Discounting Held Usurious When Effective Rate of Interest Exceeds Legal Maximum--Fausett & Co. v. G & P Real Estate, Inc.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr

Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss2/10
DISCOUNTING HELD USURIOUS WHEN EFFECTIVE RATE OF INTEREST EXCEEDS LEGAL MAXIMUM

Fausett & Co. v. G & P Real Estate, Inc.¹

G & P Real Estate, Inc. obtained two one-year, 9% ² construction loans from Fausett and Company to erect buildings on separate lots in Arkansas.³ Fausett loaned $42,800 on the first lot and $41,600 on the second, deducted a 1% service charge from each loan at closing, and advanced the balances during the loan year.⁴ Ultimately, Fausett advanced $41,445, plus a $428 service charge, on the first lot and $41,600, including the 1% service charge, on the second lot.⁵ After making one payment for interest, G & P sued to have the loans voided as usurious claiming the actual amount of interest charged exceeded the 10% legal rate.⁶ The trial court found for G & P, and Fausett appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court.

In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court made two determinations. First, the court found that Fausett’s 1% service charge constituted interest rather than a brokerage fee,⁷ a finding in accord with Arkansas precedent.⁸ Second, the court held that deducting the highest legal rate of interest from the principal before disbursing it, a practice known as

¹ 269 Ark. 481, 602 S.W.2d 669 (1980).
² The maximum legal rate of interest in Arkansas is 10% per annum. ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-602 (1979).
³ 269 Ark. at 482, 602 S.W.2d at 670.
⁴ Id. at 483, 602 S.W.2d at 670.
⁵ For a table of calculations showing the interest charged on each disbursement and the interest that lawfully could be charged, see 269 Ark. at 485, 602 S.W.2d at 671. A thorough discussion of the complicated calculation problems in determining usurious interest is found in Comment, Usury: Issues in Calculation, 34 ARK. L. REV. 442 (1980).
⁶ The effective rate of interest charged was 10.723869% on the first loan and 10.6244% on the second. 269 Ark. at 485, 602 S.W.2d at 671 (table of calculations).
⁷ Id. at 484, 602 S.W.2d at 670-71.
"discounting," constituted usury. By disallowing discounting when the effective rate exceeds the legal maximum, the court’s holding is contrary to the nearly unanimous body of English and American precedent.

Usury is the act of lending money at an excessive or unlawfully high rate of interest. By prohibiting loans at excessive interest rates, state legislatures seek to protect borrowers who, by adverse circumstances, must

9. 269 Ark. at 484, 602 S.W.2d at 671. See also Vahlberg v. Keaton, 51 Ark. 534, 558, 11 S.W. 878, 878 (1889) (discount is interest in advance); Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tenn. 1977) (same).

Discounting also can refer to the sale of negotiable paper at less than face value. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 418 (5th ed. 1979). A note for which value has once been given can be discounted at any rate, but the discount of paper for which no value has been given previously will be considered interest. See Baske v. Russell, 67 Wash. 2d 268, 407 P.2d 434 (1965).

10. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1385 (5th ed. 1979). Usury is purely a creation of statutes. The states have different usury statutes imposing a variety of penalties and allowing a variety of exemptions. In addition, many state statutes vary the maximum interest rate according to the type of loan or credit transaction involved. A consumer transaction is the most likely to be regulated by an interest ceiling. For a discussion of state usury laws, see Cooper, A Study of Usury Laws in the United States to Consider Their Affect on Mortgage Credit and Home Construction Starts: A Proposal for Change, 8 AM. BUS. L.J. 165, 174-80 (1970); Lowell, A Current Analysis of the Usury Laws—A National View, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 193, 236-45 (1971).


borrow money at any cost. The effect of usury laws is insignificant during periods of low or moderate interest rates because market rates never reach legal maximums. When market interest rates exceed market limits, however, usury limits can encourage lending institutions to divert funds from these markets to markets that allow a higher return on loans. In addition, lenders may seek to lower loan costs by imposing more restrictive lending standards, such as increased down payments, stiffer credit criteria, higher minimum loan amounts, and increased loan fees or discounts. For example, the Federal Housing Administration mortgage rate exceeded the maximum allowable rate in Missouri and Mississippi in the first quarter of 1974. In those states, the number of new housing starts dropped 34% from the preceding year. Although an economic recession contributed to the decline, the average drop nationally was 21%. This suggests that usury laws intensify the effects of a recession and demonstrates that lending institutions will restrict loans rather than lend funds at an unprofitable rate. Potential borrowers, therefore, may be unable to obtain loans because of the legislatively imposed limits on interest rates.

