android apps purchased through Google’s Play Store and on in-app purchases using its Google Play Billing service. \(^{163}\)

What the ban on uninstallable presets and the various restrictions on app policies have in common is that each is likely to disrupt a business model that has proven quite beneficial to consumers. The rule forbidding unremovable software would strike a blow to platforms financed by the use of preinstalled software. Creators of digital platforms have different means of monetizing their creative endeavors. \(^{164}\) They may sell access to the platform by bundling it with hardware that they sell. That is the approach Apple takes with its iOS operating system that is sold only with Apple hardware products (iPhones and iPads). \(^{165}\) Alternatively, platform

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158. Fortnite is a popular video game. Its producer, Epic Games, has challenged Apple’s policy of restricting side-loading. See Epic v. Apple Complaint, supra note 39, at 19, 32-33.

159. Fortnite players may purchase digital outfits called “skins” for their digital avatars while playing the game. Fortnite-maker Epic has challenged Apple’s requirement that purchases made while using the iOS Fortnite app be made using Apple’s In-App Purchase system, enabling Apple to collect a share of the revenue. See id. at 28-30.

160. In the European Union, streaming music service provider Spotify, a Swedish company, has challenged Apple’s refusal to permit it to direct users of its iOS app outside the app to purchase upgrades to its premium service in order to avoid the commission Apple charges on in-app purchases. See Spotify Files Complaint with European Commission Against Apple, Music Ally (Mar. 13, 2019), https://musically.com/2019/03/13/spotify-complaint-european-commission-apple [https://perma.cc/G8KF-2JVU].

161. Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, ¶ 57.


165. See id.
developers may license their platform software for a fee. Microsoft takes that tack with its Windows Operating System, and it briefly did so with a mobile operating system it licensed to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) like Nokia. A third monetization approach is to license the platform technology for free but include within it features that will generate revenue for the platform developer. That is the strategy Google has taken with its Android operating system, which it licenses for free to OEMs while creating incentives for them to include Google's search engine and Chrome browser as unremovable features. Google recoups its Android investments by earning search advertising revenues from Android users' web searches on Google Search and by monetizing (through targeted display advertising sales) user data gleaned from Android users' web browsing on Chrome.

Of course, platform operators that finance their creative efforts using this third approach—free platforms incorporating revenue-generating components—need to ensure consumer utilization of the revenue-generating parts of their bundle. If those components may be uninstalled to free up space for competing offerings (e.g., other search engines, browsers, etc.), operators' revenue per licensed platform will fall, requiring that they either make up that shortfall with license fees or cut back on investments in the platform. This could deny consumers an alternative that many appear to prefer: a high-quality, continually updated platform licensed at zero monetary cost.

The rules requiring platform operators to permit app side-loading and to allow the circumvention of in-app purchasing systems threaten to disrupt an app distribution model that ensures the quality and security of third-party apps, fosters the development of new apps, encourages continued innovation by platform operators, and reduces deadweight loss in the market for platforms.

Apps developed by third parties may do damage to the platform on which they are operated or may otherwise degrade the user experience on the platform. Accordingly, both providers and users of platforms have an interest in ensuring that such apps are properly vetted. On the mobile operating systems (primarily iOS and Android), such vetting occurs

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166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. The same is true if platform operators cannot preference (e.g., offered favored placement to) their pre-installed revenue-generating offerings. See supra note 151.
through app stores (Apple’s App Store and Google Play).\textsuperscript{171} Evaluating and distributing digital goods, though, is costly. Apple and Google cover those costs by collecting a revenue share on sales of paid apps distributed through their app stores and by taking a cut of in-app purchases.\textsuperscript{172} To ensure prompt collection of their revenue shares, Apple and Google require use of their proprietary in-app purchasing systems.\textsuperscript{173} This approach allows the platforms to cover the cost of ensuring a trustworthy app ecosystem.

The platforms’ revenue-sharing approach also has the benefit of subsidizing upstart apps and thereby encouraging app development.\textsuperscript{174} Because app developers are charged a percentage of revenues from app sales and in-app purchases, developers of popular apps bear most of the cost of sustaining the third-party app ecosystem.\textsuperscript{175} Developers of free apps pay nothing, and developers of unpopular (or yet-to-be popular) paid apps pay little. This means that app developers pay less early in the life of their apps, when income is likely scant, in exchange for paying more if and when their apps have proven successful and they are better able to bear the cost of maintaining the third-party app ecosystem. This system, which is analogous to Ramsey pricing for utilities,\textsuperscript{176} inures to the benefit of consumers, as it subsidizes new apps and thereby encourages app development. Though disfavored by producers of popular apps like Fortnite and Spotify, the system likely enhances overall market output.

The current system may further encourage app development by reducing developers’ business risks. Platform producers often incorporate additional functionality into new versions of their product, perhaps as a paid add-on.\textsuperscript{177} Accordingly, every app developer faces a risk that its app’s functions will be incorporated into a subsequent version of the platform itself or offered at a lower price by the platform provider, reducing de-

\begin{itemize}

\item \textsuperscript{172} See Epic v. Apple Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 125; Epic v. Google Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 177.

\item \textsuperscript{173} See Epic v. Apple Complaint, supra note 39, ¶¶ 132-34; Epic v. Google Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 178.


\item \textsuperscript{175} They likely pass much of this cost on to consumers.

\item \textsuperscript{176} Ramsey pricing involves setting rates for different products or services (typically price-regulated utilities) in inverse proportion to elasticity of demand—i.e., charging higher mark-ups over marginal cost on products where customers are less likely to cut back on purchases in response to a price increase. This allows the firm to cover its fixed costs of production in a manner that maximizes market output. See \textit{LAMBERT}, supra note 17, at 165-66.

\item \textsuperscript{177} Producers of operating systems do this when they bundle new proprietary apps into their operating systems or make those apps available in their app stores.
\end{itemize}
mand for the app. If mobile operating system producers can share in the revenue from a popular third-party app, then they have less incentive to incorporate the app's functionality into their operating systems or sell a competing app at a discount. Thus, as Dirk Auer has explained, “Apple and Google’s 30% commissions can be seen as a soft commitment not to expropriate developers, thus leaving them with a sizable share of the revenue generated on each platform.” The role such a commitment plays in encouraging third-party app development may explain why the 30% commission is fairly typical for app stores, including those operated by gaming platforms.

Finally, enabling firms to earn continuous profits off the digital platforms they create and maintain, as prevailing app store policies do, enhances output—both qualitatively and quantitatively—in the market for platforms themselves. The prospect of continued profits from platform use encourages actual and potential platform operators to invest in improving existing platforms and in the creation of new ones, and those investments attract more potential customers for app developers. The continuous revenue stream also permits platform operators to lower prices elsewhere. Apple, for example, may charge less for an iPhone because it can earn revenues when the iPhone user buys apps and makes in-app purchases. Lowering prices for platform access (e.g., in the case of iOS, cutting iPhone prices) reduces deadweight loss by enabling consumers with a lower, but still above-cost, reservation price to enter the market.


181. See Auer, supra note 174 (“The ‘closed’ business model also gives Apple and Google (as well as other platforms) significant incentives to develop new distribution mediums (smart TVs spring to mind) and improve existing ones. In turn, this greatly expands the audience that software developers can reach.”).

182. This is akin to the “variable proportion tie-in” situation in which a firm with market power on one good (i.e. a printer) lowers its price from the profit-maximizing level but ties in a complement (i.e. ink) priced at an above-cost level. High volume users will pay more, but they will effectively subsidize lower volume users who might not enter the market at all if they had to pay the higher, single-product profit-maximizing price of the tying product. A variable proportion tie-in of this sort typically enhances overall market output. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice § 10.6(e) (6th ed. 2020).
It seems unlikely that the benefits of rewriting long-standing app store policies could justify the substantial costs entailed. If platforms are required to permit side-loading and to allow circumvention of the in-app purchasing systems that collect the agreed-upon revenue share, they will likely find other ways to recoup the costs of vetting and distributing apps and to extract surplus from app developers and users. They could, for example, charge app developers for access to critical application protocol interfaces (APIs) necessary for app functionality. In the end, preventing platforms from collecting app revenue under their existing policies in no way reduces their market power—they could extract the same amount of surplus using different means—but it would impair a system that encourages more and better apps and greater output in the market for platforms.