The difficulty in determining if a transaction is usurious lies in calculating the borrower’s payment for the use of the money. In addition to the stated


15. See articles cited note 13 supra.


17. Id.

18. Id.

19. See generally Comment, supra note 5. Generally, courts will look at the amount the borrower actually receives and not the face value of the note to determine if the interest rate is usurious. See Taylor v. Budd, 217 Cal. 262, 265, 18 P.2d 333, 334 (1933); Buck v. Dahlgren, 23 Cal. App. 3d 779, 784-85, 100 Cal. Rptr. 462, 466 (1972); Sones v. Spiegel, 179 Neb. 838, 839, 140 N.W.2d 799, 800 (1966); National Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Bayou Country Club, 16 Utah 2d 417, 422, 403 P.2d 26, 30 (1965).

Judicial decisions have identified four elements of usury: (1) a loan or forbearance of money or its equivalent, (2) borrower’s absolute obligation to repay, (3) exaction or reservation of greater compensation than allowed by law, and (4) an intention to violate usury laws. See Fikes v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 533 P.2d 251, 263 (Alaska 1975); Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817, 819 (Fla. 1973); State ex rel. Turner v. Younger Bros., 210 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Iowa 1973); Rathbun v. W. T. Grant Co., 300 Minn. 223, 230, 219 N.W.2d 641, 646 (1974); Beneficial
interest rate, courts also examine other costs assessed by the lender in making the loan. Lending institutions commonly assess "front-end" charges in addition to interest. These are called service charges,20 points,21 origination fees,22 commitment fees,23 negotiation or brokerage fees,24 or closing costs.25 When the lender deducts a fee from the amount loaned, he reduces


21. The word "point" as used in the home mortgage finance industry indicates a fee equal to 1% of the principal. It is collected once, at the inception of the loan.


23. A commitment fee, common in real estate transactions, is the amount paid by the borrower to the lender, in addition to interest, for a loan commitment.


25. See United-Bilt Homes, Inc. v. Teague, 245 Ark. 132, 432 S.W.2d 1 (1968). For further discussion of the front-end charges assessed by lenders, see
the principal and increases the effective interest rate. To determine if a loan
is usurious, the crucial factor is the effective rate of interest, which hinges
on the amount the borrower can use during the loan. For example, a lender
might loan $1,000 at the 10% legal maximum for one year. If he deducts
the $100 interest in advance, the borrower receives $900. The effective rate
of interest, therefore, is 11.11%, not 10%, because the borrower is paying
$100 for the use of $900 for one year. The effective rate of interest increases
if front-end charges are found to be interest.\(^{27}\)

Loiseaux, Some Usury Problems in Commercial Lending, 49 TEX. L. REV. 419, 422-24
(1971); Podell, The Application of Usury Laws to Modern Real Estate Transactions, 1 REAL

26. In Arkansas, the term “rate” is construed to mean “effective yield.”
Davidson v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 255 Ark. 127, 131, 499 S.W.2d 68,
70-71 (1973).

27. Courts have said often that they will look behind the form of a loan trans-
action to determine if charges are an attempt to circumvent the usury laws. See
Modern Pioneers Ins. Co. v. Nandin, 103 Ariz. 125, 130, 437 P.2d 658, 663 (1968); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Vick, 303 N.C. 30, 37, 277 S.E.2d 360, 366 (1981);
Russell v. Lumberman’s Mortgage Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 171, 171, 273 N.E.2d 803,
804 (C.P. 1966); Gonzales County Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d
903, 906 (Tex. 1976); Brown v. Pilini, 128 Vt. 324, 329-30, 262 A.2d 479, 482