4. Data-Portability, Data-Sharing, and Interoperability Mandates

Several proposed ex ante conduct rules for digital platforms aim to spur interplatform competition. Data-portability, data-sharing, and interoperability mandates fall within this category. The European Union’s Digital Markets Act features all three mandates. The Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching Act (ACCESS Act) recently advanced by the House Judiciary Committee mandates data portability and interoperability.


185. Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 6(1)(j) (data-sharing mandate); id. art. 6(1)(f) (technological interoperability mandate); id. art. 6(1)(i) (data-interoperability mandate).

Data-portability rules require that a platform’s users be allowed to transfer data about themselves that the platform holds to other platforms.\textsuperscript{187} Depending on the particular rule, the data that must be portable could include “inputted” data that the user provides (e.g., photos, user posts, or playlists), “observed” data that reflects the user’s use of the platform (e.g., search or viewing history), or “inferred” data that the platform surmises based on the user’s platform activities (e.g., information on the user’s interests or relationships).\textsuperscript{188} Proponents of data-portability rules contend that they spur interplatform competition by lowering switching costs and reducing user lock-in.\textsuperscript{189}

Whereas data-portability requirements mandate that users be able to transfer data about themselves in some defined format, data-sharing mandates require that other firms be allowed to access third-party data that platforms have collected.\textsuperscript{190} One search engine, for example, may have to provide other search engines with query, click, and view data generated by its users.\textsuperscript{191} Requiring platforms to provide actual or potential rivals with access to third-party data on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms has been hailed as a means of overcoming the “data barrier to entry” that may exist in markets in which vast quantities of user data may be required to compete effectively.\textsuperscript{192}

Interoperability mandates require that platforms be designed in a way that makes it easy for the platforms to interact with competing or complementary businesses.\textsuperscript{193} Technological interoperability mandates seek to

\textsuperscript{187.} See Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 6(1)(h) (mandating that a gatekeeper shall “provide effective portability of data generated through the activity of a business user or end user and shall, in particular, provide tools for end users to facilitate the exercise of data portability, in line with Regulation EU 2016/679, including by the provision of continuous and real-time access”); H.R. 3849 § 3(a) (mandating that platforms “maintain a set of transparent, third-party accessible interfaces (including application programming interfaces) to enable the secure transfer of data to a user, or with the affirmative consent of a user, to a business user at the direction of a user, in a structured, commonly used, and machine-readable format”).

\textsuperscript{188.} See Digit. Competition Expert Panel, supra note 6, ¶¶ 2.54–2.55

\textsuperscript{189.} Id. ¶¶ 2.48–2.67.


\textsuperscript{191.} See, e.g., Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. (6)(1)(j) (mandating that a gatekeeper shall provide third-party platforms “access on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to ranking, query, click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by end users on online search engines of the gatekeeper, subject to anonymisation for the query, click and view data that constitutes personal data”).

\textsuperscript{192.} Id. § 56 (“Access by gatekeepers to such ranking, query, click and view data constitutes an important barrier to entry and expansion, which undermines the contestability of online search engine services. Gatekeepers should therefore be obliged to provide access, on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, to these ranking, query, click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by consumers on online search engine services to other providers of such services, so that these third-party providers can optimise their services and contest the relevant core platform services.”).

\textsuperscript{193.} See, e.g., H.R. 3849 § 4(a) (“A covered platform shall maintain a set of transparent, third-party accessible interfaces (including application programming interfaces) to fa-
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ensure that other businesses can utilize a platform’s functionality. Such mandates might be designed, for example, to ensure that messages sent from a user on one messaging platform can be read by someone using another. Technological interoperability may help overcome direct network effects—the situation in which a particular offering (such as a social network or messaging service) becomes more attractive as more people use it. If users of one social network or messaging service can easily interact with users of another, there is less need to be on the dominant platform, and smaller platforms may be able to enter the market, gain a foothold, and compete.

Another form of interoperability requirement, which we may call a data-interoperability mandate, obligates a platform to make the data it holds about a business user and its on-platform interactions continuously available to the business user in a format it can access on demand. This sort of mandate differs from both a data-portability mandate (because it does not require that the user be able to transfer the data to another firm) and a data-sharing mandate (because it does not require the provision of third-party data). It is a type of interoperability mandate because it requires that the platform be designed in a manner that provides users with continuous, real-time access, which requires an interface that users may plug in to and access data about themselves as they desire. Such a mandate ensures that business users who are helping provide data to the platform can themselves use that data, perhaps to engage in competition with the platform. It may also spur competition among platforms vying for business users—e-commerce platforms, digital advertising services, etc.—by ensuring that such users can easily monitor how the platform is performing for them.

In mandating data portability, data sharing, and technological and data interoperability, regulatory planners assume that the competitive benefits their conduct rules will achieve will exceed the costs they will impose. Again, however, that is not clear.

Consider data portability. The fact that users tend to “multi-home” in digital platform markets, participating simultaneously on multiple competing platforms, suggests that a lack of data portability is not a great cilitate and maintain interoperability with a competing business or a potential competing business . . . ”).

194. See, e.g., id.; Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 6(1)(f) (mandating that a gatekeeper shall “allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system, hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services”).


196. See, e.g., Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 6.1(f) (mandating that a gatekeeper shall “provide business users, or third parties authorised by a business user, free of charge, with effective, high-quality, continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data, that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users”).
impediment to utilizing new platforms. In recent years, numerous digital platforms hosting user-provided data have started and grown quite large without new users’ porting their data from other platforms to the upstart. TikTok, for example, was launched in 2016 and already has around 700 million monthly active users (including 100 million in North America) and was the most downloaded app in both 2020 and 2021.

Moreover, the benefits of a data-portability mandate are lessened by the fact that major digital platforms are in the process of voluntarily facilitating data transfers. The Data Transfer Project (DTP), a collaboration between Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and Apple, is creating API standards to enable users to transfer their data between participating services. Participants in this voluntary project, which will be open-source so that other platforms can participate, are well-positioned to develop means of interplatform data sharing while taking care to preserve users’ privacy. The marginal benefits of a government-designed data-sharing mandate, then, may not be that great.

At the same time, the costs of such a mandate may be significant. First, there are the direct administrative costs of making data portable. Proponents of data portability analogize to the local telephone number portability requirements of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, but actual data-portability proposals tend to be far more complicated and costlier to implement. Luigi Zingales and GuyRolnick, for example, have pro...
posed a “social graph mobility” mandate that would enable users to transfer the information about all the relationships they have established on one platform to another.204 As Geoffrey Manne and Sam Bowman have observed, this is a far cry from telephone number portability: “Requiring social graph portability would be much more like requiring that a phone company provide competing phone companies with all the metadata related to an individual’s use of a phone network so that the new company could tailor a custom phone book for the new user.”205

As the costs of data-portability mandates rise, as they will when the scope of data that must be portable expands, the mandates may conversely tend to entrench incumbent platforms by making market entry more difficult for upstarts who must themselves comply with the portability mandates.206 Entry may also be deterred by the fact that an upstart cannot rely on “data stickiness” to keep users around long enough to develop an affinity for its platform.207 And existing platforms may engage in less innovation because data portability requires that they hold data in a common format, reducing their ability to make changes.208

Requiring data portability also threatens user privacy. When data is held in a common, transferable format, it may be easier for malicious actors to access.209 In addition, even a user-authorized transfer of some data may impair the privacy rights of other users. For example, if user A agrees to connect with user B on platform X, she may not want that connection known to users or administrators of platform Y.210 If B can easily transfer his social graph from X to Y, A may never agree to connect with B in the first instance. Just as a person might not want to invite members of her different friend groups to the same dinner party, she may value the ability to segregate relationships on digital platforms. Data-portability mandates impede her ability to do so and could keep her off platforms altogether, squandering value that could otherwise be obtained.

As with data-portability mandates, the benefits of data-sharing requirements may not justify the costs they would entail. When it comes to generating success for a digital platform, the ability to process data—to mine
it and draw insights that can be used to craft attractive offerings for consumers—appears to be far more important than merely possessing data. Firms that have developed superior abilities to use data in a productive fashion have succeeded despite the lack of significant amounts of data at the outset; the promise of their offerings has attracted users that have provided the data they need. WhatsApp in messaging, King Digital in social gaming, and Tinder in online dating have all thrived, despite an initial lack of data in markets in which data access is important to success, because they developed superior data processing tools and used the data at their disposal to create more attractive offerings. And, of course, Google and Facebook, with virtually no start-up data, dislodged seemingly entrenched players in search and social networking because they figured out better ways of contextualizing the data at their disposal. If data processing abilities are the real key to success, as experience would suggest, then mandating large dumps of unprocessed data is unlikely to spur competition significantly.