Generally, courts will not consider the charges to be interest, provided they are
for services actually performed in connection with the particular loan and the charges
are reasonable. See, e.g., Altherr v. Wilshire Mortgage Corp., 104 Ariz. 59, 62, 448
P.2d 859, 862 (1968) (charges for supplying required FHA supervision and pro-
cessing FHA applications are not interest provided charges are reasonable); Johnson
v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 271 Ark. 588, 589, 609 S.W.2d 60, 61 (1980)
(charges for photographs, appraisals, title insurance, credit reports, abstract, and
attorney were legitimate); Harris v. Guaranty Fin. Corp., 244 Ark. 218, 224, 424
S.W.2d 355, 358 (1968) (charge for title work pursuant to contract was not interest);
(legitimate charges for specific items of actual service and expense are not interest);
(borrower can be charged reasonable expenses of making particular loan); D & M
(court found commitment fee or brokerage fee did not constitute interest); State
ex rel. Turner v. Younker Bros., 210 N.W.2d 550, 560 (Iowa 1973) (lender could
charge a reasonable fee for specific services such as title examination, recording fees,
travel and commission expenses, and credit reports); People v. Central Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n, 46 N.Y.2d 41, 43-44, 385 N.E.2d 555, 555, 412 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816
(1978) (commitment fee paid in consideration of lender’s keeping funds in reserve
for future mortgage loans not considered interest for purpose of usury statute); Sted-
man v. Georgetown Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 595 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1979) (lender
may charge fee that commits it to make loan at future date); Gonzales County Sav.
& Loan Ass’n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1976) (same); Peoples Nat’l
(1966) (10% service charge allowed for actual services performed, including plat-
The consequence of exceeding the legal limit is harsh in Arkansas. While states impose a variety of penalties for violating usury statutes, very few states exact forfeiture of the principal as does Arkansas. A violation can occur even if the borrower pays no interest because usury occurs when the parties execute a usurious contract. If the lender contracts for more

ting area, blacktopping streets, installing drains, water supply, and fire hydrants.

When courts have considered the charges to be interest, the charges were for services not actually performed or were an unreasonable charge for the service that was performed. See, e.g., Turner v. West Memphis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 266 Ark. 530, 534, 588 S.W.2d 691, 693 (1979) (1% origination fee was interest because part of finance charge); Winston v. Personal Fin. Co., 220 Ark. 580, 587, 249 S.W.2d 315, 319 (1952) (service charge an attempt to conceal usury); Russell v. Lumberman's Mortgage Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 171, 172, 273 N.E.2d 803, 804 (1946) (lender performed no special services that justified discount or origination fee); Brown v. Pilini, 128 Vt. 324, 331, 262 A.2d 479, 483 (1970) (10% handling charge constituted interest).

Ordinarily, the charge is not retained by the lender, but is paid to third parties. See, e.g., Johnson v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 271 Ark. 588, 589, 609 S.W.2d 60, 61 (1980) (money charged for services was paid to third party and was legitimate); Abramowitz v. Barnett Bank, 394 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (legitimate fees usually paid to third parties).

Courts tend to view an excessive charge for an otherwise legitimate service as a way of avoiding usury laws. Consequently, any amount above what is considered reasonable is regarded as interest. See Altherr v. Wilshire Mortgage Corp., 104 Ariz. 59, 63, 448 P.2d 859, 863 (1968); Abramowitz v. Barnett Bank, 394 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See also D & M Dev. Co. v. Sherwood & Roberts, Inc., 93 Idaho 200, 207, 457 P.2d 439, 445 (1969) (commitment fee should comport with going rate in community); Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516, 535 (Tenn. 1977) (service charges must bear reasonable relation to expense and service of lender). In Stedman v. Georgetown Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 595 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. 1980), the court held that a bona fide commitment fee is not interest. The court's holding disregards any inquiry into the reasonableness of the charge. Id. at 495 (Spears, J., dissenting). Stedman is notable because the lender repeatedly characterized the commitment fee as interest in its correspondence and its monthly billing to the borrower. Id. at 488. For criticism of Stedman, see Usury—Commitment Fees—Consideration Paid for Loan Option Is Bona Fide Commitment Fee, Not Interest, Despite Label Attached and Amount Charged, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259 (1980); Stedman v. Georgetown Savings & Loan Association: Reasonableness Is Not A Characteristic Of A Bona Fide Commitment Fee, 21 SOUTH TEX. L.J. 127 (1980).

28. Both the interest and the principal are forfeited. The contract is void and cannot be enforced. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-609 (1979).

29. The various penalties include forfeiture of the excess interest, forfeiture of double or triple the amount of interest involved, and forfeiture of both interest and principal. For a complete list of the state usury statutes and the penalties involved, see Cooper, supra note 10, at 174-80; Lowell, supra note 10, at 236-45.


interest than the law allows, therefore, the Arkansas borrower can have the entire transaction declared void and retain the principal.

Contrary to the court’s first determination, Fausett claimed the 1% service charge was a broker’s fee for procuring the loans. After G & P executed the notes and mortgages, Fausett immediately assigned them to two separate banks. The notes, however, listed Fausett as the payee and mortgagee on both loans. In addition, G & P dealt only with Fausett during the transactions, and there was no evidence that G & P knew of the impending assignment. Because the 1% service charge was not justified as a broker’s fee, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the charge constituted interest. The characterization of Fausett’s 1% service charge as interest was crucial because if it were not interest, the total interest charged would have been less than 10%.