The cost of mandating data sharing, however, may be substantial. If regulators require platforms to provide access to the data they have amassed, the regulators will have to set a price (possibly zero) for the data. Determining the appropriate price is tricky. Given differences in the costs of collecting different bits of data and in the value those different bits confer, and the fact that both collection costs and value conferred are likely to differ from platform to platform, an elaborate pricing schedule would be required. Regulators, however, are poorly positioned to set prices, and any mistakes they make may undermine the data-sharing mandate. If they set prices too high, upstarts will not acquire data, and the mandate will be pointless. If they set prices too low, incumbents will have less incentive to gather data in the first place, something that they typically do by creating attractive offerings for consumers whose behavior they can then observe.

211. Id. at 11 ("[T]he real value of a large agglomeration of data comes not in the data per se, but in the analysis of the data"); ANJA LAMBRECHT & CATHERINE E. TUCKER, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., CAN BIG DATA PROTECT A FIRM FROM COMPETITION? 11 (2017), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/CPI-Lambrecht-Tucker.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB2N-N6CY] ("It is only when combined with managerial, engineering and analytic skill in determining the experiment or algorithm to apply to such data that it proves valuable to firms.").

212. MANNE & BOWMAN, supra note 205, at 14.

213. Id.

214. See Lambert, supra note 118, at 1128.

215. Grocery stores’ loyalty card programs, for example, provide discounts to consumers in exchange for swiping a card when making purchases. See MANNE & BOWMAN, supra note 205, at 18 (offering example involving grocers Kroger and Aldi). A primary objective of the programs, which benefit consumers, is to collect data for marketing purposes. Id. If a grocery store that had developed a loyalty card program were forced to share the data collected with a competitor who had not developed such a program, the store sponsoring the loyalty program would have less incentive to “pay” for data by giving discounts to encourage participation in the program. Id. If a competitor’s price for the data were too low, the loyalty card sponsor might decide that the program was no longer conferring competitive benefits sufficient to justify its cost and might scrap the program altogether. Id.
little benefit on upstarts while reducing the incentive of incumbents to create consumer amenities that generate data for their sponsors, they may reduce market output and consumer welfare.

Interoperability mandates may reduce market output and harm consumers because they impede commercial flexibility and innovation and may make it difficult for platforms to provide the level of data security that many consumers appear to desire.216 Both technological and data interoperability require adherence to some kind of standard. This restricts a platform’s ability to innovate in any way that departs from that standard format or might otherwise impair the functionality of third-party apps connected to the platform.217 Data interoperability—making data continuously available to some group of users in real time and on demand—increases the difficulty of ensuring data security. The security of a data collection depends on the number, size, and accessibility of points at which bad actors might infiltrate the collection. Mandating points of data access for platform users, as data interoperability requirements do, increases a platform’s “attack surface,” rendering it less secure.218

None of this is to say that the marginal costs of data portability, data sharing, and interoperability mandates definitively outweigh the benefits such mandates would secure. Neither we nor the planners crafting these mandates know the balance of costs and benefits in any particular context. What we can state with confidence is that the balance is sure to differ from context to context and platform to platform. And that is precisely the problem with requiring data portability, data sharing, and interoperability via \textit{ex ante} rules.219 Such rules are certain to misfire more than a standards-based approach that customizes directives for particular contexts.

C. 

AGENCY OVERSIGHT

In light of antitrust law’s relative slowness and the tendency of \textit{ex ante} conduct rules to produce high error costs because of the knowledge problem, the agency oversight model appears to combine the relative advantages of each approach: antitrust’s ability to contextualize directives through the use of flexible standards and direct regulation’s ability to act quickly without awaiting the resolution of a lawsuit. The United Kingdom recently embraced this model in launching a Digital Markets Unit

217. \textit{Id.} at 18. The ACCESS Act, for example, prohibits covered platforms from “mak[ing] a change that may affect its interoperability interface” absent prior approval from the Federal Trade Commission or exigent circumstances. H.R. 3849, 117th Cong. §§4(e)(1)–(2). The Act further mandates that “[a] covered platform shall provide reasonable advance notice to a competing business or a potential competing business . . . of any change to an interoperability interface maintained by the covered platform that will affect the interoperability of a competing business or a potential competing business.” \textit{Id.} §4(e)(4).
218. \textit{Manne} \& \textit{Bowman}, \textit{supra} note 205, at 20.
219. \textit{See} Hovenkamp, \textit{supra} note 60, at 1956 (“[B]road regulation is ill-suited for digital platforms because they are so disparate.”).
(DMU) within the nation’s antitrust agency, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).\textsuperscript{220}

According to the CMA’s proposal to create the DMU, the unit has authority to ensure that the digital firms it deems to possess “strategic market status” act to achieve three objectives: fair trading, open choices, and trust and transparency.\textsuperscript{221} To secure compliance with those objectives, which are essentially standards, the DMU is authorized to craft tailor-made codes of conduct for each of the platforms determined to possess strategic market status.\textsuperscript{222} This approach is analogous to an antitrust court’s crafting of firm-specific conduct remedies to ensure compliance with antitrust law’s standards (e.g., no unreasonable restraints of trade, no unreasonably exclusionary conduct).\textsuperscript{223} The approach is quite different from the European Union’s approach of positing generally applicable rules for all major platforms. As Cristina Caffarra and Fiona Scott Morton have explained, under the U.K. approach:

> [T]here is no fixed, pre-established list of rules. The DMU will evaluate whether a particular platform has this important level of market power and at the same time develop the set of rules needed to protect consumers and prevent exclusion of rivals or exploitation of trading partners. As the CMA puts it, the goal is “(a)n enforceable code of conduct which sets out clearly how the firm is expected to behave in relation to the activity motivating its Strategic Market Status designation.”\textsuperscript{224}

Caffarra and Scott Morton contend that this tailored approach “seems very apt” as “it will generate rules targeted to the problematic conduct, that directly take into account the business model and that can be adjusted and updated as technology and business models evolve one by one.”\textsuperscript{225}

The agency oversight approach, however, is not simply faster antitrust law with expert adjudicators. While standards-based and flexible, the approach differs from antitrust along three significant dimensions: focus, political susceptibility, and duration of control. Taken together, antitrust courts’ more narrowly focused objectives, greater insulation from political influences, and limited jurisdiction over their subjects render them far less susceptible to adverse public-choice concerns than are agencies like the United Kingdom’s DMU.

\textsuperscript{220} See Olson, supra note 76. The existing DMU has not yet been legislatively approved and is therefore operating with limited powers at present. Id.

\textsuperscript{221} OLIVER DOWDEN & KWASI KWARTENG, A NEW PRO-COMPETITION REGIME FOR DIGITAL MARKETS ¶ 83 (2021), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fc27567e0756f208286c/Digital_Taskforce_-_Advice.pdf [https://perma.cc/GLX4-FHMC].

\textsuperscript{222} Id.

\textsuperscript{223} See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{225} Id.
In crafting remedies for anticompetitive harm, antitrust courts have a tremendous reservoir of authority. But antitrust’s focus—and the objective of any court-ordered remedy—is narrow: the restoration of market output to competitive levels for the benefit of consumers. This precludes successful claims by and remedies in favor of parties seeking some private benefit apart from the enhancement of market output. A digital-markets regulator is unlikely to be as laser-focused on output effects as an antitrust court and will, therefore, be a more attractive target to rent-seeking firms. The DMU’s “open choices” objective, for example, invites a laggard competitor, which might otherwise be driven out of business, to seek some rule that hinders its more efficient rivals on the ground that preserving its own offering will create a broader range of options for consumers.

A second important difference between antitrust courts and agencies relates to the decisionmakers’ incentives. The federal judges determining liability and imposing remedies in antitrust cases have little reason to please the parties before them. Possessing life tenure and fearing no retribution save possible reversal, they are insulated from outside pressure and motivated to make decisions calculated to enhance market output and thereby benefit consumers. Agency staff, by contrast, do not enjoy this level of political insulation. Many bureaucrats will have been appointed by or have ties to a political leader whom they will wish to please. They may also contemplate future employment at one of their regulatees or at a regulatee’s rival. Even absent contemplation of a job change, they may have a stake in one regulatory outcome over another as the budget or prestige of their agency may be affected by the regulatory choices they make. Their personal interests are, therefore, less aligned with the public’s interest in maximizing overall market output.