In making its second determination, the Fausett court, without explanation, invalidated discounting when the effective interest rate exceeds the usury rate. This invalidation conflicts with commercial custom sanctioned by a long line of cases and recognized in Arkansas when it adopted its present constitution. For example, in Bank of Newport v. Cook, which was overruled by Fausett, the court allowed a lender to deduct in advance the highest legal rate of interest on a twelve month note. Cook was reaffirmed in Simp-
son v. Smith Savings Society,\(^3^9\) which again upheld discounting.\(^4^0\)

Courts that have allowed discounting have done so because it is a traditional financial practice of the commercial community. The strength of this custom is sufficient to allow courts to approve an admittedly usurious transaction.\(^4^1\) Courts, however, are in a difficult position because the custom is usurious in a strict mathematical sense. An unequivocal legislative expression, either allowing or disallowing discounting, would enable courts to reach a decision on a challenged transaction that is both legally and mathematically correct.\(^4^2\)

Because discounting can produce a loan that is mathematically usurious, courts have been reluctant to allow discounting on long-term obligations.\(^4^3\) For example, in Miller v. First State Bank,\(^4^4\) the lender retained two years’ interest in advance on a three-year loan. The court rejected the bank’s contention that this prepayment of interest did not violate the usury statute, although it recognized that the rule allowing interest in advance at the highest rate for a year or less was “too firmly established to be departed from.”\(^4^5\)

---

39. 178 Ark. 921, 12 S.W.2d 890 (1929).
41. E.g., Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931). The Shropshire court stated:

'Though logically it is usury to deduct in advance the highest legal rate of interest on the principal of a loan for any part of the term for which the principal is borrowed, . . . [this practice has] been validated by the decisions in Texas, as elsewhere in the United States, too long for this court to now adjudge . . . [it] to be usurious.

120 Tex. at 412, 30 S.W.2d at 286.
42. Georgia’s usury statute provides that the lawful rate of interest may not be exceeded by reserving or discounting the interest, regardless of the type of loan. GA. CODE ANN. § 57-101 (Cum. Supp. 1981). See also Kent v. Hibernia Sav., Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 190 Ga. 764, 10 S.E.2d 759 (1940) (deducting interest in advance at highest legal rate is usurious, regardless of term of loan). Conversely, Alaska has a statute that expressly allows money lenders to collect the maximum interest in advance. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.30 (1980).
45. 551 S.W.2d at 97. See also Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 783 (Tex. 1977) (not usurious to collect one year’s interest at highest lawful rate in advance). In Bothwell v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ State Bank & Trust Co., 120 Tex. 1, 30 S.W.2d 289 (1930), the court recognized the rule, but pointed out “how devoid of logic . . . it was to sanction the collection in advance of interest at the highest conventional statutory rate, on even short-term loans, under statutes against
While also recognizing the validity of discounting on one-year obligations, the court in *First National Bank v. Davis*\(^{46}\) stated:

[W]e regard the toleration of taking interest in advance at the highest rate allowed by law, as an artificial rule, resting upon long usage and authority, unsupported by any sound reasoning, and can not consent to take that artificial rule as the basis of a philosophy by which a like rule may be extended to cases not within the artificial rule.\(^{47}\)

The majority in *Fausett* seems to say that custom can not legalize a usurious loan. The court's decision is logically consistent if the effective interest rate determines whether a loan is usurious. It follows that if a 1% deduction of interest in advance in combination with the interest rate charged causes the effective yield to exceed the legal maximum, then a deduction of the entire maximum legal rate in advance that has the same effect is also usurious. Lending institutions, however, have long relied on the permissibility of front-end charges and discounting, which are justified by commercial custom that acknowledges both the desirability and convenience of these practices to borrowers and lenders. Arkansas usury laws have been observed repeatedly to be strict.\(^{48}\) *Fausett* exemplifies this strictness and is important to any lender that makes loans in Arkansas. Since almost all other jurisdictions have long permitted discounting,\(^{49}\) however, it is unlikely that *Fausett* will acquire a following.

J. BRUCE FARMER

---

usury."\(^{11}\) *Id.* at 5, 30 S.W.2d at 290. Refusing to extend the rule further, the court stated:

But the question which now confronts the court is whether a rule difficult to sustain in reason . . . which sanctions the advance deduction of interest at the highest conventional rate on short-term loans . . . shall be extended . . . . Common sense counsels against extension of a rule not entirely defensible on principle. *Id.* at 7, 30 S.W.2d at 291.

46. 108 II. 633 (1884).

47. *Id.* at 638.

48. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text *supra.* See also authorities cited in note 49 *infra.*