A third difference between antitrust and agency oversight is that antitrust courts’ involvement with parties is limited in duration while agencies remain perpetually involved with the firms they regulate. Ongoing oversight requires continuous contact with the regulatee whose perspective the regulator needs in order to make sound decisions. Eventually, however, the regulator may begin seeing things from the perspective of the regulatee. This is especially likely if the individuals with interests adverse to the regulatee’s position are widely dispersed and difficult to or-

226. Hovenkamp, supra note 60, at 2005 (“Antitrust’s provisions for public equitable relief are extremely broad, with no explicit restrictions on the nature of relief.”).

227. By “consumers” we mean parties on the other side of the transaction from an antitrust defendant, which, in cases involving exercises of monopsony power, could include laborers and suppliers forced to accept lower wages or input prices. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 628–36 (2018) (explaining how consumer welfare standard addresses buyer market power and labor market monopsony).

228. This is sometimes referred to as “cultural capture,” a form of “non-materialist” capture that does not turn on the provision of material benefits from regulatee to regulator. See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 71, 79 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2014).
ganize. The benefits to a regulatee from a decision may be outweighed by the aggregate costs the decision would impose, but if the costs are so widely spread that no individual or group has an incentive to incur the cost of arguing against the decision, the only argument the regulator will hear is that of the regulatee–beneficiary. In light of the relationships that develop from perpetual supervision and the common “concentrated benefits-diffused costs” dynamic, agencies possessing continuous oversight over their regulatees are frequently captured by those firms to the detriment of the public at large.

It seems, then, that the ongoing agency oversight model for addressing market power from digital platforms may not be the panacea its proponents have suggested. Combining broad discretion that invites interest-group manipulation, exposure to political pressures that may sway regulators from pursuing the public interest, and the sort of continuous regulatee contact that often leads to capture, the approach raises serious public-choice concerns. The United Kingdom’s experience with its new DMU will be informative. But U.S. policymakers would do well to wait on the results of the United Kingdom’s experiment, and the resolution of the numerous pending antitrust actions, before abandoning antitrust in favor of a digital platforms regulator.

V. CONCLUSION

Under certain circumstances, markets may systematically fail to allocate resources in a way that generates as much value as possible for members of society. The same is true for government interventions to correct instances of market failure.

In light of that unhappy situation, policymakers confronting a market failure should catalogue the remedies available for addressing it (including the option of doing nothing), consider the efficacy limitations and side effects of each, and select the option most likely to minimize the sum of welfare losses from market and governmental failure. As policymakers engage in that analysis, they should keep in mind two difficulties that attach, in varying degrees, to all efforts to use state power to alleviate market failures: the Hayekian knowledge problem and public-choice concerns.

This Article has engaged in the preceding analysis to answer the question of how governments should address market power concerns arising from dominant digital platforms. The three approaches typically employed to remedy market power—antitrust law, ex ante conduct rules, and ongoing agency supervision—are all imperfect. Antitrust law is some-

229. See Lambert, supra note 97, at 504–05 (describing dynamic of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs).


231. See Lambert, supra note 17, at 168–69.
what indeterminate and proceeds rather slowly. *Ex ante* conduct rules are faster and more determinate, but they are more likely to generate high error costs because planners lack the information they need to determine, in advance and for a wide variety of actors, what behaviors will enhance or reduce social welfare. At first glance, ongoing agency oversight appears to combine the good and avoid the bad from the first two options: it may move faster than antitrust and offer greater clarity to regulatees, and its ability to tailor directives on a case-by-case basis avoids many of the knowledge problem concerns afflicting *ex ante* conduct rules. Continual agency oversight, however, involves a combination of features—broad discretion, politically susceptible decisionmakers, and perpetual contact—that generates significant public-choice concerns.

Policymakers in the United States are currently facing pressure from both the left and the right to do something about the digital platforms that, because of the enormous surplus they offer consumers, have become so central to twenty-first century life. The objective of this Article has not been to argue that the status quo is perfect or that competitive conditions could not be improved. Consideration of the possible downsides of a move to *ex ante* conduct rules or continual agency oversight, however, urges caution. At a minimum, U.S. policymakers should await the outcome of the major pending antitrust cases against the technology platforms and gather data from the natural experiments occurring in the European Union and United Kingdom before jettisoning antitrust in favor of *ex ante* conduct rules or some new digital platforms regulator.